

# Виктор Суворов

Марк Солонин и другие



# НОКДАУН

# 1941

Почему Сталин  
«проспал» удар?

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**ПРАВДА**  
**Виктора Суворова**

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# **Виктор Суворов: Нокдаун 1941**

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«проспал» удар?**

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The catastrophe of 1941 was more than once tried to be explained in "boxing" terms - they say, having missed a crushing blow, the Red Army found itself in a deep KNOCKDOWN and was able to rise only at the very last moment, at the expense of "ten". But the war with Hitler is not a "noble" duel, but rather "fights without rules", where the fallen is finished off mercilessly, without waiting for the end of the countdown, and if the Red Army stood and won even after such a massacre, one wonders what it would have been capable, had Stalin not "slept through" the enemy attack, which almost became fatal for the USSR ...

Historians wrestled with the mystery of 1941 for almost half a century, until Viktor Suvorov solved this riddle, convincingly proving that the monstrous defeat of the Red Army was possible only because Hitler was lucky to catch Stalin "on the backswing" when he himself was preparing to attack Germany. And no matter how hard the Kremlin agitprop tries to refute Suvorov's discovery, no matter how much it denies the obvious, more and more experts come out in support of the Icebreaker. The new book of the project "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov" substantiates and develops the sensational revelations of the most popular and cursed historian, who turned all previous ideas about World War II upside down.

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## Talking to *Viktor Suvorov* *Dmitry Khmel'nitsky*

- Why do you think the Red Army, despite many years of preparation for the war, was under the first clash with the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941. destroyed almost instantly?

- Soviet troops were preparing for a completely different war, and this explains everything. It's like if we were preparing for an exam in calculus or physics, and we would suddenly be given an exam in the anatomy of some African zebra. There would be a complete discrepancy between what we were preparing for and what actually happened. All my books are about this.

Here is a famous example. We had the Dnieper flotilla, which blocked the river route from Smolensk to the Black Sea, and did not allow the enemy to go east. The Dnieper is a great river. A very difficult obstacle to overcome if you blow up the bridges and shoot from the other side, preventing them from crossing. Stationed there in the 1930s. Dnieper flotilla. This Dnieper flotilla was disbanded just before the war and moved to the mouth of the Danube. Well, what should she do at the mouth of the Danube? In the case of a defensive war, this is sheer stupidity.

And the second part of the Dnieper flotilla was moved to the Pripyat River and dug a canal to the city of Brest to connect it with the Bug, the Vistula and the rivers of Germany. What was it for?

**I have evidence that this is not stupidity and it is not unpreparedness. This is readiness, but for a completely different war.**

**Let's say that the Germans used our H2P bridges throughout the war.**

**- What it is?**

**— The best floating bridge in the world, it was called H2II. These floating bridges were concentrated in the area of state borders. The Germans attacked, seized the bridges that we had prepared in advance. After that, they easily crossed the Dnieper, Berezina, and so on. Further.**

**So why did the Germans advance so quickly? Because we weren't ready? No, the rapid advance of the Germans in the direction of Moscow is explained by the amazing readiness of the Red Army for war.**

**Here's another example. The Soviet Union captures Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia. If you don't want to say "captures", say "liberates", you can say whatever you want. There were practically no airfields in these territories, because no one needed them there. And the Germans were all counting on tactical aviation. They did not have strategic aviation; by and large, they did not need it.**

**They did not need to destroy the Donbass, industrial centers - Leningrad, Moscow, etc. They needed to defeat the army, and then the Donbass, and Leningrad, and Moscow would have gone to them whole, not destroyed. And to defeat an army, you don't need a strategic bomber that bombs stationary targets far in the rear. We need a tactical bomber, with one engine, which falls down from the sky and destroys a command post, an anti-tank battery, a column of tanks. It works on point moving targets. These aircraft have very small**

shoy radius of action. Therefore, in order to follow the troops, they need airfields. And if the Soviet Union had not prepared for war, the following would have happened: the Germans attacked, entered Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, there were no airfields there. They move forward, and the air bases remain far behind the lines, on German and conquered Polish territory. Conquered by the Germans. And ahead of them is a huge non-airfield strip.

But when the Germans entered Western Ukraine and Belorussia, hundreds of airstrips were discovered there, on which fuel, bombs, etc. were procured. Because the Germans went forward so quickly to Kyiv and Smolensk, because someone prepared concrete airfields for them with everything they needed. Our preparations for war worked entirely for Hitler.

There are two ways to defend a country. This easy to imagine on the model. Here, suppose not far from each other are two hostile villages. To protect yourself from a neighbor, you can build a high wall, put machine guns there, guard around the clock and make it clear to the evil neighbor that it is better he doesn't even bother, it won't be good. And you can not build anything, but on the contrary - form a team hunters themselves at a convenient moment to attack the neighbors, capture their village and thus reliably prevent the attack. So, did the Soviet Union act according to the second option?

- Yes exactly.

- So, the defeat in the summer of 1941 was the natural end of a long and thorough preparations for war. When did this preparation begin?

— It began in 1917. The October Revolution was immediately regarded as a prologue to the world revolution. The first attempt to unleash the Second World War

well, was undertaken by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918. On November 11, at 11 o'clock, the First World War ended, and already on November 13, the Soviet government ordered the Red Army to go forward, and it went - to Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, with the intention of reaching to Berlin. But at that time the Civil War was already going on, and they did not succeed.

- And how did this trip end?

- This campaign ended with the establishment of Soviet power in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Therefore, later, when it came to 1940, the Soviet Union usually said that then there was a RESTORATION of Soviet power in the Baltics. But then all sorts of whites rose up there, Yudenich and others, quickly kicked the Bolsheviks out of there, but this attempt in November 1918 to rush to Europe was.

Then there was another attempt, in 1920. "Give Warsaw, give Berlin, we crashed into the Crimea" - this is the march of the First Cavalry Army. Then Tukhachevsky went to Warsaw, but his books clearly show that Warsaw is just a station half-station, they went to Europe.

After the failure of the Polish campaign, there were two ways. All the leaders of the Bolsheviks understood very well that we could not coexist with the capitalist world, and in this they were completely right. The reason why the Soviet Union eventually collapsed was that it could not exist side by side with a normal human society. Because the West is an example of a normal human life for our entire subjugated population. Just as North Korea is incapable of coexisting with South Korea. People look over there, to South Korea, and ask: "Why do we live in any other way?" Similarly, East Germany could not coexist with West. Either one or the other will win, said Comrade Lenin.



So, there were two ways. The first path is the path of Trotsky, that is, the permanent revolution. Constantly support any forces that anyone, anywhere, raises against capitalism. A partisan war, for example, like the one that was fought in Poland in the 1920s.

Was there a Soviet underground in Poland then?

— Yes, there was a Soviet partisan war. Vaupshasov, Ryabtsevich, Orlov, the future leaders of the Soviet partisan movement in World War II, were partisan leaders in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus in 23-24-25. There are a few other names, I don't remember now. In the book "M Day", I think I wrote about our partisan leaders.

The second path is the path of Stalin: socialism in one country. This socialism is interpreted in a completely wrong way in our country. Anyone who says that Stalin wanted to build socialism in one country has not read Stalin. Stalin wrote that it was possible to achieve the complete victory of socialism in one country. However, he continued, the final victory of socialism can only be achieved on a world scale. And he was right about that too. What is socialism? Liquidation of private property. They did it. The congress of victors in 1934 decided that socialism had been built in the Soviet Union. Collectivization was carried out, everyone was driven into collective farms, everything came under state control. But, as Comrade said. Stalin, final victory is a guarantee against the restoration of capitalism. Because the socialist revolution did not win on a world scale, we did not achieve final victory. Everything collapsed.

So, the path of Stalin is socialism in one country, which is being built as the basis of the future freedom  
the birth of humanity.

Just yesterday I received an amazing poster "Combat Pencil No. 1", which says: "Fascism is the enemy of mankind. No to fascism! The snake is drawn

our Red Army soldier sticks a bayonet in his throat, and there are four small pictures around: "Fascism is the destruction of culture" - some barbarian burns books on fire. "Fascism is hunger" - an unhappy mother with a dying child. "Fascism is a prison" - a prison is drawn. Fascism is war. Drawn warmonger. There is a stamp: "Museum of V.I. Lenin. Leningrad branch. Inventory number. There is no date, but "No. 1" says a lot. That this is the very first poster in the series. The fact that he was prepared before the war is completely obvious to me - in this poster there is nothing about the defense of our Fatherland. There is nothing to say that fascism is the enemy of the Soviet Union, or the Russian people, or the Soviet peoples. Fascism is the enemy of mankind. And we are liberating humanity—not defending ourselves, but liberating humanity from fascism.

- It is interesting when the word "fascism" began to be applied in relation to the National Socialist Germany? It seems to me that this is an invention of Stalin.

— I do not know when it began to be used, but the term I met this one in Stalin's speeches in 1927.

"It was clear Comintern propaganda."

- Yes. The Nazis never called themselves fascists. I did not find such a term in Mein Kampf. The Italians called themselves fascists. Fashina is a Roman name, it means a bunch of rods, that is, if translated into a language we understand, this is the union of edicts and nominees.

- In Soviet propaganda, the word "fascism" was applied to anything, to everyone who was considered in this or that another moment the enemy of the USSR.

- That's it. Therefore, in 1927, the Social Democrats began to be called social fascists. Like don't believe

**this name, they are not social democrats, but social fascists. It was a fictitious, meaningless label that was hung anywhere.**

**- The funny thing is that this Stalinist label still used all over the world. Even in Germany they talk about "fascist Germany" and not about "Nazi". Hence the Soviet Union, which fought with the Nazis, and in general with everyone he wanted, still listed as "anti-fascists". Although if believe that "fascism" is a colloquial synonym totalitarianism (which is right), it could not The USSR to be in the "ranks of anti-fascists." By definition, he couldn't. Antifascism is a struggle for democracy, not the other way around.**

**- Yes, this is a purely Stalinist sticker that stuck anywhere. Here is an example. I open a dictionary of foreign words, ed. Lekhina and prof. Petrova, Moscow, 1949, p. 323: "Conservative. The first meaning is Latin, the second: a member of the reactionary political party of the bourgeoisie, pursuing an imperialist policy of expansion, the forcible suppression of the workers' and revolutionary movement, the elimination of democratic freedoms. At present, the conservative parties are openly going over to the side of fascism. So our Margarita, who is Mrs. Thatcher, here**

**where, it turns out, drove.**

**"It was an ingenious invention. Soviet propaganda preparations for a future war declared a "war against fascism", which meant all enemies, any, regardless of their political differences. Who could be in the "fascists"**

**whatever. So, the first attempts to unleash a war on a world scale began in 1918, then - the Polish**

the war of 1920, then Stalin deposed and expelled Trotsky, and about a year in the 28th, a serious one began, long-term preparation for war. So?

- In economic terms, it began in 1927. This is the first five-year plan. That's what she thought about. Although these same "German fascists" were not yet in power. Future "fascists" at that time were undergoing military training in Kazan and other Soviet cities.

- Was not such a time period - five years - specially chosen in order to just  
Is this the time to prepare the country for war?

- We can assume that it is. I don't have a clear opinion on this. In my opinion, Stalin had two plans: a maximum and a minimum. To all appearances, he counted on one or two five-year  
because looking further ahead is never possible. When we try to do this, the proportion is always violated: events seem to us either very distant or close, but it is purely psychologically impossible to catch a certain moment. Therefore, perhaps, the first five-year plan was organized by Stalin in such a way that in five years they would begin to break from the gray-haired. Break Poland, break Europe. But Stalin could have doubts. In this case, the first five years was the first powerful reserve for him. The time of construction of the production base. And the second five-year plan is the further development of this production base and the mass production of weapons.

In fact, no one could have guessed what would happen. It was impossible to predict the situation in Germany if Hitler came to power (1932-1933). Quite likely, for example, was a civil war. She wasn't excluded, was she? In this case, the USSR breaks through Poland and provides direct assistance to Germany. So long term forecasts can always be wrong, they just can't be made.

**- When could the next one after 1920 take place?  
Soviet attempt to really provoke a European war?**

**- The World War came close in 36-37. And that's why. In 1936, the Spanish Civil War breaks out. Then the Soviet Union begins to put pressure on France and Great Britain: "Children are dying there, Picasso is painting there, they destroyed the village, the damned fascists ..." The international brigades rush to Spain, and Stalin drives military advisers there. To understand the seriousness of Stalin's intentions, you just need to look at who he sent there. Here is a list of these advisors. Then they were lieutenants, captains, colonels, but these were the most promising commanders of the Red Army, whom Stalin outlined for promotion. Spain was their last test. Most after returning from Spain rapidly went up. Here are the peaks**

**achieved by some of the military advisers  
after few years:**

**Malinovsky, Marshal of the USSR, Minister of Defense of the USSR.**

**Meretskov, Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the USSR.**

**Kulik, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense,  
Marshal of the Soviet Union.**

**Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,  
Minister of the Navy, throughout the war a member of  
the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. In Spain,  
he was a naval officer, smashed convoys that went  
through Mallorca, Minorca.**

**Voronov, Chief Marshal of Artillery, Commander of  
the Artillery of the Armed Forces of the USSR.**

**Nedelin, Chief Marshal of Artillery, Deputy Minister  
of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile  
Forces.**

**Ogoltsov, Marshal of Aviation, Commander of Long-Range Aviation,  
First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.**

**Kazakov, Marshal of Artillery, Commander  
artillery troops of the ground forces.**

**Rychagov, lieutenant general of aviation, chief  
Headquarters of the Air Force.**

**Mansurov, Colonel General, First Deputy Head of the  
GRU.**

**Eternal, lieutenant general, military adjutant Sta  
line.**

**Proskurov, lieutenant general of aviation, head of the  
GRU.**

**Datov, Pavlov, Kolpakchi, Lyashchenko - army generals.**

**Rodimtsev, Romanenko, Stern, Shumilov, Yushke  
vich - colonel-general ...**

**In total, more than four dozen generals, admirals ... Do  
you feel what a bouquet? So I collected them and both  
cases. After returning from Spain, all the military went up  
sharply. In addition, there were scouts. And the most  
important person there was Antonov-Ovseenko. Officially,  
he held the position of consul general in Barcelona, but  
this was a front. This is the Antonov-Ovseenko who took  
the Winter Palace, then crushed the peasants in the  
Tambov province, Tukhachevsky was with him then on  
military business. This consul took all the Spanish gold  
reserves across the Mediterranean, but on his return he  
was shot. The chief military adviser was Berzin, head of  
the Fourth Directorate (later the GRU). He, too, was shot.  
I explain it this way: the military did their job and everyone  
went up. But the scouts, politicians, the same Antonov-  
Ovseenko - they did not fulfill their task. And the task was  
to unleash the Second World War.**

**Stalin protected the Spanish children. And we only have  
that collectivization had passed, how many millions had  
died ... If he had dragged Spain, England and France into  
the war and it would have spread further to**

Italy and Germany, then all European countries would be involved. And there, in addition, there were international brigades - both Americans, and Swedes, and others. It could turn out that the United States, and some Canada, and Mexico, and others would also be drawn into the war.

28        March 1939 Madrid fell, the last bastion of the Republic. The war in Spain was, as it were, a kind of prologue to the Second World War. There were 42,000 people from the Internationalation of Volunteer Sheets, from 54 countries of the world. Someone organized propaganda - come on, guys, fly to Spain. For some reason, when the Soviet Union fought in Finland, no one assembled international brigades. But here's what's interesting. I was involved in these international brigades. So, when they got to Spain, they took away their documents. And then a shell always hit the building where these documents were stored, or the truck that transported them burned down. In this way, Soviet intelligence received real passports for tens of thousands of young men. American, Dutch, Belgian...

This is number one. And here is the second moment. When a person came there and his passport was taken away, he turned into a slave. He has no money, to the north - the sea, to the west - the sea, to the east - the Pyrenees mountains, he could not escape. Escape from the International Brigade was punishable by death. The system was thought out very clearly. I believe that it was organized by the Soviet Union, although I have no proof. But the fact that they were exploited to the fullest is for sure.

One internationalist in Barcelona has matured after all. He saw people being tortured and everything. He returned from there full of sight and then wrote a book. Orwell, "1984"...

Of course, all this was done with Soviet money. Someone paid people who went there ... It was

torture to unleash the Second World War away from Soviet territories. Why Stalin spared neither tanks nor advisers. But the world war did not work out. Immediately after the end of the Spanish Civil War, in March 1939, Stalin changed his foreign policy. Already in May, he removed Litvinov, who, as a Jew, could not act as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and transferred the arrows to Poland, to Germany.

- There is a very interesting book "Russian Volunteers in Spain", published in San Francisco in 1983 Author - A.P. Yaremchuk 2nd. He spoke about the white guards who fought on the side of Franco and remained victorious. There were only three of them twenty.

- I have this book. An article was once published in Krasnaya Zvezda that the accursed White Guards, having been defeated in their own country, stood under the banner of the fascists and fought against their own people, against the Soviet volunteers on the side of the fascists. However, General Franco did not have collective farms, and if the Spaniard did not like something, he could spit, take it and leave for some Argentina. And the Soviet peasant at that time was already sitting on the collective farm. I believe that by fighting in Spain, the Russian volunteers thereby saved the honor of their country.

Spain - it was the most real opportunity to start the Second World War. In 1936, there were no tanks at all in Germany, just something was starting to be built. And in Italy there was nothing special yet. At that time, the Soviet advantage would have been even steeper. And if the Second World War broke out in Spain and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain were involved ...



- Yes, then no one would care about Poland at all thrashed.

- It would look like this: we are going to liberate Europe, and here is some kind of mongrel under our feet. She would have been immoral. We go kids spa sit down, but she won't let us in.

- There is an opinion that Stalin in another once preparing for the jump in the summer of 1940, counting on the fact that Germany would become deeply bogged down in France

Yes, that would be the ideal situation. None expected the fall of France, even Hitler did not expect that everything would happen so quickly.

- In your opinion, is it possible, based on the situation 1941, to consider the German attack on the USSR as a preventive one?

- I believe that neither the one nor the other side of the fall could not be fully preventive. When they say that Stalin wanted to warn the Ger a Mans attack with his own, then this is nonsense, because he did not believe in a German attack at all. And on the German side, it was more or less preventive, but from a slightly different point of view. Hitler did not see an immediate threat, because Stalin had perfectly disguised his actions, and German intelligence was too weak and did not really see through the Soviet military preparations. However, from a strategic point of view, Hitler clearly understood that if he landed in Britain, Comrade Stalin would beat him up.

Let's put the question in a different way. 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. What Stalin planned break it, no doubt about it. Was Naru going to

**sew it Hitler? Or was he making a pact in earnest, with intention to comply? If he did not intend to, then he was preparing a war on two fronts in advance.**

**“There is ample evidence that he made the pact in earnest. And he was not so stupid as to prepare a war on two fronts.**

**But he was stupid enough to set up twist to Stalin.**

**- In my opinion, Hitler's main idea at that time was to consolidate Germany. He did not foresee or plan the Second World War. In my opinion, he just flew with the UK and France. His task was to unite all areas inhabited by Germans. At that time, Hitler had to break out of the Treaty of Versailles, he had to return the German lands, he had to return Danzig, of course, East Prussia was not enough for him, he wanted Germany not to be torn into halves. At first he wanted to consolidate Germany, build good houses, improve the birth rate, raise living standards, and then...**

**- That is, in 1939 he decided purely tactical tasks without understanding what is involved.**

**— Yes, I think so.**

**- So, when concluding the pact, he really wanted to divide spheres of influence, and that's all? No war for living space in the East was not supposed?**

**— Yes, only the division of spheres of influence. And East Prussia unites with Germany...**

**- If Hitler was not going to deceive Stalin, then the strategic attack on the USSR was ventilated.**

**- From the point of view of big politics - yes. Hitler realized in 1940 that Stalin would not stop at**

chickpeas. When Stalin entered Romania, Hitler trembled. And then Molotov came to Berlin, talked to Hitler, and he finally understood everything. Yes, from this point of view the war is preventive. Hitler thought that if now, when I am at war with Britain and France on the Continent, they break my arms, then what will happen later when I rush to Britain. And Britain on

peace is not advancing, and it is impossible to subdue it, given its number of colonies.

And Hitler could not have had a direct interest in Soviet territory at that time. He already had Dutch colonies, and Denmark, and Slovenia, and Czechoslovakia, and part of Poland, so there was enough living space  
talo.

*Mark Solonin*

## **A SIMPLE REASON FOR THE GREAT CATASTROPHE**

In the summer of 1941, something bad happened to the Red Army. At various times in our history countries, this "something" received various names: from "temporary failures" to "catastrophic defeat". Accordingly, the search for the causes and explanations of what happened acquired a different severity. It is one thing to look for the causes of "temporary failures." Simple common sense and the personal experience of every adult person immediately suggests the obvious answer: "Eka is unseen, with whom it does not happen." It is quite another thing to try to explain the catastrophic defeat of the largest land army in the world. Therefore, before the to determine the causes of the phenomenon, we will try to determine as accurately as possible the scale and actual content I eat what happened.

### **1. RELATION OF FORCES**

By the start of World War II, the Soviet Union was armed and - in the opinion of many - very dangerous. It is impossible to name exact figures characterizing the strength and armament of the Red Army (as well as the army of any other powerful state of that time). The reason for this is very simple - on the eve of the great war, the USSR, Germany, Poland, France, Italy liya, etc. continuously increased their military power. More and more new parts and connections were formed

I, the tank and aircraft fleet was rapidly updated, staffing tables and the structure of formations were changing, the principles and schemes for transferring military missions from a state of peace to a state of war. In such a situation, it is impossible to indicate exact figures up to the last comma, but - as will become clear from what follows - this does not create big problems for researcher, since with the numerical superiority possessed by the Red Army, small "measurement errors" do not have a fundamental values.

Hitler's Germany began preparations for war with a big (relative to the Soviet Union) delay. At that time (the first half of the 1930s), when, in the midst of the most severe world economic crisis, the big bourgeoisie of the industrialized countries of the world (USA, England, France, Germany) rushed to sell Stalin military equipment, technology, machine tools and entire factories were fully equipped, Hitler was just "clearing" the political space of his power in Germany, and the newborn Wehrmacht was conducting field exercises with cardboard mock-ups of tanks. The reckless and suicidal policy of the West allowed Stalin to turn gigantic financial resources (both forcibly taken from the former owners and newly created by the labor of many millions of collective farm and Gulag slaves) into mountains of weapons and military equipment. Already in 1937, the Soviet Air Force was armed with 8139 combat aircraft - about the same number will be in service with Germany (4093), England (1992) and the USA (2473) two years later, combined. By October 1, 1939, the aircraft fleet of the Soviet Air Force had grown one and a half times (up to 12,677 aircraft) and now already exceeded the total number of aircraft of all participants in the outbreak of the world war. By the number of tanks (14,544 - and that's not counting the obsolete T-27 and light amphibious T-37/38) Red

**The army at the beginning of 1939 was exactly twice as large as the armies of Germany (3419), France (3286) and England (547), taken together.**

**Universal conscription in Germany was introduced only on March 16, 1935. By the summer of 1939, the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 motorized), and the Red Army had 100 rifle divisions (counting the existing 5 rifle brigades for two "settlement divisions"), 18 cavalry divisions and 36 tank brigades. In the future, both powers rapidly increased the number of their armed forces, and the gap between them was continuously decreasing (Germany was "catching up" with its future adversary). On the other hand, by the summer of 1941 the geopolitical situation had changed radically: Wehrmacht divisions were scattered over vast expanses from Northern Norway to North Africa, from Brest on the Atlantic coast of France to Brest-Litovsk on the Western Bug River. As a result, of the approximately 200 divisions (of all types) that Hitler's Germany had in the early summer of 1941, on the western border of the Soviet Union as part of three army groups ("North", "Center", "South") to**

**On June 22, 91 infantry divisions, 17 armored and 9 motorized divisions were concentrated (in the total number of "91 infantry divisions" we included 4 light infantry, 1 cavalry, 4 mountain divisions and 5 SS combat divisions). In total - 117 divisions.**

**Subsequently, over several weeks and months, the composition of this grouping gradually increased due to the introduction of reserves into battle: 2 tank divisions (which appeared on the Eastern Front only at the beginning of the battle for Moscow), one motorized, 24 infantry divisions. In addition, from June 29, fighting began in the Arctic (in the direction of Murmansk and Kandalaksha), in which 4 more German divisions took part (more precisely, three divisions and the "SS Nord Group", according to**

size corresponding to the rifle brigade). Total - 148 German divisions. On July 10, 1941, the offensive of the Finnish army began in Karelia, and thus the total composition of the enemy grouping increased by 1 German and 16 Finnish infantry divisions - significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in armament and equipment, but not inferior in fighting spirit. The notorious "190 enemy divisions", invariably present (and supposedly from the first day of the war!) in all the writings of Soviet historians, were obtained by adding the combat units of the Wehrmacht and the SS, 9 German security divisions, reserve divisions of the High Command and troops into one heap allies of Nazi Germany, including Italians, Hungarians and Slovaks, who in the summer of 1941 did not exist on Soviet territory at all.

By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had armed forces consisting of 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 61 tank, and 31 motorized divisions. In total - 303 divisions. In addition, the Red Army included such formations that had no direct analogues in the Wehrmacht invasion forces, such as 16 airborne brigades and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades (PTABR). According to the accepted tradition, we did not include in the general list of units and formations of the NKVD troops, the number of which (154 thousand people) corresponded to 10 "calculated divisions". understands

However, not all of this colossal land army was on the western frontier. How many divisions were there in the West? Unfortunately, it is impossible to give an exact answer to this simple question. The Red Army was on the move. In May 1941, the largest redeployment of troops in the history of the USSR, Russia and the world began, and in June it continued and significantly increased in scale. Without being distracted for a second by d about the reasons that prompted Stalin to start this grandiose operation to transfer troops, we will try to

it would be tentative to estimate the composition of the grouping of the Soviet army in the field.

The last of the known pre-war documents - the certificate "On the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war in the West", signed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. Vatutin on June 13, 1941 - provided for the following distribution of forces: 186 divisions in the active fronts, 51 divisions in consisting of five (16th, 19th, 22nd, 24th, 28th) armies of the GC reserve deployed in the strip from the western border to the Bryansk-Rzhev line. Total - 237 divisions for the "war in the West." In addition, the existing 66 divisions were distributed among the internal districts, in particular 31 divisions (a tenth of the entire Armed Forces of the USSR) in the Far East. Further, Vatutin writes: *"With such a distribution of forces, it is necessary to additionally plan transportation by rail ... a total of 33 divisions ... It will take about 13 days to transport ... combat units can be transported in 10 days."*

We recall once again that the cited document was drawn up on 13 June. Even if the terms mentioned by Vatutin are doubled, it turns out that the complete concentration of the Red Army grouping could have ended by July 10th. In other words, Hitler is strongly

lucky.

Postponing the invasion by only two weeks could have resulted in 117 German divisions launching an offensive against twice the enemy force. But even in real history, the numerical superiority was on the Soviet side.

On June 22, as part of the troops of four border districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa) there were 149 divisions (not counting the PTABR, 7 cavalry divisions and 12 airborne brigades were counted as 7 "calculated divisions"). In addition, by June 22, at least 16 divisions of the second strategic



echelon. Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, the Red Army had 165 divisions in the Western theater of operations, including 40 tank and 20 motorized. Comparing these figures with the enemy grouping (117 divisions, including 17 tank and 9 motorized divisions), one can immediately note not only the overall numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, but also a significantly larger proportion of tank and motorized formations in their number. However, in terms of the number of rifle (infantry) divisions, the Red Army had some superiority over the enemy (105 against 91). Contrary to the lie about "6 thousand people in a division" repeated a thousand times by a huge army of Soviet historians, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts (with a staff strength of 14,483 people) at the beginning of the war was as follows: 21 divisions of 14 thousand people each, 72 divisions of 12 thousand people and 6 divisions of 11 thousand each

Human.

Subsequently, the size of the grouping of Soviet troops began to grow - and on a much larger scale and at a faster rate than the grouping of the Wehrmacht and its allies. At the end of June, units and formations of the Leningrad Military District entered the battle: 15 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions. By July 10-15, the redeployment of troops of the second strategic echelon (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies) to the theater was basically completed. In the middle of July, the active army already had about 235 divisions. By the end of July 1941, the 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 43rd, and 49th armies were formed. In total, during the two-month battle of Smolensk, 104 divisions and 33 brigades were put into battle. In total, until December 1, 1941, the Stavka sent 150 divisions and 44 rifle brigade to the western strategic direction.

reptiles, to the Leningrad and Kiev directions - another 140 divisions and 50 rifle brigades. But in addition to rifle (infantry) formations,

**also cavalry, tank, artillery brie**

**bastards and divisions ...**

**The reason why the Red Army increased its numbers in volumes completely inaccessible to the enemy is extremely simple. The number of divisions that the Wehrmacht was able to concentrate at the borders of the Soviet Union represented the maximum reached by Germany of 80 million two years after the start of general mobilization. There was almost nothing to add to this "maximum". On the other hand, the 235 divisions that the Red Army had concentrated on the front by mid-July 1941 represented the minimum that the 200 million Soviet Union could form in the framework of covert, secret mobilization BEFORE the announcement of open general mobilization. On June 23, 1941, open mobilization began, and by July 1, 5.3 million people were drafted into the Armed Forces (which meant a doubling of the total number of military personnel compared to June 22). But mobilization, of course, did not end on July 1. She was just getting started. As a result, by the end of 1941, a total of 14 million people were mobilized. Disposed**

**With such a huge human resource, the command of the Red Army could both make up for the losses of the personnel of the units of the army in the field, and form more and more new formations. On the whole, in the second half of 1941, the total available "resource" of personnel (the initial strength of the active army plus reinforcements and new formations sent to the front) of the parties correlated as 2.7 to 1. Due to the fact that open mobilization in the USSR was announced not before, but after the outbreak of hostilities, in the first days and weeks of the war, the numerical superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in terms of personnel and the total number of divisions was relatively small (approximately 1.3 to 1). Superiority**

in the most modern and effective (for that time) branches of the armed forces - tanks and aviation - it was overwhelming from the first days of the war.

As part of the troops of the German Army Group "North" there were 3 tank divisions, which were armed with 602 tanks. The troops of the Soviet North-Western Front opposing it in the period from June 22 to July 6 brought into battle four mechanized corps (12, 3, 21 and 1 without one tank division, which fought at that time in the Arctic), which were armed with 2188 tanks. The ratio of the number of 3.6 to 1. In brackets, we note that prepared by the military historical service of the General Staff of the Russian Army under the general editorship of Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev's statistical collection "The Classification Removed" on page 368 reports that during the "Baltic defensive operation" in the period from June 22 to July 9, S-3 troops, f. lost 2523 tanks. So, the number of tanks indicated by us (hereinafter) in the mechanized corps of the Red Army is underestimated (probably due to an underestimation of the process of receiving new tanks, which process did not end on June 22, 1941). For the most meticulous readers, we note that the German tankers also received new tanks during the fighting. In particular, in the period up to September 10, 1941, three tank divisions of Army Group North received the following reinforcements: 1st TD - zero, 6th TD - 2 (two) Czech tanks Pz-35(t), 8th TD - zero. In total, by September 10, the Eastern Front received 10 (ten) Pz-IVs, 35 (thirty-five) Pz-III's and 44 (forty-four) Czech Pz-35 / 38 (t). This is how "the whole of Europe worked for Hitler" ...

The most powerful German army group "Center" included 9 tank divisions, 1936 tanks. In the period from June 22 to July 6, the Western Front opposing it brought into battle six mechanized corps (11, 6, 13, 14, 7 and 5 without the 109th Motor Rifle Division) and a separate

which had 4365 tanks. The ratio is 2.25 to 1. True, on page 368 of the collection "Secrecy Removed" it is reported that the loss of tanks of the Western Front from June 22 to July 9 amounted to 4799 vehicles.

Army Group South included 5 tank divisions and 728 tanks. The troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts opposing it had ten mechanized corps (22nd, 15th, 4th, 8th, 16th, 9th, 19th, 24th, 2nd, 18th). In the Yu-3 lane. f. the 109th medical unit from the 5th mechanized corps transferred to the Western Front also fought. This huge armored horde numbered 5826 tanks. The ratio is 8 to 1.

In general, 17 German tank divisions were armed with 3266 tanks (and if - which would be completely logical - subtract from the total number of 146 unarmed "commander tanks" and 152 combat training tankettes Pz-I with machine gun armament, then the Germans did not recruited and three thousand tanks). Already in the first 2 weeks of the war, this "steel avalanche" was opposed by 20 Soviet mechanized corps, which had 12,379 tanks before the start of hostilities. The ratio of the number of tanks is 3.8 to 1. To be completely clear, we will clarify that 11 divisions and 7 batteries of self-propelled "assault guns" were not included in the calculation, which adds another 246 vehicles to the German armored weapons (including armored ammunition transporters). On the other hand, we did not take into account the two mechanized corps being formed in the Western OVO, the 17th MK and the 20th MK, which were armed with 63 and 94 tanks, respectively, did not take into account the tank regiments of the amphibious tanks as part of reconnaissance divisions of rifle divisions and corps. The total composition of the tank fleet of the Red Army on June 1, 1941 (not counting 2.4 thousand obsolete tankettes T-27, not counting 3.6 thousand light amphibious T-37/T-38/T-40) was expressed unthinkable for any other army in the world

figure 19,540 tanks. In addition, there were 3258 cannon armored vehicles in service, in terms of their armament (a 45-mm cannon in a tank turret) surpassing two-thirds of what the Wehrmacht called the big word "tank" ...

The degree of mechanization of Soviet artillery was also completely unique. According to the staffing table of an ordinary (not motorized rifle!) Rifle division of the Red Army, a howitzer artillery regiment was supposed to have two tractors for one howitzer, 90 trucks and 3 cars. In a separate anti-tank battalion of a rifle division, 18 "forty-five" had 24 vehicles and 21 tractors. Moreover, it was supposed to use the armored caterpillar Komsomolets as a tractor - created on the basis of the components and assemblies of the T-38 light tank, armed with a machine gun in a ball mount and generally corresponding in terms of combat capabilities to the German tankette Pz-I.

This is the staffing table of April 1941. By the beginning of the war, they did not have time to bring the staffing of rifle divisions to such heights (two tractors per howitzer) (which all Soviet historians tirelessly referred to). What has been done in reality? Already in February 1941, the Red Army had 34 thousand tractors (caterpillar tractors), 214 thousand vehicles of all types and 11.5 thousand motorcycles. By the beginning of the war, the number of tractors (caterpillar tractors) had grown to 44,900 units. Including 7780 armored "Komsomol". Now let's compare the number of mechanized traction devices with the number of artillery systems. By June 22, the entire Red Army had 14.9 thousand anti-tank guns and 17.9 thousand howitzers and guns with a caliber of more than 76 mm. As you can see, by June 22, the number of tractors exceeded the number of guns.

But on June 22, 1941, the equipping of the Red Army with military equipment was by no means completed. This obvio

The (seemingly) fact was vehemently ignored in Soviet historiography. Nevertheless, during the beginning On June 23, the Armed Forces received another 31,500 tractors and 234,000 vehicles from open mobilization. As a result, the staffing of troops with tractors (tractors) was brought up to 80% of the regular requirement, i.e. from those very two tractors to one howitzer.

Contrary to popular belief, the Red Army also had a walkie-talkie. And far from alone. At the beginning of January 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR included:

- 40 front-line radio stations (i.e. 8 for each of the five future fronts);
- army 845 pieces (fifty for one general shackle army);
- regimental (5AK) 5909 pieces (about 4 pieces per regiment).

The Soviet Air Force was also the largest in the world. In terms of the number of aviation squadrons, flight crews and combat-ready aircraft, Soviet aviation also had a significant (and overwhelming) superiority over the Luftwaffe on the southern and northern flanks of the huge front. The above-mentioned Vatutin report dated June 13, 1941 reports the presence of *"a total of 218 combat capable (excluding new, emerging. - M.S.) air regiments"*. True, already in the next paragraph, where the distribution of these forces along the fronts is indicated (it is this term, "front", that is used in the text of June 13), the summation leads to the number of 225 air regiments, i.e. 1125 squadrons. Slightly more than half of these forces were deployed in the Western theater of operations (in relation to the events of the first weeks of the Soviet-German war, the theater of operations should be understood as the sky over Karelia and Murmansk, the Baltic States, Belarus, Right-Bank Ukraine, Moldova and Crimea). The smallest of the numbers at our disposal allow us to determine the size of the g

**Soviet Air Forces (including aviation of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets) into 136 air regiments (680 squadrons), 7200 flight crews (including about 3.6 thousand fighter pilots). The enemy (1st, 2nd, 4th and some parts of the 5th Luftwaffe air fleets) included 63 groups (air regiment), i.e. 189 squadrons, 2110 flight crews (including 910 fighter pilots). The ratio in the number of squadrons is 3.6 to 1. In terms of the number of crews - 3.4 to 1. In terms of the number of fighter pilots - 4 to 1. And behind the back of the Soviet aviation group deployed in the Western theater of operations, there was practically equal in number (about 120 air regiments) reserve in the internal districts, in the Caucasus and the Far East.**

**The most unfavorable balance of forces for the Soviet Air Force was in the offensive zone of Army Group Center. The most powerful grouping of the Luftwaffe (2nd Air Fleet) and the weakest grouping of Soviet aviation (Air Force of the Western Front and the 3rd Long Range Bomber Corps) are concentrated here. But even in this direction, numerical superiority was on the side of Soviet aviation (in terms of the number of squadrons - 1.6 to 1, in terms of the number of crews -**

**1.4 to 1, in terms of the number of fighter pilots - 1.5 to 1).**

**On the northern and southern flanks (the Baltic states, Ukraine), the numerical superiority of Soviet aviation over German aviation was enormous. In the offensive zone of the Army Group "South" (4th VF Luftwaffe), the Soviet Air Force outnumbered the enemy in fighters by 5.4 times, in bomber crews - by 4.4 times. In the offensive zone of Army Group North (1st and part of the forces of the 5th VF Luftwaffe), the ratio of fighter pilots is 7.2 to 1, bomber crews - 4.3 to 1. The frail forces of German aviation were so small - both in comparison with the size of the Red Army Air Force, and in comparison with the forecasts of Soviet intelligence - which in the report**

Headquarters of the North-Western Front No. 3, signed at 12 noon on June 22, 1941, the following was stated verbatim: *"The enemy has not yet put into action significant forces of the Air Force, limited to the action individual groups and single aircraft."*

We did not begin to give figures characterizing the number of combat aircraft of the parties, for two reasons. Firstly, because an aircraft in military aviation is a consumable item. Moreover, it is very quickly expendable: the average "lifetime" of an aircraft in a war is estimated at two to three dozen sorties. After that, he is either shot down by the enemy, or he himself breaks down in an accident, or he is simply taken out of service to replace engines, the real resource of which in combat conditions did not exceed 50-100 hours. Secondly, there were much more serviceable aircraft in the Air Force of the western districts than pilots (Soviet aviation was rapidly renewing its aircraft fleet, and in many air regiments, especially fighter regiments, two sets of aircraft accumulated). Therefore, an estimate of the ratio of forces in terms of the number of aircraft (instead of an estimate in terms of the number of crews and squadrons) would lead us to absolutely astronomical figures.

A few words should also be said about the aviation of Germany's allies. Two Finnish fighter and one bomber regiment, armed with about 180 combat aircraft, took part in the fighting in the skies of Karelia. The Romanian Air Force had 8 squadrons of fighters and 11 squadrons of bombers, which were armed with about 200 aircraft by the beginning of the war. Of course, the Finnish and Romanian Air Forces could not have any significant effect on the balance of forces of the parties and the course of hostilities, especially since they had to operate precisely in those sectors of the common front where the numerical superiority of Soviet aviation was enormous. However, they should not be completely discounted.



First of all, this applies to the Finnish Air Force, the pilots of which accumulated during the three months of fierce air battles of the "winter war" of 1939-1940. significant combat experience. In general, it can be assumed that the Allied aviation increased the combat potential of the Luftwaffe by 10%.

Let us now descend from heaven to earth and look at this earth (more precisely, at the geographical map of the western regions of the Soviet Union) with a close look. The war unfolds, as everyone knows, not on a smooth chessboard, but on real terrain, with its ravines, potholes, lakes, mountains and swamps. And if there are no "offensive" or "defensive" tanks and aircraft, and there were none, then the terrain, on the contrary, can help either the defending or the attacking side. This was not invented by us, and the terms "tank-inaccessible terrain", "tank-dangerous direction" have long and firmly taken their place in military literature. This is all the more true and significant for the armies of the 40s, in which motorized rifle battalions of tank divisions moved not on tracked armored personnel carriers, but on ordinary, "civilian" trucks and captured buses; and the German tanks, on their narrow tracks, got stuck after the first rain on the terrain that in Russia is called "road".

Turning to the map, we will see that the German Army Group North, immediately after crossing the border, "stumbled" into the full-flowing Neman River, and in its lower (i.e., widest) course. Further, having crossed many small rivers and streams, the German divisions, about 250 km from the border, came to the banks of the wide navigable river Zapadnaya Dvina (Dau Gava), again in its lower reaches. Another 200-250 km later, on the way to Leningrad, the German

The ska were supposed to cross the Velikaya River, to the north of which the road to Leningrad was tightly blocked by the system of Lakes Peipus and Pskov. And this is the best of the options provided by nature. The troops of Army Groups "Center" and "South" were waiting for much more serious obstacles.

The terrain in the offensive zone of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups (Southern Lithuania and Western Belarus) is completely "anti-tank". From the north, the Bialystok ledge is covered by a strip of impassable swamps in the floodplain of the forest river Biebrzha; in the south, the border was drawn along the banks of the navigable river Western Bug (again, in its lower reaches). After forcing the Bug, the Germans were waiting for the swampy banks of the Narev River and a continuous series of forest rivers, tributaries of the Pripyat (Yaselda, Shchara, Tsna, Sluch, Ptich). The few roads among the dense forests and swamps of Western Belarus are a kind of mountain gorges: for a stuck (or knocked out) head car, the columns cannot be bypassed or bypassed. East of Minsk, the attack zone of Army Group Center from north to south is crossed by two full-flowing rivers, with which Napoleon had the misfortune to get acquainted in his time: the Berezina and the

Army Group "South" could launch an invasion practically only through a narrow (100-120 km) "corridor" between the cities of Kovel and Brody. From the north, this corridor is bounded by the absolutely impassable strip of swamps of Polesie, from the south by the Carpathian M strip and advancing all the German tank and motorized divisions. On this way they had to cross the Western Bug, and then the southern tributaries of the Pripyat (Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, Sluch) following one after another at almost equal intervals of 50-60 km. South of the Carpathians, in Moldavia and in the steppes of southern Ukraine, the terrain, it would seem, is much more favorable for the advancing troops - there is not a single

forests, no swamps. But there are three navigable rivers - the Prut, the Dniester, the Southern Bug - in their lower reaches. Finally, the mighty Dnieper inevitably arose on the path of the German and Rumanian troops, the forcing of which in its lower reaches is an opera. a campaign that is already quite comparable in complexity and riskiness with the landing of amphibious assault forces. In fact, only to the east of the Dnieper did the German motorized formations of Army Groups Center and South enter the terrain, allowing for a wide and difficult to predict operational maneuver. Yes, only from the border to the Dnieper more than 450 km. This roughly corresponds to the size of the whole of Germany from its western to eastern borders.

The obstacles created by nature itself were supplemented and intensified many times over by man-made obstacles. Along the western border of the Soviet Union, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a continuous strip of fortified areas of the "Molotov Line" stretched: Telshiaisky, Shaulyaisky, Kaunassky, Alytussky, Grodno, Osovetsky, Zambrovsky, Brestsky, Kovelsky, Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russian, Strumilovsky, Przemysslsky, Upper Prut and Lower Prut. By June 22, 1941, from 332 to 505 bunkers were built in the Western OVO, and about 375 in the Kiev OVO. Twice as many bunkers were still under construction. For example, 128 bunkers were built in the Brest UR and 380 more were to be handed over by the builders by July 1, 1941. 95 bunkers were built in the Rava-Russian UR and 306 more were under construction. Wednesday

In the main operational areas of the Molotov Line, there were three concrete bunkers dug into the ground at every kilometer, the walls of which could withstand a direct hit by a heavy field howitzer projectile, and one of them was fully built and equipped.

At a depth of 200-300 km from the border there were fortified areas of the "Stalin line": Kingiseppsky, Pskovsky, Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Polotsky, Minsky, Slutsky, Mozyrsky, Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Starokonstantinovskiy, Ostropolsky, Letichevsky, Kamenetz-Podolsky, Mogilev-Yampolsky, Rybnitsky, Polish Tiras. The number of bunkers in one UR was different and ranged from 206 to 455. Density - from 2 to 3 bunkers per 1 km of the front. In terms of the number and composition of weapons, the quality of reinforced concrete, and the equipment with special equipment (filtering and ventilation installations, wire and radio communications, electrical equipment, optical devices), any of these bunkers was at least as good as the defensive structures of the notorious "Mannerheim Line". Contrary to the legend that has been circulating for many decades, no one blew up the pillboxes of the "Stalin line" before the war and did not cover them with earth. On the contrary, on May 25, 1941, another government decree was issued on measures to reconstruct the fortified areas on the "old" border. Some pillboxes of the "Stalin line" are still intact to this day. No one planned to transport weapons from them to the "Molotov Line", and it was impossible in principle: bunkers on the "old" border were 9/10 machine-gun, while on the new border there should have been one and a half times more bunkers ( 5807 against 3279), and half of them were to be armed with artillery pieces.

Let's sum up the first results. The facts listed above already contain enough information to provide simple and precise answers to questions that have been the subject of heated debate for decades. For example, question number 1. Why did Stalin sleep through the attack? Why did he not heed the notorious "warning

deniyam "of Churchill and Sorge? Why didn't he announce mobilization? Why "did not move troops to the border"?

And why shouldn't he have slept peacefully on the night of June 21-22? On the night before the exam, he doesn't sleep and flips through textbooks frantically, a loser who spent the whole semester lounging and not studying. Stalin was not an idler. For many years he worked late into the night (or early in the morning), personally solving thousands associated with the creation, equipment, armament, training of the largest army in the world. This army has been created. It was larger than any European army. It was armed with so many tanks and planes that all of Stalin's opponents combined did not have. In the west of the country, along the banks of the mighty rivers, two rows of the most powerful fortifications were built, on which - Comrade Stalin knew for sure from the experience of the Finnish war - even numerically an insignificant army can hold back the onslaught of an advancing enemy for weeks. But his army was not "insignificant in numbers." Even in the First Strategic Echelon, it outnumbered the Wehrmacht grouping, which was revealed (as we now know - with some exaggeration) by its intelligence. So why did Stalin have to stay awake? Throwing around the office with an extinct pipe? take ka

some convulsive decisions that break the long and carefully worked out Grand Plan? To declare an open (!!!) mobilization, depriving oneself of the opportunity to appear before the whole world as an innocent victim of a perfidious attack for a hundred years ahead?

Question number 2. "But if Directive No. 1 had been sent to the troops a day, an hour, half an hour earlier ... And if Molotov had acted not at 12 noon, but at 9 o'clock in the morning ... And if the commander of the Western Front announced a combat alert at the same time as the commander of the Southern Front (that is, 4 hours earlier) ... And then ... "

Nothing would have changed. Neither at the operational, nor - even more so - at the strategic level. Even if we didn't know anything about the actual course of hostilities, even if we didn't know that the biggest defeats of 1941 (Kiev and Vyazemsky pockets) did not take place on the first day, not in the first week, and even far not in the first month of the war, even if we forgot that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the Crimea and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942 was no less crushing than the defeats and defeats of the 41st, even without knowing anything about it, we could firmly assert that nothing fateful happened on June 22, 1941. Because it couldn't happen. Not that scale. Not the same spatial scope. An army with three hundred divisions, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft scattered over the vast expanses of the Soviet Union could be destroyed with one first blow only by the massive use of nuclear missile weapons. But Hitler did not have an atomic bomb. V-2 ballistic missiles and jet bombers existed in the summer of 1941 only in the form of blueprints. Fortunately for all of us, Hitler did not succeed in "postponing" the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union for a long time. As a result, of the 117 divisions of the invading army, three-quarters were infantry. With horse-drawn artillery. Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border rivers on foot. Over bridges that still needed to be built (or captured and held). The estimated rate of march (march, not offensive!) of an infantry division is 20 km per day. Without taking into account the time required to cross the rivers, and without taking into account the resistance of the enemy, who also participates in hostilities. Add to this the maximum firing range of the main systems of the German field artillery (10-20 km), and we get the value of the maximum possible depth of the "zone of destruction on June 22". At least 4/5 of all divisions of the Red Army are

**They fought outside this zone, at a distance of 50-500-5000 kilometers from the border. They learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov's speech on the radio (as hundreds of memoirs tell about this). And even more so, those 14 million reservists who put on soldier's overcoats after the announcement of general mobilization on June 23, 1941, could not become victims of the "first annihilating blow".**

## **2. PRICE AND RESULTS**

**Having finished with the discussion of what was not, we now turn to the history of real events.**

**The task assigned to the Wehrmacht according to the Barbarossa plan (*"the main forces of the Russian ground troops stationed in Western Russia should be destroyed in daring operations by deep, rapid advancement of tank wedges..."*), was completed by mid-July 1941. The troops of the Baltic and Western military districts (more than 70 divisions) were defeated, destroyed or taken prisoner. The same thing happened with the 60 divisions introduced into the North-Western and Western fronts already in the period from June 22 to July 9. The Germans passed through most of the fortified areas of the "Molotov Line" and "Stalin Line" without even paying attention to the gray concrete boxes of bunkers. Through others, they broke through with battles that lasted no more than two or three days (we are talking specifically about breaking through the front of the fortified area, and not about the resistance of some garrisons that held the pillboxes of the Grodno, Brest, Osovets URs until June 27-30, 1941). The enemy occupied Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, crossed the Bug, Neman, Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper. On July 16, the Germans occupied Smolensk. Two thirds of the distance from the western border to Moscow was covered in less than a month. Troops Southwest**

the front in disorder retreated beyond the line of the old Soviet-Polish border, in mid-July 1941, the tank units of the Wehrmacht occupied Zhitomir and Berdichev, went to the suburbs of Kyiv.

Almost all the equipment and heavy weapons of the troops of the western districts were lost. By July 6-9, the troops of the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Fronts had lost 11,700 tanks and 19,000 guns. By the end of July, aviation losses had already reached 10,000 aircraft, i.e. exceeded the initial strength of the Soviet Air Force groupings in the Western theater of operations. Particularly heavy, almost irreparable losses were suffered by tank troops. The main striking force of the Red Army - huge mechanized corps armed with the best T-34 and KV tanks in the world - simply melted away, disappeared, leaving behind piles of abandoned tanks, armored vehicles, trucks and tankers that blocked all the roads of Lithuania, Belarus and Western Ukraine. Already on July 15, 1941, the remnants of the mechanized corps were officially disbanded.

What Soviet historians modestly called "the failure of the frontier battle" meant in fact the complete defeat of the First Strategic Echelon in the Red Army (the number of divisions surpassed any army in Europe, and the number of tanks surpassed them all combined). By July 7-10, 1941, the Germans occupied (more precisely, passed through) an area of 700 thousand square meters. km, which is about three times the territory of Poland occupied by the Wehrmacht in September 1939. True, the German command soon had to learn that the encircled and the defeated armies of the four western districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa) were only part of the *"main forces of the Russian ground forces."* And in place of the broken divisions from the depths of the vast country, more and more new formations approached. All this countless warrior



The state was defeated, surrounded and captured in new boilers: near Smolensk and Roslavl, Uman and Kyiv. By the end of September 1941, the Red Army had lost 15,500 tanks, 66,900 guns and mortars, and 3.8 million small arms in the course of seven major strategic operations alone. A month later, the Germans captured Kharkov, Odessa and the Crimea, went to Moscow and Tikhvin.

Now let's look at the situation in the first weeks of the war from the other side. What price did the Wehrmacht pay for its (let's face it, phenomenal) success? *"The total losses,"* writes the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder, *" by 6.7.41 are: wounded - 42,755 (1588); killed - 13,869 (829); missing - 5010 (81); total - 61 634 (2498).*

*The numbers in parentheses show losses in the officer's composition, they are not included in the total number of losses.*

If we translate Halder's data into a more familiar form for us (by combining soldiers and officers), then we get the following Wehrmacht loss figures:

- 19.8 thousand killed and missing;
- 44.3 thousand wounded.

Total: 64 thousand soldiers and officers.

Is it a lot? Everything is relative. To begin with, let's compare the losses of the first weeks of the Soviet-German war with the losses of the Wehrmacht in Poland (September 1939) and France (May-June 1940).

War in Poland: 14 thousand dead and missing, 30 thousand wounded, total losses - 44 thousand people.

War in France: 45 thousand dead and missing, 111 thousand wounded, total losses - 156 thousand people  
lovek.

These figures are taken from the famous monograph Type Pelskirch. According to updated data presented in the equally well-known work of Müller Gill ebrand, the Wehrmacht lost 17 thousand people irretrievably in Poland, and 49 thousand people in France.

In principle, the picture is clear, but some explanations

are still needed. The Polish army was five times inferior to the Soviet troops of the western military districts in the number of divisions. The technical equipment of the Polish Army in 1939 and the Red Army in 1941 are simply incomparable. Attacked from three sides (from the west, from East Prussia, from the Czech Republic occupied by the Germans), the Polish army was practically left without a rear, and even received a crushing blow from the "Stalinist ax" in the back. *"Polish state, whose rulers always showed so much arrogance and bragging, -* shouted on November 7, 1939 from the rostrum of the Mausoleum, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, *now collision shattered like an old rotten cart ... "* And yet the losses of the Wehrmacht in Poland turned out to be a little less than those suffered by the Germans during the defeat of the troops of the western districts of the Soviet Union. The losses of the Wehrmacht in France (both total and irretrievable) during what Russian historians to this day do not hesitate to call the "triumphal march" were 2.5 times greater than the losses on the Eastern Front by July 6 1941. And this despite the fact that the entire French army was less than the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army in the number of people, divisions, tanks and aircraft, and the main events of the war with France took place on the "patch" of Normandy and Flanders, with maximum distances of 300 km along the front and 250 km in depth. This roughly corresponds to the size of Lithuania, which one of the three, the smallest, Army Group North occupied in one week of June 1941.

The results of the war in the air also deserve a brief mention. During the first three weeks of the war on the Western Front (from May 10 to May 31, 1940), the irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe (aircraft of all types) amounted to 978 aircraft. During the first three weeks of the war on the Eastern Front (from June 22 to July 12, 1941), the irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe (aircraft of all types) amounted

according to the so-called "updated data" - 550 aircraft, according to a simple summation of the weekly reports of the Luftwaffe headquarters - 473 aircraft, i.e. two times less than in the sky of France.

In general, during the entire campaign in the West (from May 10 to June 24), the Luftwaffe lost 1,401 aircraft irretrievably on the Western Front, and another 672 were damaged. For a comparable period of time (from June 22 to August 2, 1941), German aviation losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 968 shot down and 6 aircraft.

Thus, the losses of the Luftwaffe on the Western Front were - in any of the considered time intervals - higher than on the Eastern. During that period (May 1940), when French aviation and British fighters based in France (700-750 pilots in total) still had the opportunity for organized resistance, German losses were 2 times greater than in the first three weeks. fighting in the East. It remains to be reminded once again that only in the air force of the western districts there were 3.6 thousand fighter pilots (almost five times more than the allies), and the composition of the Soviet aviation group

increased continuously.

Everything is relative. Now compare the losses Wehrmacht with its strength. The same Halder repeatedly determines the size of the grouping of German ground forces in the East at 3.2 million people. Thus, by July 6, 1941, the losses amounted to exactly 2% of the total. These are certainly not small, but very small losses.

Even for those who have not graduated from the military academy, it should be clear that the army, which had to "stubborn resistance of the enemy", bears completely different losses. Let us explain this with three specific examples.

**Khalkhin Gol. The number of Soviet**

**troops: three rifle divisions, six tank and armored brigades, 57,000 personnel. Russian historians determine the number of Japanese troops at 75,000 people (i.e., 5 "estimated divisions"). Active hostilities lasted only seven days (from 23 to 30 August 1939). Compared to the war in which two huge, multimillion-strong armies entered on June 22, 1941, the conflict at Khalkhin Gol looks like a forgotten minor episode. Nevertheless, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 40% of the total strength of the group (8 thousand killed and missing, 15 thousand wounded). Let us immediately note that the losses of the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol turned out to be only three times less than the losses suffered by the Wehrmacht in battles with 150 Soviet divisions!**

**Operation "Bagration" (the defeat of German troops in Belarus in the summer of 1944). The size of the grouping of Soviet troops: 156 rifle, 12 cavalry divisions, 2 rifle, 18 tank and mechanized brigades, 2332 thousand personnel. Losses amounted to 33% of the total (179 thousand killed and missing, 587 thousand wounded and sick).**

**Lviv-Sandomierz operation (liberation of Western Ukraine in the summer of 1944). The losses of the Red Army (65,000 dead and missing, 224,000 wounded and sick) amounted to 29% of the total strength of the group.**

**In general, during the liberation of the Baltic States, Belarus, the western regions of Ukraine, Moldavia (in domestic historiography, this is called the Baltic, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz and Iasi-Kishinev strategic offensive operations), the Red Army lost 1400 thousand people (318 thousand killed and missing, 1084 thousand wounded and sick). Let us clarify that here the losses of the Red Army in two more operations to liberate Western Ukraine are not taken into account: Rivne-Lutsk and Proskurovo**

**Chernovitskaya, for which the author has no data.**

**Comparing these terrible figures with the losses suffered by the Wehrmacht during the occupation of the same territories in June - early July 1941, we find that the total losses of the advancing Red Army turned out to be 22 times greater than the losses of the advancing Red Army in the summer of 1941 on that the same terrain of the Wehrmacht**

**Finally, we should compare the losses of the Wehrmacht (64 thousand killed and wounded) with the losses of the Red Army. The troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts in the period from June 22 to July 6-9 lost 749 thousand people killed, wounded and missing. This figure does not include the losses of the Northern Front (Leningrad MD) and the Southern Front (Odessa MD), which began active hostilities on 29 June and 2 July, respectively. But even without taking into account the losses of these fronts, the ratio of losses of the advancing (and very successfully, 20-30 km per day advancing) Wehrmacht and the defending Red Army is 1 to 12. This is a "miracle" that does not fit into any canons military science. According to sound logic - and throughout the practice of wars and armed conflicts - the losses of the attacker should be greater than the losses of the defender. The ratio of losses of 1 to 12 is possible only in the case when the white colonialists who sailed to Africa with cannons and rifles, attacking the "enemy", armed with spears and hoes. But in the summer of 1941, on the western borders of the USSR, the situation was completely different: the defending side was not inferior to the enemy either in numbers or in armament (the mere fact of losing 19 thousand guns suggests that these guns were), significantly superior to him in the means of inflicting a powerful counterattack - tanks and aircraft, and even had the opportunity to build its defense on a system of powerful natural barriers and long-term defensive structures.**

No less eloquent are the figures characterizing the ratio of military equipment losses. As noted above, by the end of September 1941, the Red Army had lost 15,500 tanks. The losses of the Wehrmacht tank divisions (although not by the end of the month, but by September 5-6) amounted to: 285 light Pz-II, 471 Czech Pz 35/38 (t), 639 medium Pz-III and 256 "heavy" Pz -IV. A total of 1651 tanks. This is the total number of losses, including both irretrievably decommissioned vehicles and those tanks that were under repair. But even with this, not quite correct, comparison, the ratio of the losses of the parties is 1 to 9. The calculation, carried out taking into account only irretrievable losses, almost doubles this proportion.

The ratio of tank losses on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front is also very indicative. The fact is that on the eve of the war, eight mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were armed with 833 of the newest T-34 and KV tanks - more than there were any different ones in the five tank divisions of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht (728 tanks). The long-barreled 76-mm gun F-34, mounted on Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, pierced the frontal armor of the most protected German tanks (Pz III of the J series, Pz IV of the F series) at a distance of 1000-1200 meters. Light tanks with anti-bullet armor (of which there were 319 units in the 1st TGr) were pierced by the F-34 cannon projectile through two sides. On the other hand, not a single Wehrmacht tank could hit the T-34 even from 500 m. Strictly speaking, the 1st TGr had 255 Pz-III tanks armed with a 50-mm cannon, which could fire a special sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten carbide core (armor penetration - up to 65 mm at a distance of 300 m) to hit the T-34, but due to the shortage of tungsten, such ammunition was very rare. Well, against the 48-ton KV monster with 95 mm frontal armor and 75 mm side armor, any German tanks were just

unarmed. Thus, the huge quantitative superiority of the tank forces of the Southwestern Front was complemented by an absolute qualitative superiority. Nevertheless, Yu-W.f. by July 6, he lost 4381 tanks. The losses of the 1st Panzer Group by the end of August amounted to: 183 tanks were irretrievably lost and 198 were under repair. The ratio of deadweight losses is 1

1 to 24. These two numbers give a simple answer to the question of "what would happen if we managed to delay ...". In Soviet historiography, this word denotes the postponement of the date of the beginning of the Soviet-German war to a later date. What kind of transfer would allegedly allow "to complete the rearmament of the army." Not to mention the fact that completely and finally "rearmament" can only be a defeated army, the very idea of "pulling back" is absurd in principle. Yes, of course, 15 minutes of extra time in a football match is guaranteed to lead to victory. But on one condition: if the entire opposing team sits on a bench and allows you to score goals into empty nets. And if not? And if the enemy also tries to use each of these 15 minutes to strengthen his defenses and storm your gates? In the early 40s. Germany was rapidly catching up with the Soviet Union in terms of the quality and technical perfection of its military equipment. By the end of the war, it undoubtedly overtook it. Overtaken in the conditions of the economic blockade and the environmental ruins of cities completely destroyed by Anglo-American air strikes. And what would have been in the arsenal of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe if Hitler had really been able to delay the start of the war against the USSR? Returning from the subjunctive mood to real history, we see that the re-equipment of the tank divisions of the Kiev district with the latest tanks did not change anything either in the course of hostilities or in the dynamics of equipment loss.

Two generations of Soviet (and now Russian

Russian) historians waged an uncompromising struggle against the Soviet tanks of 1941. They were simply mixed with mud (not on the battlefield, of course, but on paper). It was "genuinely established" that all the tanks were broken, hopelessly outdated, worn out, with an insignificant balance of 100-150 hours of engine life. The gears were too fragile, the track pins were too soft, the filters were not filtered, the periscopes were not periscoped... In short, they were not something to fight with - it was impossible to drive 50 km from point A to point B. You just wonder how these hopeless "thirty-fours" stood in service with many armies of the world until the mid-60s. Fortunately, this struggle was bloodless. Unfortunately, it had very concrete, tangible economic consequences. Two generations of Soviet generals were brought up and trained in military academies on the myth that the catastrophe of 1941 happened because of the technical backwardness of the Red Army.

The Soviet generals did not want a repeat of the catastrophe and for half a century put pressure on the party leadership, demanding finally and irrevocably "re-equip" the Soviet Army in such a way that even friends would be afraid. As a result, the Soviet Union collapsed and disarmed, armed with - among other things - 30 thousand of the best tanks in the world ...

A detailed analysis of the tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet tanks, aircraft, guns, and artillery tractors, and a serious and impartial comparison of them with enemy equipment, are far beyond the scope of this article. Let's not even try to "embrace the immensity". Let's take a better rifle.

On page 367 of the statistical collection "Secret Classified Removed", which we have repeatedly mentioned, it is written that in 1941 the Red Army lost 6,290,000 small arms. The most common "small weapon" of 1941 is the three-line rifle Mo



sina. This weapon was and remains an unsurpassed example of reliability and durability. The "three-ruler" could be drowned in a swamp, buried in sand, dropped into salty sea water - and she kept shooting and shooting. The weight of this true masterpiece of engineering is 3.5 kg without cartridges. This means that any young and healthy man (namely, the Red Army consisted of such men in the summer of 1941) could carry 3-4 rifles from the battlefield without much effort. And the most seedy collective farm mare harnessed to a simple peasant cart, could take a hundred "three-rulers" left over from the dead and wounded soldiers to the rear. And further. Rifles "just like that" are not handed out. Each has its own individual number, each is given personally and against signature. Everyone, even the "youngest" first year, was explained that he would go to court for the loss of his personal weapon. How could six million rifles and machine guns have gone missi

Let's not simplify. In war as in war. It is not always possible to collect all rifles down to the last one on the battlefield. Not every truck and not every wagon with weapons in a combat situation reaches its destination. Finally, a certain number of rifles and submachine guns could in fact be damaged by fire, explosion, or polar cold. Is it possible to roughly estimate the size of such "normal" losses of small arms? Of course you can. After working for a few minutes with a calculator and the same collection of secrecy removed, we find out that in the 44-45th years. one million soldiers "lost" 36,000 small arms per month. Consequently, in the six months of 1941 "normal" losses should not have exceeded 650,000-700,000 units. Actually lost - 6.3 million. There is an "excessive" loss of more than 5.6 million small arms.

Just as "abnormal" were the losses other types of weapons. So, for six months in 1941.

24,400 field artillery pieces were lost (this figure does not include anti-tank guns and mortars), which amounted to 56% of the total resource. And for 12 months in 1943, 5700 guns were lost (9.7% of the resource). Thus, the "average monthly" losses in 1941 turned out to be 8.5 times greater than in the year 1943. Even more revealing are the proportions of losses of antitank defense guns. As of June 22, 1941, there were 14,900 anti-tank guns in the Red Army (in fact, even more, since the compilers of the collection "Secrecy Removed" for some reason did not take into account the 76-mm and 88-mm guns that were on the yard zhenii PTABov). In addition to this colossal number (5 guns against one German tank), in the six months of 1941, Soviet industry transferred another 2,500 anti-tank guns to the troops. In total - a total resource of 17,400 units, of which 70% (12,100 guns) were lost. And for the whole of 1943 - for all of its 12 months - 5500 anti-tank guns were lost, which amounted to only 14.6% of the total resource of 1943. As an example for comparison, 1943 was not chosen by chance. This is the year of grandiose tank battles on the Kursk Bulge, this is the year when the Germans began mass production of heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", against which our "forty-five" (namely, they still accounted for 95% of the total resource of 1943 .) were completely helpless. And yet, in 1943, the Red Army was losing 460 guns a month, and in 1941, at a time when two of the three German tanks on the Eastern Front were light vehicles with bulletproof armor, 2,000 a month. 4.5 times more. But this is also a completely wrong calculation. There was no "uniform" loss of two thousand guns every month. There was a massive loss of most of all anti-tank weapons in the first weeks of the war - and bottles with combustible mixture of the KS, which were officially

but they were adopted by the Red Army and put into serial production a month after the start of hostilities.

These figures are so unbelievable that  
A reasonable question immediately arises: "Are they true?"

As far as accounting for personnel losses is concerned, this question can be answered with a firm "no". The losses of the personnel of the Red Army, given in the statistical collection of G.F. Krivosheev, are clearly underestimated. Let us illustrate this with the following specific example. On page 162 of this collection, it is reported that the troops of the North-Western Front (the number of which by the beginning of hostilities was determined by the compilers at 440 thousand people) until July 9 lost 87,208 people killed, wounded and missing. 20% of the original number. Can this figure be true? Of course not. All the documents, memoirs and studies at our disposal testify with absolute unanimity that the front was defeated. Ruined to the ground. Here are just a few excerpts from the reports that the command of the S-Z.f. sent to Moscow:

*June 28 "... the 8th Army, which suffered 40% or more of loss, departs to the northern bank of the Western Dvina.*

*The 2nd Panzer Division apparently perished. Position  
5th Panzer Division and 84th Motorized Division  
zii don't know.*

*The 11th Army does not exist as a formation.*

*Regulations 5, 33, 188, 128, 23 and 126th Rifles  
divisions do not know ... "*

*June 29 "... our forces are near Dvinsk: two airborne  
brigades, of which one actually does not exist due to the  
losses incurred, two combined regiments,  
formed from the stragglers, the remnants of the 2nd tank  
division without a single tank and the 46th motorized*

**naya division of the 21st mechanized corps - total 1000 people..."**

**July 2 "... 5th Panzer Division 24.6. in the Vilnius area was surrounded by the enemy and dispersed. The remaining fighters and commanders began to appear in the Polotsk area only on 06/26/41 and on 06/30/41 in the area Pskov. Mat. part of the combat vehicles was completely destroyed or left on enemy territory ...**

**The 2nd Panzer Division ... was surrounded, and there was no more information about her. Now, just like in the 5th Panzer Division, the remnants are gathering in the area of Pskov and Polotsk.**

**The 84th motorized division ... was heavily bombarded by enemy aircraft and subsequently surrounded and fought in encirclement until 25.6. There is no information about her, they are found in various places. individual Red Army soldiers ... "**

**July 3 "... the condition of the units of the 8th Army is characterized by the following data:**

**10th Infantry Division: 98th Infantry Regiment almost completely destroyed; from the 204th rifle the regiment left 30 people without materiel; The 30th Artillery Regiment has one gun; 140th howitzer artillery regiment of 36 guns lost 21...**

**Parts and management of the 90th Infantry Division before so far have not been able to find it. Separate fighters of the division attached to units of the 10th Infantry Division.**

**Data on the state of the rest of the army is not received...**

**... The composition of the connections of the 12th mechanized corps on 3.7.41:**

**23rd Panzer Division - 10 tanks, 150 men infantry, has no shells;**

**28th Panzer Division - 22 tanks, a motorized rifle regiment almost at full strength;**

**202nd motorized division - about 600 people ... "**

How can such reports be reconciled with the loss of "only" (forgive the cynicism) 20% of the initial strength of the personnel? However, in the mentioned statistical collection there is also page 368. On it we read that in the same period, from June 22 to July 9, S-Z.f. lost 341 thousand units of small arms. This already makes it possible to estimate real losses with a certain degree of reliability...

The constant underestimation of the number of casualties (mostly "missing") led to the fact that in the final table No. 69 on page 146 the total number of missing in 1941 was determined at 2,335,482 people. And this despite the fact that the generally accepted estimate of the number of Soviet prisoners of war in 1941, based on long-declassified and comprehensively studied documents of the Wehrmacht, is 3.8 million people. Without pretending to absolute accuracy, we will try to estimate the total losses of the Red Army in 1941. We will solve this problem, forgetting for a moment that we are talking about millions of killed people. Just like a problem about a pool, into which it flows through one pipe, and pours out from another. It is known (all the same statistical collection of Krivosheev, p. 152) that by the end of 1941 the average monthly strength of the active army not only did not increase, but even slightly decreased (2,818,500 against 3,334,400). The only possible explanation for such dynamics is that the losses exceeded the number of repl

What human resources did the Red Army receive in the second half of 1941? A total of 14 million people were mobilized. Of course, not all of them ended up in the army. The active army is only one of the components of the armed forces. There are also rear and training units, test sites, warehouses and bases, hospitals, rear airfields. For example, in Germany, with a total number of the armed forces of the Reich in 7.25 million people. in parts and

formations of the active army (on all fronts) in June 1941 was 3.8 million (52%). In the USSR, during the last three years of the war, the share of the personnel of the active army amounted to 57-58% of the total number of servicemen. It can reasonably be assumed that the same figures apply to the distribution of manpower resources in 1941. In this case, out of a total of 14 million people called up for mobilization, at least 8 million people should have entered the active army. And this is the minimum estimate. Let us not forget that in the summer of 1941 the active fronts also included the armies of the Second Strategic Echelon, then the troops of the internal districts previously considered rear, and at the end of the year, units of the Far Eastern Front.

This simple arithmetic leads us to what the Red Army lost in 1941 at least 8.5 million people ( $3,334,400 + 8,000,000 - 2,818,500 = 8.5$  million). And now the most important thing: what are the components of this nightmarish figure?

The most reliable (according to the author) are the data on the number of wounded admitted to hospitals for treatment. In the rear, there was more order, and accounting was at least double (both on admission and on discharge). So, all the sanitary losses of the active army (wounded and sick) were determined by the authors of the collection "Secrecy Removed" at 1314 thousand people. Based on the ratio of the wounded and killed, which is constant for all wars of the 20th century, as 3 to 1, it can be assumed that 450 thousand people died on the battlefield.

In fact - more precisely, according to the reports of the headquarters of units and formations of the army - the number of those killed and dying from wounds in hospitals amounted to 567 thousand people. Even if we assume the worst - not a single wounded man returned to service before the end of 1941 - and add to the number of the

sanitary losses (1314 thousand), it turns out that the recorded combat losses in 1941 (i.e. killed and wounded) amount to no more than 2.0 million people. Another 6.4 million fighters and commanders "disappeared."

6.4 million. As much as was in operation

Russian cabbage soup on June 22, 1941, and so many more times.

Of course, the term "missing" is a euphemism intended to replace other, much less euphonious terms. The "standard scheme" of the defeat and disappearance of a military unit of the Red Army is well known. Known from a great variety of documents, memoirs, books:

Point one. A heart-rending cry is heard: "They lived around!" In the summer of 1941, this unpretentious word created miracles.

*"One single, rare, almost unused in civilian life, fatal word ruled by countless herds of people running, wandering, crawling somewhere without any orders and rules ..." (V. Astafiev )*

Point two. Loss of a commander. The reasons could be very different: he died, was wounded, left to find out the situation at a higher headquarters, shot himself, or simply ran away.

Point three. Someone from the "experienced", who took command of the decapitated military unit, makes a decision: to break through to the east in "small groups". All. This is the end. A few days (or hours) later, the former battalion (regiment, division)

crumbles into dust and ashes.

Point four. A huge number of lonely "wanderers", having wandered aimlessly, without meaning and without food through the fields and forests, go out to the villages, to the people. And in the village - the Germans. The same Germans who were supposed to be stopped by the division scattered through the forests and fields. There are already very few options

naya widow, prisoner of war camp, service in the "police". That's all.

What word can we call these people? Deserters, traitors to the motherland, surrendered, captured? By no means do I pretend to replace the competent authorities and give personal assessments, we will try to at least tentatively assess the scale of the catastrophe (the very nature of such a phenomenon, as mass desertion, excludes the possibility of accurate, by name accounting).

The figure obtained by us purely by calculation in 6.4 million "missing" (ie prisoners, deserters, not taken into account in the reports of the headquarters of the dead and wounded) with acceptable accuracy correlates with other, quite reliable information. For example, with the above figure of losses of small arms (6.3 million units).

Further. The German military command recorded the capture in 1941 of 3.8 million former Red Army servicemen. This figure, as Soviet historians rightly point out, may be somewhat overestimated due to the fact that the Germans included among the prisoners military builders (and in some cases, just men from among the civilian population mobilized to dig trenches and anti-tank ditches). This is true, just as it is true that we are talking about only a few percent of the total number of prisoners. The Germans had no need to "catch" civilian builders and enroll them in the number of prisoners of war of the Red Army. Moreover, by the end of July 1941, the flow of prisoners of war exceeded the possibilities of the Wehrmacht in terms of their protection and maintenance. Things got to the point that on July 25, 1941, the order of the quartermaster general No. 11/4590 was issued, in accordance with which the mass release of prisoners of a number of nationalities (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Balts) began. During the validity of this order, i.e. until November 13



1941, 318,770 former Red Army soldiers were sent home (mainly Ukrainians - 277,761 people).

According to the data cited in the same collection "Secrecy Removed" (that is, at least not exaggerated for the purpose of "evil defamation of the Red Army"), the Soviet military command and the NKVD discovered and convicted 376 thousand soldiers for desertion. former military personnel. Another 940 thousand people were "called for the second time." This strange term denotes those soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who, for various reasons, "lagged behind" their military unit and remained in the territory occupied by the Germans. As the Red Army advanced, in 43-44. they were re-armed. At the same time, one should not forget that the initial number of "those who have become" was much larger: someone died from poverty, hunger, shelling, executions and bombings, someone joined the partisans and died in battle, someone he joined the "policemen" and left along with the retreating units of the Wehrmacht.

Probably, we will not be much mistaken in estimating the total number of deserters (if only this term is generally applicable to the situation of the massive collapse of the army) at 1.5 million people. And this figure is rather underestimated than overestimated. On page 140, the total number of all categories of retired personnel of the Red Army - killed, dead, missing, captured, convicted and sent to the Gulag (and not to the penal battalion, which is part of the army), demobilized due to injury and illness, and "other" - does not agree with the total number indicated on page 139 of "who left the Armed Forces for various reasons" by 2248 thousand people. The compilers of the collection directly explain this inconsistency by "a significant number of unidentified deserters."

Arithmetic difference ( $6.4 - 3.8 - 1.5 = 1.1$ ) can

be a reflection of the inaccuracy of our estimate of the total number of "missing". Well, if that were the case. Unfortunately, there is every reason to assume that this "missing million" consists of the wounded, abandoned in a stampede and not counted in the reports from the front of the dead. At least, many Soviet historians in their writings without the slightest embarrassment informed readers that "the wounded, who could not be evacuated, were transferred to the care of the local population." Is it worth discussing the question of how the "local population", in whose house there were no medicines, or even

an extra glass of milk, could take on its "care

nie" seriously wounded soldiers? On November 17, 1941, the head of the Political Directorate of the Western Front, divisional commissar Lestev, in his report "On the political and moral state of the troops" wrote: "

*Seriously wounded or wounded in the legs, who could not walk at best, they stayed in the villages or simply rushed to the battlefield, in the forests and died slowly death from starvation and loss of blood. All this happened in front of people and was one of the reasons the fact that many Red Army soldiers and commanders tried to evade the battle, because they saw the inevitability of death in the wound. According to the information G.F. Krivosheev, 200 (two hundred) army hospitals went missing, 17 left the encirclement big losses."*

The fact that in the summer of 1941 mass desertion and mass surrender were the main component of the losses of the Red Army is clearly seen from the (as has already been shown - significantly underestimated) data given by the compilers of the collection "The Classification Removed". For example, during the 32 days of its existence in July-August 1941, the Central Front irrevocably lost 111,000 soldiers and commanders. Including 9199 (8%) killed, 45 824 missing

lead and prisoners and another 55,985 people pass through the strange column "non-combat irretrievable losses." The Central Front fought for a very short time. The Western Front, constantly changing its commanders and absorbing more and more dozens of divisions, survived until the end of 1941. Its irretrievable losses amounted to 956 thousand people, of which 849 thousand (89%) were missing, captured and "non-combat losses". Such

the same unattractive situation developed on the southern flank of the war. The troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts irretrievably lost 956 thousand people in 1941 (this is not a typo, but an accidental coincidence with the number of losses of the Z.F.). Of these, 864 thousand (90%) are missing, surrendered, deserted.

### 3. SIMPLE ANSWERS

Stalin himself was the first to absolutely understand the meaning of what was happening. Perhaps that is why he understood so quickly and so correctly that his "universities" were underground work in a subversive organization that once destroyed the Russian army right during the world war. Stalin knew exactly how empires crumble and armies of millions disappear. Therefore, it took him only seven days to understand what was the main reason for the unheard-of defeat. The revealed truth turned out to be unreasonably heavy and stunningly unexpected even for this man with a heart of stone and nerves of steel. On the night of June 28-29, Stalin abandoned everything and everyone, went to the "near dacha", where he spent two days in complete prostration - June 29 and 30, not answering phone calls and not meeting with anyone.

We do not need to conduct seances and summon the spirits of the dead in order to find out what Stalin thought about and what conclusions he came to. He expressed his decisions in the form of orders that came in

troops either on his behalf or on behalf of the Headquarters, People's Commissar of Defense, General Staff, commanders of fronts and strategic directions. Let's quote just a few of them:

GKO Decree No. 00381 of July 16, 1941

(signed personally by Stalin):

*"...individual commanders and rank and file soldiers show instability, alarmism, shameful cowardice, throw down their weapons and, forgetting their duty to Motherland, grossly violating the Oath, turn into a herd of rams, running in a panic before an insolent adversary..."*

Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-West Forces No. 3 dated July 14, 1941:

*"... the troops of the North-Western Front, not always giving due rebuff to the enemy, often leave their positions without even engaging in a decisive battle. Separate alarmists and cowards not only arbitrarily leave the battle front, but also sow panic among honest and staunch fighters. Commanders and political workers in a number of cases not only do not stop the panic, do not organize and do not lead their units into battle, but their shameful behavior sometimes further reinforce disorganization and panic on the front line..."*

Order of the Commander of the North-Western Front No. 044 of July 26, 1941:

*"... I order*

*1. Commanders and military commissars of formations and units to oblige all commanders and political workers, under their personal responsibility, to sew loops on overcoats and tunics within three days*

*tsy, sleeve insignia and insignia.*

*2. Henceforth, all persons of the command personnel who violate the uniform, who have removed their insignia, should be considered as cowards and alarmists, dishonouring the high rank of commander of the Red Army, and attracted*

***subject them to severe punishment, up to and including trial by military tribunals."***

**Headquarters Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941:**

***"... commanders and political workers, during the battle tearing off their insignia and deserting to the rear or surrendering to the enemy, to be considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest ... to shoot such deserters on the spot from the command staff ... If the head or part of the Red Army, instead of organizing a rebuff to the enemy, would rather surrender to him here - destroy them all means, both ground and air, and deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who have surrendered of state benefits and assistance ... "***

**Stavka Directive No. 001919 of September 12, 1941:**

***"The experience of fighting German fascism showed that that in our rifle divisions there are many panic and directly hostile elements that at the first pressure from the enemy, they drop their weapons, start shouting: "We are surrounded" and pull the rest of the fighters with them. As a result the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then begins to leave alone from the forest. Similar phenomena occur in all fronts" (highlighted by me. - M.S.).***

**Supreme High Command Directive No. 002202 dated September 21 1941 (given the full text without abridgements):**

***"The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the proposal no urgently convey:***

- 1. Is Kyiv abandoned by our units or not?***
- 2. If Kyiv is abandoned, are the bridges blown up or not?***
- 3. If bridges are blown up, then who guarantees that Are the bridges really blown up?***

**If the question of the morale of the army in which such orders were issued still needs some comments, then the following three figures remain to be given as such:**

163 division (brigade) commanders;

221 division (brigade) chief of staff;

1114 regimental commanders.

This is a list of commanders of the ground forces (excluding aviation commanders who did not return from a sortie) who went missing during all the years of the war. Taking into account that the staff of one rifle division required one commander, one chief of staff and five commanders of regiments (three rifle, two artillery), we come to the conclusion that an officer corps was missing, more than sufficient in number. for the full staffing of the senior command staff of all divisions of the five western military districts of the USSR. It is worth noting that even by the beginning of the 90s. the burial places of 44 generals of the Red Army were not known (not counting those who were shot or died in prisons and camps, not counting those who died in enemy captivity). Forty-four generals - among them two dozen commanders of the corps and army level - shared the fate of millions of ordinary soldiers who perished without a trace in the abyss of war. But there is a big difference between a general and a soldier. A soldier often fights alone and sometimes there is no death without witnesses. But how could a general, a division or corps commander go missing? The commander does not fight alone. The command and headquarters of the division had a strength (according to the state of April 1941) of 75 people. This is not counting the personnel of the political department, three battalions and the commandant's platoon. There are even more people in the headquarters structures of the corps and the army. To what extent did chaos, panic, and desertion have to reach in order for the commander of a corps or division to "disappear" in an open field, without a sign or a trace? And not all "missing" generals disappeared without a trace. For voluntary surrender and cooperation with the occupiers after the war, he was shot or hanged.

23 former generals of the Red Army (this is not counting the

**much more of those who received a full-fledged camp term for betrayal). Among the traitors were commanders of the highest rank:**

**- Head of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the North Western Front Trukhin,**

**- Commander of the 2nd Shock Army Vlasov,**

**- Chief of Staff of the 19th Army Malyshev,**

**- Member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army Zhilenkov,**

**- Commander of the 4th Rifle Corps (Western Front)**

**Yegorov,**

**- Commander of the 21st Rifle Corps (Western Front)**

**Zakutny.**

**Yes, ten people from among the executed generals were posthumously rehabilitated in the late 50s. But it should not be forgotten that the rehabilitation of the 50s. carried out according to the same rules as the repressions of the 1930s. List, without any objective examination, on the direct instructions of "directive orders gangs"...**

**The executed generals are known by name. About the rank and file, as always, only the total numbers are known. So, for less than four months of the war (from June 22 to October 10, 1941) according to the verdicts of the military tribunals and the Special Departments of the NKVD, 10,201 soldiers of the Red Army were shot. In total, over the years of the war, only military tribunals (excluding the activities of the NKVD) convicted over 994 thousand Soviet military personnel, of which 157,593 people were shot. However, the discussion of the scale of repressions turns into demagoguery if it takes place in isolation from the discussion of the main thing: the completely unparalleled behavior of a huge mass of fighters and commanders of the Red Army, with which the Soviet military-political leadership tried to fight in the only way known and accessible to it, i.e. cruelest terror.**

**Already a few months after the start of the war, in the autumn of 1941, the German command was able to**

to the planned formation of "national" units of the Wehrmacht, staffed by former Soviet citizens (if only the word "citizen" is generally applicable to subjects of the Stalinist empire). Thus, a total of about 90 so-called "Eastern" battalions were created: 26 "Turkestan", 13 "Azerbaijani", 9 "Crimean Tatar", 7 "Volga-Ural", etc. The following year, 1942, after the breakthrough of German troops to the Don and Kuban, the creation of "volunteer" Cossack formations began. So, in May 1942, in the 17th field army of the Wehrmacht, an order was issued to create one Cossack hundred at each army corps and two hundred more at the army headquarters. Its own Cossack hundred appeared in September 1942 even as part of the 8th Italian Army. By the spring of 1943, more than 20 Cossack regiments with a total strength of about 30 thousand people were fighting in the Wehrmacht. The most common and massive form of cooperation between former Red Army servicemen and the occupiers was their enrollment in the regular units of the Wehrmacht as the so-called "voluntary helpers" (Hilfswillige, or abbreviated "Khivi").

Initially, the "Khivi" served as drivers, storekeepers, orderlies, sappers, loaders, thus releasing "full-fledged Aryans" for direct participation in hostilities. Then, as the losses of the Wehrmacht grew, the Russian "volunteers" began to arm. In April 1942, there were 200,000 Khivas in the German army. Thus, in November 1942, Paulus' 6th Army, surrounded at Stalingrad, had 51,800 Khivs, and in the 71st, 76th, and 297th Infantry Divisions of this army, "Russians" (as all former Soviets were called) amounted to 40% of the personnel. In summer

In 1942, there were 47,000 "volunteers" in Manstein's 11th Army. In the end, the scale of this incredible mass cooperation in the history of Russia



The battle with the invaders became so great that the Wehrmacht High Command created a special post of "Inspector General of the Eastern Troops". In February 1943, under the command of General Kestring, about 750 thousand people served in the ranks of the Wehrmacht, SS. From October 1943 the Heavies were incorporated into the standard strength of a German infantry division at 2,000 men per division, or 15% of the total manpower. Such figures are called by foreign historians. The military historians of the Russian General Staff, the compilers of the collection "Secrecy Removed" are in full agreement with them. On page 385 we read: *"The number of personnel of the military formations of the so-called 'volunteer assistants' Germany, including police and auxiliaries, to mid-July 1944 exceeded 800 thousand people. Only in the SS troops during the war served more than 150 thousand former citizens of the USSR."* On page 334 it is reported that in 1942-1944. about 500,000 people were released from among the prisoners of war in German camps in connection with joining the "volunteer formations". But the prisoners were an important, but by no means the only source of human resources. At the service of the Germans were hundreds of thousands of deserters, and millions of conscripts who evaded mobilization at the beginning of the war ...

More than 60 years have passed since those terrible days. And all these years, official Soviet military history science, ignoring the obvious and indisputable fact of the full-scale collapse of the Red Army, the fact of unprecedented mass desertion, mass surrender and defection to the side of the enemy, successfully searched for and found more and more "reasons for the defeat of the Red Army." Armies in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The history of these attempts itself,

cheating techniques developed over the years can be the subject of a separate study. Such studies received a new impetus in the early 1990s, after the declassification of a huge body of documentary information made (more correctly, should have made) obsolete Soviet tanks. New time - new songs. And the reader is now new, young and much more demanding. Therefore, the current successors of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet historiography are not looking for simple answers, but their 700-page works

write in a very scientific, purely concrete, language:

*"The first battle group of the 14th Panzer Division (Kampfgruppe Stempel) consisted of the 108th motorized infantry regiment (without the 2nd battalion), headquarters of the 4th artillery regiment of the 14th tank divisions with the 3rd division of the 4th artillery regiment (without the 1st battery), the 1st battery of the 4th artillery regiment, t batteries of the 607th mortar division (given hull, 210 mm mortars), 1st battery 60-th artillery regiment (attached corps part, 100-mm guns), 1st company of the 4th anti-tank battalion of the 14th tank division, 36th tank regiment (without the 1st reinforced company) with the 2nd company of the motorized sapper battalion, parts of the motorized communications battalion, 2nd platoon of the 4th sapper companies. The second combat group (Kampfgruppe Falkenstein) consisted of the 103rd motorized infantry regiment, the 1st reinforced company of the 36th tank regiment, 2nd division of the 4th artillery regiment, 4th anti-tank division without one company and two platoons, 1st platoon of the 4th sapper company. Third combat group (Kampfgroup Damerau) consisted of ... "*

You will still laugh, but the young author of this ma lazy masterpiece of pretentious idle talk udo

was even worth public praise from the lips of Makhmud Akhmetovich himself! Comrade M.A. Gareev, General of the Army, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and others, others *there will be people like Alexei Isaev, our cause is not hopeless!*" Perfectly accurate definition. Makhmud Akhmetovich and his subordinates in high epaulets and high ranks ate folk bread for decades, but they did not bother to come up with anything that had at least signs of scientificity and plausibility. The modern successor of their business does its job much better. Thinner. Tov. Isaev does not "substitute" himself with a direct statement about the "numerical superiority" of the enemy. But an infinitely long (out of pity for the reader, we have quoted only half) list of platoons, companies and batteries of the 14th Panzer Division on a subconscious level forms in

the reader, mesmerized by all this flashing numbers, mortars and guns, the idea of the "huge black cloud" that was approaching the positions of the Soviet troops. In fact, on its way from the border Vladimir-Volynsky to Lutsk, the German 14th Panzer Division met (again, it would be more correct to say - it should have met) four divisions of the Red Army (19th TD, 135th SD, 215th RD, 131st md) and the 1st anti-tank brigade. This is not counting the 87th Rifle Division and the 41st Tank Division located directly at the border, as well as three defense units of the Vladimir-Volynsky UR (about which A. Isaev briefly dropped: "40 rarely

*located bunkers*"). "Rarely located" is 40 bunkers per 20 km of the front. On June 26, two more rifle divisions of the Red Army (200th Rifle Division and 193rd Rifle Division) approached Lutsk, occupied by the Germans. Miracles do not happen, and if a complete list of all units of a German division takes 2 pages of text, then the same list in relation to 9 Soviet divisions should

would take 18 pages. But for some reason A. Isaev does not bring him up.

Something else is more interesting. Accidentally or consciously, but A. Isaev, with his long passage ("the first Kampf group consisted of ..., the second Kampf group consisted of ..., the third Kampf group consisted of ..."), almost exactly reproduced the textbook fragment known to every educated person from the novel by L.N. Tolstoy "War and Peace". Yes, yes, the very one where the Austrian general, before the battle of Austerlitz, long and tediously read out his wonderful disposition: *"Die erste Kolonne marschiert ... Die zweite Kolonne marschiert ..."*

Throughout the entire novel, Lev Nikolayevich contrasts this stupid mechanistic approach to the military genius of Kutuzov, who *"knew for many years of military experience what they were deciding the fate of the battle is not the orders of the commander in chief, not the place on which the troops stand, not the number of guns and killed people, but that elusive force, called the spirit of the army, and he followed this force and guided it as far as it was in his power."* Without being distracted by a discussion about how the real historical character corresponded to the image of Kutuzov, which was created by L.N. Tolstoy, we note the main thing - an almost mystical gift of foresight, manifested by the great writer. In the novel, dedicated to the events of the Patriotic War of 1812, both the main reason for the defeat of 1941 and the main source of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War are named with absolute accuracy. Alas, today's youth (to which I can no longer rank myself) do not read War and Peace, but "pass through". But he plays computer "shooters" a lot and for a long time.

Believe me, I'm not joking at all and I'm not being rude. Playing "shooter games" fatally prevents me from understanding the simple causes of the military disaster of 1941. And here's why: the funny little man on the monitor screen

where absolutely obedient to you. With a slight movement of the computer "mouse" you can direct him into an alley that is teeming with evil monsters - and he will go. No questions. The monsters will devour him, the second, the tenth - the next one will go over the "corpses", as if unquestioningly carrying out your commands. Computer games do not at all imply the possibility that a little man suddenly gets out of a flying-diving missile tank, throws a laser blaster on the ground and, swearing obscenely, shows you a big muzzle. This doesn't happen in the game. And in real history, this has already happened countless times. The huge army of the Persian king Xerxes, whose soldiers were driven into battle with whips (not figuratively, but in the literal sense of the word), could not cope with a small "speck" on the map called "Ancient Greece". The numerically insignificant army of Alexander the Great conquered the vast expanses of the Persian Empire not at all because the horses in the Persian cavalry were reliably outdated", and scythed chariots "you worked almost the entire motor resource". Tiny Israel over and over again smashed numerous Arab armies, and the armed forces of the richest country in the world could not cope with the Vietnamese partisans who were catching helicopters with nets woven from wild lianas...

Strictly speaking, neither Soviet nor considering itself part of Russian historiography has never denied the role of the "human factor" as the successor of her work. Not on your nelly! On the contrary, the tireless repetition of the "mantra" about the "environment of a nationwide patriotic upsurge" was an integral part of any publication devoted to the events of the Soviet-German war. There was even a new branch of military-historical science: "troop heroics".

And I'm not kidding again. On the shelf I have a little book that simply shocked me with a stream of the rudest factual "blunders". On the first page of the text

The first paragraph says that Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR... you know when? "In December 1940". Further - more, and all in the same spirit. Who is the author? On the cover we read: *"colonel, doctor of historical sciences, professor, 300 printed (it would be better to say non - printed) works on the theory and history of military art and the heroism of the troops.* Of course, writing about the "heroism of the troops" is more profitable and charming. And it's much easier - you don't need to check a single figure, because, after all, what difference does it make: the 15th or 51st, tank or rifle division accomplished its feat in October or November of the 14th or 41st. ? In general, the logic of Soviet propaganda cannot but amaze: it (propaganda) was ready to recognize almost agree that in the course of dispossession there were "individual excesses", and complete collectivization was not always voluntary, that during the mass repressions of 37-38. "violations of socialist legality" were committed, and life in "communal apartments" and barracks was not very satisfying and fun. But to admit at least a shadow of doubt that the subjects of the Stalinist empire *"like one person are gladly ready to give their lives for the great cause of Lenin - Stalin, and in the name of this ideology, fighters, commanders and political workers are always ready to sacrifice their life"* (Voroshilov, speech at the 18th Party Congress) —no, no, and again no! It couldn't be, because it could never be!

However, let us not exaggerate the role of propaganda beyond measure and reason. People believe in propaganda when they really want to believe in it. Since we are talking about literature, how can we not recall Pushkin's immortal line: *"Ah, it is not difficult to deceive me - I myself am glad to be deceived."* Dumb and primitive Soviet propaganda was not always believed. No matter how much they talked on radio and TV about

the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism", and the people strove to get away to this very "decaying West" - if not forever, then at least on a tour for jeans and a Japanese "two-cassette". How many

no knowledgeable experts and moderately decent politicians warned that the market economy is not a milky river with jelly banks, and friendship cannot "win" in the competition, no one heard them and did not believe them. The heroic myths of Soviet history are believed to this day because they really want to believe in them. What else can a modern Russian find in the history of the 20th century that could support and justify his great power ambitions? What else can he be proud of? Excuse the expression, the current status of a "great energy power"? Moscow offices built from Finnish and Italian materials in German

technique by Turkish builders, in which several thousand "middle managers" wipe them  
tailor pants with imported chairs, calculating on an imported computer the revenues from the export of Russian oil?

I am often asked: when will we find out the truth about the Great Patriotic War and will we find out about it at all? The answer to this question is very simple. Let's find out. When? Not earlier, but not later than the current, fairly protracted, "Time of Troubles" ends and Russia finally takes its rightful place in the general

a number of civilized countries.

Only then can we honestly admit that in our recent history there have been not only glorious  
dy, but also shameful defeats.

## **Andrey Burovsky**

### **DAY "H"**

He passed the planet Clovis, three hundred of which  
eighty residents were quite  
seriously preparing to conquer the universe.

*K. Saimak*

Xenthos got drunk and promised you to  
drink the sea. The next morning, having  
sobered up, he was horrified by his promise.

*From Aesop's fables*

#### **THE IDEA OF CONQUERING THE WORLD**

**There is nothing new in the fact that communism in the USSR is a utopia in power. There is nothing new in the fact that this utopia wanted to become Zemsharna.**

**There is nothing new in the fact that Stalin was a genius gullibility, secrecy, deceit, the ability to calculate several moves ahead. No one knows what form this idea could have taken in Stalin's head.**

**There is also nothing new in the fact that the communists were building an empire, first gathering the countries of the former Russian Empire. To do this, they were ready at any moment to violate any international treaties. The Communists easily violated the agreement with Georgia and occupied this country in 1921. They suppressed the 1924 uprising with incredible cruelty. They re-conquered Kazakhstan, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Only a lack of forces prevented them from conquering Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia.**

**Already after 1920, and after the formation of the USSR in 1922, the communists waged a civil war:**

- 1) With white armies.**
- 2) With the "green" peasant armies.**



**3) With political enemies, socialist parties and their armed forces.**

**4) With nation states and their armies on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire.**

**But that's not all! Bolsheviks consistently believed that Russia was a "wrong" country. It is necessary to radically remake not only its entire political, but also its entire economic and social system. The entire people of Russia, all its estates, classes, ethnographic and cultural groups were subject to a complete "remake". As they said then, you need to "change your skin."**

**Here it is, another "front" of the Civil War:**

**5) The war with the people of Russia for its sovietization.**

**The Bolsheviks thought the same about ALL the peoples of the world. They believed that the legitimate governments of all powers were not legitimate. They are formed by the bourgeoisie, not by the proletariat. These governments must be overthrown in order for the proletariat to take power.**

**By virtue of this position, the Bolsheviks found themselves in a state of war with the rest of mankind. They could not yet, but really wanted to open this "sixth front" of the Civil War:**

**6) War with the legitimate governments of the whole world.**

**And behind this sixth direction of the Civil War we looked at the seventh ...**

**7) War with the peoples of the world for their sovietization.**

**All this is part of not a national, but a World Civil War. What happens in the country easily spills out beyond its borders. What is happening in the world is reflected in the policy of the Bolsheviks.**

**The idea of world domination appeared before the USSR. An old friend of Lenin, G. A. Solomon, recalled at the very beginning of 1918: "My next meeting was with Lenin ... The conversation with Lenin made the most depressing impression on me. It was pure maximalist nonsense.**

**“Tell me, Vladimir Ilyich, as an old comrade,” I said, “what is going on here?” Is this really a bet on socialism, on the island of Utopia, only on a colossal scale? I do not understand anything...**

**“There is no island of Utopia here,” he replied sharply in a tone of great authority. “It is a matter of creating a socialist state... From now on, Russia will be the first state with a socialist system implemented in it... Ah!..., you shrug your shoulders! Well, be more surprised! It's not about Russia, good gentlemen, I don't give a damn about it - this is only the stage through which we are passing to the world revolution! .. ”<sup>1</sup>**

**On July 10, 1918, at the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Soviet Russia adopted the Constitution. It consisted of six sections, and the second section, "General Provisions", declared the temporary, transitional nature of the Constitution. Even the third section, “The Structure of Soviet Power,” included formulations of a purely political nature, oriented not at Russia, but at the entire world community. “Setting as our main task the abolition of all exploitation of man by man, the complete elimination of the division of society into classes, the merciless suppression of the exploiters, the establishment of the socialist orientation of society and the victory of socialism in all countries...”**

**In the fifth section, "Budget Law" - also completely new policy, and international.**

**The constitution determined the ways of destroying all the old economic foundations of the state and the financial impact on other states. The basic principles are the refusal to pay debts "as the first blow to international banking and finance capital" and the promise to follow this path "until the complete victory of the international workers' uprising against the yoke of capital."**

<sup>1</sup> Solomon G. A. Among the red leaders. Paris. 1930. T. 1. S. 15.

**In 1922 the USSR is created. The Constitution of the Soviet Union begins with the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR. After a long demagoguery about the fact that “there, in the camp of capitalism, there is national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist atrocities and wars. Here, in the camp of socialism, mutual trust and peace, national freedom and equality, peaceful cohabitation and fraternal co-operation of peoples”, the “Declaration” finally gets down to business: “Access to the Union is open to all socialist Soviet republics, both existing and having arisen in the future, the new union state will be a worthy crowning of the foundations laid back in October 1917 for peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation of peoples, it will serve as a faithful bulwark against peaceful**

**capitalism and a new decisive step towards the unification of the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic”<sup>1</sup> .**

**Many other equally impressive texts could be cited.**

**The USSR is the form that the communist fixation idea took: world domination. A very convenient form: at least theoretically, any republics could be annexed to the USSR without changing either the political structure or the structure of the state.**

## **ORIGINAL LOCALITY OF THE IDEA**

**The communists were not the first to come up with the idea of conquering the world.**

**Alexander the Great wanted to conquer the world - and instantly became convinced that the part of the Oikumene known to him was much smaller than the unknown. He wanted to v**

**1 The Basic Law (Constitution) of the Union of Soviet Socialist sky republics. Adopted by the second session of the CEC of the USSR of the first convocation July 6, 1923 and in the final version by the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 31, 1924. M., 1924.**

India - but could only stand on its very edge. And behind India, as it "turned out", are colossal regions, about which neither Alexander nor his great teacher, Aristotle, simply knows anything.

Moreover, the areas of the globe that Alexander learned about towards the end of his life are only a tiny piece of the entire Earth.

Genghis Khan commanded his descendants to conquer the Universe, to reach the "last sea". He had vaguely heard about the Atlantic Ocean, and he became this "last" for the savage and ignoramus. In reality, everything ended not even on the shores of the Atlantic ... The Adriatic became the "Last Sea", and that is how it all ended. The oceans either roared in storms, or spread out in blinding blue silk. They washed Cape Horn, the islands of Tasmania and Tahiti, the coast of California and Greenland. The oceans rose in tsunamis and carried ships. Volcanoes erupted in the oceans and delicious fish swam.

... And in the wild and impoverished steppes, on the threshold of a primitive yurt, sat an illiterate, bow-legged savage who, not only could not conquer all this ... Who did not even know that all this existed in the world. And if I saw it, I didn't understand what it was that I saw.

And the Communists did not want to conquer the world with the power of ideas. first.

The emperor of the Roman Empire, Constantine, was depicted with an orb in his hand. The orb symbolized the globe, into which a cross was stuck, a symbol of the Christianization of the World. The empire saw itself as a ship of true faith, sailing on an ocean of paganism. But the plans to seize and Christianize the world were not destined not only to come true - they could not even come close to implementation.

All "great" conquerors inevitably face the fact that the world is much larger and more diverse than it seems to them from an ideological hangover.

Choking with enthusiasm for the "Zemsharny Republic of Soviets", striving to "give the land of Grenada to the peasants of the Yans", dreaming of dying in battles on the Ganges, so that their Arbat homeland shone from Japan to England, the boys in red revolutionary trousers with completely ignored this.

We won't talk seriously about the Zemshar Republic of Soviets: we won't get on the same level with Pasha Kogan and others who are equally frivolous people.

There is something deep in the very formulation of such problems. small-town.

Let's not even take the whole world, let's take only Europe, a small piece of our colossal world. Even this piece is too large and varied for anyone to conquer. Not only Stalin, but anyone in general.

#### THE IDEA OF CONQUERING EUROPE

In propaganda films such as "Sniper" or in the book "First Strike"<sup>1</sup>, the war of the future was understood simply: the defeat of the Wehrmacht, with further comprehension by enemy soldiers of all the genius of Marx's idea.

The film "If Tomorrow is War" was filmed using documentary footage of the maneuvers taking place then. Documentary footage turns into feature footage: the enemy attacks, is instantly defeated, the war goes on in enemy territory, the Red Army bombs Germany: Nuremberg, Magdeburg, Fürth. And in Germany, of course, uprisings of the proletariat against the "fascists" flare up.

Even imagine for a moment - it would be so in reality, and not in the inflamed imagination of directors and stage directors.

But what is the "Earthness" in this?

<sup>1</sup> *Shpakov N.N.* First hit. A story about a future war. M., 1939.

Even if we defeat the Wehrmacht and occupy Germany, France and Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, the countries of the Balkans and Scandinavia lie behind it. Each country will have to be conquered, putting a lot of its soldiers. Each of them will have to enter the occupation army, suppressing uprisings and carrying out sovietization. Where to get the strength for all this?

In reality, the USSR with difficulty and not completely sovietized only Eastern Europe, and even in it had "holes" such as Yugoslavia, Albania, and stubborn Polish resistance.

By the way, did the communists Sovietize Russia? They sincerely believed that a person's personality is a complete nothing, a product of the environment, and nothing more. And if so, if a person is brought up in the right environment, then a like-minded communist will turn out. But many people whom they raised as pioneers and Komsomol members we grew up either completely indifferent to ideology, or staunch enemies of the Soviet regime.

It is in Russia. How were they going to sovietize Spain and Ireland? Not to mention the Indians in Peru and the farmers in Australia?

As for the conquests ... Conquering the world with them all the time it was just that which the communists either "did not believe in", or did not put a penny on: the inner world, the inner convictions of a person. The Finns lay down behind a boulder and fired to the last, at the cost of their own lives, putting bullet after bullet into the "builders of a bright future." And therefore, even after dividing the world with Hitler, Stalin could not conquer Finland allotted to him. After the war, the USSR was forced to leave Austria, to refuse to send troops to Greece ...

If the USSR in 1941 had begun to implement plans for the seizure of Europe, it would not have been able to carry them out purely physically.

The very attempt of this kind was utter madness in the most direct, literal sense -

**manifestation of inadequacy. Such an attempt could only be made by people spiritually living outside the real world.**

## **WHY COMMUNISTS WAS WAR NEEDED?**

**The Hoover Institution of Stanford University in California (USA) has a package of 232 highly secret decisions of the Soviet Politburo on foreign policy issues for 1934-1936. "German agents regularly acquired such documents, receiving them 7-8 days after their creation"<sup>1</sup>. These decrees contained information about the instructions of the Politburo to the top of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the highest government officials.**

**On February 11, 1934, the Politburo decided that a major European war would help the proletariat seize power in the major European centers.**

**In a Politburo resolution of May 1, 1935, the Politburo believed that the USSR would take part in new conflicts in Europe and Asia exactly to the extent "that would allow it to be a decisive factor in the sense of turning the world war into a world revolution"<sup>2</sup>.**

**On August 19, 1939, Stalin said to the Politburo that if the Pact was signed with the Third Reich, then the Reich would certainly attack Poland. And then the entry into the war of England and France will become inevitable. The Soviet Union can stay out of the conflict and wait in an advantageous position until he comes queue.**

<sup>1</sup> *McDowell J., Lowenthal M.* Documents of Stalin's foreign policy, shedding light on the Stalin-Hitler pact // Truth of Viktor Suvorov. New evidence. M., 2008. S. 235.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* S. 243.

**Back in 1920, during the Soviet-Polish war, the goal was to reach Germany, carrying the corpse of White Poland on Red Army bayonets. Now, since 1939, and there is no Poland, Brest stands on the Soviet-German border.**

**The "icebreaker of the revolution" cut into the body of the rest of Europe and by 1940 conquered almost all of it.**

**Apparently, Stalin was in no hurry. He wasted time, but not out of cowardice or weakness. After all, he saw that time was working for the USSR. The later the USSR enters the war, the more the states of Europe will be exhausted fighting each other. And the Red Army every year will become more professional, stronger, more active, more manageable.**

**If it is possible to hit Hitler in August 1941, that is better than in July. And if possible in the spring of 1942 - even better! If Hitler was ahead of Stalin, it was precisely because Stalin was in no hurry. Time worked for him.**

**And behind all the borders, the Red Army is impatiently awaited by like-minded people, waiting only for the moment - how can they blow up the world in which they live?**

## **OFFENSIVE WAR PROPAGANDA**

**The anecdotal nature of talk about the "peacefulness of the USSR" is very clearly visible if you read articles in the Soviet press in 1938-1939. You literally get tired of the flow of vicious, not shy in expressions of aggression. "Fascist freaks", "cannibals", "stupid people", "so-called "generals" are still compliments. Cartoons depicting enemy soldiers and politicians with pig snouts and monkey muzzles are in Krasnaya Zvezda and Literaturnaya Gazeta.**

**What is characteristic: in 1938 the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was already talking about "the outbreak of a world war." About the "Second World War", which will lead to uprisings and revolution**



**Europe... Formally, the Second World War is considered from September 1, 1939, but for the communists it has already begun. Which is logical: the civil war in Spain is already underway, Czechoslovakia is already being divided.**

**Even more characteristic is the clear anti-German orientation of all militaristic propaganda.**

**There is no common border with the Third Reich yet. War with the German people still does not smell. And the enemy soldiers in the films If Tomorrow is War and No. 5 Squadron speak German! And it was in 1938 that Eisenstein was filming Alexander Nevsky!**

**Here is a song from this movie "If tomorrow the war is on." Words by V. Lebedev-Kumach, music by Dm. and Dan. By Krassov.**

If there is war tomorrow, if the enemy attacks,  
If the dark force comes, -  
As one man, the entire Soviet people will  
stand up for a free homeland.

### ***Chorus:***

On earth, in heaven and at sea  
Our melody is both mighty and severe:  
If tomorrow is war  
If the hike is tomorrow, -  
Get ready to go today!

If there is war tomorrow, the country will be  
stirred up From Kronstadt to Vladivostok.  
The country will shake, great and strong,  
And we will crush the enemy cruelly.

### ***Chorus.***

A plane will fly, a machine gun will rumble,  
Mighty tanks will rumble  
And the battleships will go, and the infantry will go,  
And dashing carts will rush.

### ***Chorus.***

We do not want war, but we will defend ourselves, -  
We strengthen the defense not in vain, -  
And on the enemy's land, we will defeat the  
enemy With little blood, with a mighty blow!

### ***Chorus.***

There is nowhere in the whole world such a force,  
To crush our country -  
Stalin is with us dear, and with an iron  
hand Voroshilov leads us to victory!

### ***Chorus.***

Rise up, people, get ready for a hike!  
Drums, drum harder!  
Musicians, go! Singers, go ahead!  
Resound our victory song!

### ***Chorus:***

On earth, in heaven and at sea  
Our melody is both powerful and severe:  
If tomorrow is war  
If the hike is tomorrow, -  
Get ready to go today!

**Abram Room's film Squadron No. 5 begins with Soviet intelligence intercepting an order from the Third Reich command to cross the Soviet border. They fly out to bomb German airfields thousands of Soviet aircraft, including squadron No. 5. "Ours" are destroying "theirs" with terrible force, but the "fascists" knock out two of our planes. Pilots of Squadron No. 5 - Major Grishin and Captain Nesterov - descend on enemy territory by parachute. A! Here they are, underground hangars of enemies!!! Capturing the radio, the heroes call in squadrons of Soviet bombers. "We" "them" will show - to build underground hangars! And here is the German anti-fascist. Your boyfriend, proletarian, working bone. With his help, the heroes of the film capture "theirs" plane and fly away to their own.**

**And the same thing happens in literature! In the late 1930s, Soviet literature did more than whip up war hysteria (it had done so since 1918). She names a very specific future enemy: "fascist" Germany. Socialist Reich.**

Not a single book before the war had such circulation as *The First Strike*. After the signing of the Pact in 1939, the book was withdrawn from sale... But by that time only the lazy had not read it. And in general, every red commander was obliged to read this book, because the military publishing house published it in the educational series "Commander's Library".

Everything is "as it should be" in it: the enemy, "fascists", attacks. But "ours", of course, instantly overturn the enemy, on the territory of the USSR the battle goes on only for the first day. And then the sky darkens from avenging planes ... "The percentage of defeat was quite satisfactory, despite the good work of the enemy's air defense. Over fifty percent of his brand new twin-gun fighters were destroyed on the ground before

got up in the air."

"The flight personnel of enemy units subjected to attack, showed tenacity. The officers rushed to the vehicles, despite the explosions of bombs and the machine-gun fire of attack aircraft. They pulled planes out of burning hangars. The fighters took off running across the cratered field towards the impenetrable wall of the smoke screen and the continuous glare of explosions. Many immediately overturned in the craters, others flew up, thrown up by the explosion of bombs, and fell in a heap of burning debris. Here and there, flaming fighters, struck by incendiary bullets, were visible here and there through the haze of the smoke screen. And yet, some officers managed to take off. With the courage of blind despair and malice, no longer following any plan, out of order, they entered into a single battle with Soviet aircraft. But this courage served only to the detriment of their own defense. Their scattered efforts could not be a serious obstacle to the work of the Soviet

1 See: *Shchapov N.N.* First hit. A story about a future war. M., 1939.

years and only forced their own anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns to cease fire.

To what extent, after all, what we are waiting for materializes ... Of course, in books and films, "we" fired, and "they" exploded. In real history, it was not quite so... But since 1938, Soviet society has been waiting for a war with Germany. It can be said that it called her according to all the rules of primitive magic. Well, it called. How can one not believe in the fact that thought is material, and in God's Providence in history?

As for the statements of officials, "... a lot of "indirect evidence" allows us to assume with a high degree of certainty that it was in May 1941 in Moscow that the decision was made to start a large-scale war with Germany, and not once in indefinite future, and in July-August 1941"<sup>1</sup>.

For example, on May 5, 1941, Stalin delivered a speech to graduates of military academies at a reception in the Kremlin. In it, without naming the enemy, he unexpectedly announced that the USSR would wage not a defensive, but an offensive war, for which the country was re

The question is how ready?

## TECHNICAL POTENTIAL OF THE RED ARMY

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army was the largest army in the world. In the border districts and fleets of the USSR there were 3,289,850 soldiers and officers, 59,787 guns and mortars, 12,782 tanks, of which 1,475 were T-34 and KV tanks, and 10,743 aircraft. The three fleets included about 220,000 personnel, 182 ships of the main classes (3 battleships, 7 cruise ships, 45 leaders and destroyers, and 127 submarines).

Direct protection of the state border

<sup>1</sup> *Solonin M.* USSR - Finland. From a peace treaty to a howl Not. // The truth of Viktor Suvorov. New evidence. M., 2008.

carried border units (land and sea) of eight border districts. Together with the operational units and units of the internal troops, they numbered about 100 thousand people.

These troops were subordinated to five border districts: Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kyiv Special and Odessa. From the sea, the actions of the ground forces were to be supported by three fleets: the Northern, the Red Banner Baltic and the Black Sea.

The troops of the Baltic Military District under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsov included the 8th and 11th armies, the 27th army was in formation west of Pskov. These parts were located from the Baltic Sea to the southern border of Lithuania, over a distance of 300 km.

The troops of the Western Special Military District under the command of General D. G. Pavlov were located from the southern border of Lithuania to the Pripyat River on a front 470 km long.

This district included the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies. In addition, formations and units of the 13th Army were formed in the area of Mogilev, Minsk, Slutsk.

The troops of the Kiev Special Military District under the command of General M.P. Kirponos, consisting of the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies and formations of district subordination, occupied positions on a front stretching 860 km from Pripyat to Lipkan in Northern Moldavia.

The troops of the Odessa Military District under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko covered the border in the area from Lipkan to the mouth of the Danube, 480 km long.

The troops of the Leningrad Military District under the command of General M. M. Popov were located in the northwestern regions of the USSR (Murmansk region, Karelian-Finnish SSR and the Karelian Isthmus), as well as on the northern coast of the Estonian SSR and the KI

The length of the land border in this area reached 1300 km, and the sea border - 380 km. The 7th, 14th, 23rd armies and the Northern Fleet were located here.

But these 186 divisions are only a part of the Red Army, which included 303 divisions with a total strength of 5,400,000 men. In total, 34-37 million lived in the USSR potential recruits. The number of conscripts during the four years of the war was 28,807,150.

## WEHRMAHT

Suvorov absolutely rightly writes that in the USSR they diligently underestimated the size of the Red Army, the quality of its weapons, and just as diligently exaggerated the size of the Wehrmacht and the quality of its military equipment.

The classic way to distort is to compare obviously incomparable values: for example, only heavy tanks in the USSR and ALL tanks of the Third Reich. Or compare ALL artillery of the Wehrmacht only with the number of barrels with a caliber of more than 76 mm in the Red Army.

Back in the USSR, it was believed that there were 8-9 thousand people in the divisions of the Red Army, while in reality there were 12,360 soldiers and officers on average per division.

Citing the size of the Red Army, usually not approximately 500,000 people were taken into account from the additional call-up received in June 1941.

And speaking of the Wehrmacht, they took into account the combat staff, and technical workers, and service staff.

In general, there are a lot of cheating tricks.

If we take into account not all Wehrmacht personnel, but only combat personnel, then its number for the summer of 1941 cannot be determined at 4.2 million people, of which 1.8 million are citizens of other states, not Germany. Of these, about 3 million people are in the western border districts and the troops of the second strategic echelon. Poten

**There were 23 million social conscripts in the Reich, of which 21,100,000 were actually called up.**

**In the troops of the western border districts alone, the Red Army had more than 37 thousand guns and mortars, and in the troops of the Wehrmacht and all its allies - no more than 31 thousand guns.**

**In addition to motorized artillery, the German infantry division of the first waves had 6,300 horses, almost half of them in the artillery regiment. All artillery of the infantry divisions was horse-drawn. Only the artillery of anti-tank artillery, RGK, tank and motorized infantry divisions was motorized.**

**There were only 3,300 tanks and 250 self-propelled guns on the border with the USSR, of which 1,600 were light (T-1, T-2, and T-38) and 1,610 medium (T-3 and T-4). Against 1610 medium tanks of the Wehrmacht in the western districts of the USSR stood 160 heavy and medium tanks KV and T-34, far superior to the German ones in combat qualities. And against 1600 German light tanks Soviet lungs, in no way inferior to the Nazi ones (excluding 2 thousand tanks of mechanized corps of the second strategic echelon).**

**Against 3046 of all Nazi combat aircraft (1067 fighters, 1417 bombers and 562 reconnaissance aircraft), the Air Force of the western districts, fleets and long-range barter aviation (TWO) had 9917 combat aircraft, including 7133 in the districts, 1339 in the TWO and in the fleets — 1445.**

**The Soviet Air Force accepted aircraft of new types from factories 3719, since aircraft of the 1939-1940 model should also be taken into account among the new ones. DB-ZF, Ar-2, Su-2, Tu-2, Yak-4, Pe-8, BB-2, of which there were more than a thousand. The Wehrmacht, out of all 3,046 combat aircraft, had less than 2,000 new ones, if we exclude the obsolete Yu-87, Xe-111, Do-217, etc.**

**What do we end up with? That's right: the overwhelming superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in the quantity and quality of tanks and aircraft. Not surprising,**

that the leadership of the USSR was not afraid of a potential provnik.

Later, Stalin was blamed many times for not declaring a general mobilization and not sending troops into the foreground of the fortified areas before the Nazi attack. If this is a mistake, then only in assessing the combat ability of the troops. Stalin and the People's Commissariat of Defense believed that 186 divisions and all the accumulated strength would be enough to repel any sudden attack by the Third Reich and all its allies.

Judging by the number of divisions and military equipment, Stalin is absolutely right: the Red Army is much stronger than the Wehrmacht. If Stalin made a mistake, it was not because he miscalculated the divisions.

Probably, the war between the Third Reich and the USSR was inevitable because each of them claimed world domination, and so far no one has succeeded in creating a second globe. In addition, "dear allies" did not trust each other. They practically agree  
Czechs couldn't.

It is no coincidence that both the Third Reich and the USSR held large contingents of troops on the common border. They held a general parade, signed treaties, exchanged valuable experience... And on the border by June 22, 1941, according to Meltyukhov<sup>1</sup>, there were such forces:

Quantity:	Soviet	Germanic Ratio	
divisions	190	166	1.15:1
Soldier	3 289 851	4 306 800	1:1.3
Tanks and assault guns	15 687	4171	3.8:1
aircraft	10 743	4846	2.2:1
Artillery - guns and mortars	59 787	42 604	1.4:1

<sup>1</sup> See: *Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. M., 2000.*



**Soviet troops are stronger. At the same time, the Nazis did not have heavy tanks (more than 40 tons), and in the Red Army - 564 vehicles (504 of the latest KV and 59 T-35); medium tanks (more than 20 tons) the Nazis had 990, and the Red Army - 1373, including 892 of the latest T-34s and 481 T-40s. But the Nazi troops are also at the ready. As they got up in 1939, they stand for two years ... long before the Barbarossa plan.**

**The global inevitability of war was supplemented by many the gesture of small mutual injections.**

**The USSR seized more than it "was supposed to" under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (that's what it took three new secret protocols specifying the boundaries of the zones of occupation - and all three in favor of the USSR).**

**Probably, the question was only one: when exactly and who will attack whom. And here really bewilderment arises: why did Hitler choose such an inconvenient time for the attack? If he had attacked after the conquest of Britain, everything would have been clear. And so, before the Sea Lion operation, the outbreak of war with the USSR meant a war on two fronts. The Nazis and the Wehrmacht were very afraid of such a war - according to the experience of the First World War. Why did they go for it?**

**Firstly, because they were convinced that Britain cannot be defeated. At least for now.**

**Secondly, with Britain it was not possible to conclude read the world.**

**Thirdly, the USSR could not be used against Britain.**

## **WHAT WAS THIS ARMY FOR?**

**In the USSR, it was usually said that the Soviet Union with 1939 "begins to actively prepare for entry into the war." In preparation for the increase in the size of the Red Army, industry is transferred from a six-day to a seven-day week, the working day**

increases by an hour, a law on criminal liability for being late and absenteeism is introduced, and the right to quit "at one's own will" is abolished.

But why, in fact, is it "preparing"? The USSR has been in a state of war since September 17, 1939. He annexed 3 countries, divided Poland, bit off pieces from Romania, spent the Winter War with Finland and started a new war with her at the same time as the attack Nazis.

All measures to strengthen the rear can be fully explained not by preparation, but by natural changes in the laws and customs of the belligerent country.

This also explains the launch into serial production of samples of new military equipment: the latest aircraft, tanks, Katyusha rocket launchers, etc.

Troops are being drawn to the western borders? But it was not only Hitler who did not trust Stalin. Stalin also did not trust Hitler. He was getting ready too. (Besides, why did these two and their entourage have to trust each other? They weren't so naive.)

We know quite a lot about the Barbarossa plan. Documents on the plans of the Soviet leadership by June 22, 1941, the orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Kyiv Military District in the first hours and days of the war have not been cut to this day. There are separate documents... But they are very eloquent.

"Considerations on the Fundamentals of Strategic Deployment formation of the Armed Forces of the USSR" - September 18 1940

"Updated plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR" - March 11, 1941

"Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies" 1 - May 1941

And finally, "a note from the chief of staff of the Kyiv

<sup>1</sup> Military history magazine. 1992, nos. 1 and 2.

Air defense according to the decision of the Military Council of the South-Western Front according to the deployment plan for 1940"<sup>1</sup>.

In essence, this is one and the same document, refined and refined many times.

In total, the Red Army included 61 tank and 31 motorized rifle divisions, 12,400 tanks, not counting thousands of machine-gun tankettes.

This huge invading army was supposed to implement the doctrine of "with little blood and in foreign territory." It's hard to say what about "little blood" there, but about foreign territory, that's for sure. According to all these documents, enemy troops were not supposed to stay on the territory of the USSR for more than a day. This is if the enemy will attack first at all. And it was considered better "under no circumstances to give the initiative of action to the German command niyu, preempt the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in a hundred deployment diy".

And in general, "our operational training, the training of troops, should be aimed at ensuring in practice the complete defeat of the enemy already at a time when he has not yet had time to muster all his forces"<sup>2</sup>.

Like this. Attack first, do not wait for the full deployment of enemy troops. And to foreign territory. By the 30th day of the war, the Red Army was supposed to go "to the front of Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. That is, to be located 300-350 km from the new border of the USSR, on the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic.

The next stage, spelled out less clearly, is "to seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia."

In the same way, by the way, in terms of "Barbarossa"

1 Russia - XX century. Documentation. 1941 Book. 1. M., 1998.

2 *Meltyukhov M.A.* Stalin's missed chance. M., 2000.

The immediate plans were clearly spelled out, the subsequent ones less clearly. The date of the invasion is not earlier than July 10-15. Not exactly? But Hitler postponed the day of the attack on Belgium and France 9 times. The day of the attack on the USSR - three times. All transfers and clarifications of this kind are within the normal range when planning operations of this magnitude.

Among the models that were considered in the USSR was the following: the Nazis attacked Belarus with the forces of 50 divisions. And the Red Army, with the forces of 44 divisions, holds them back and at the same time strikes from the south against Krakow. 44 defending divisions can really hold back 50 attackers... An excellent plan, but for its implementation it is necessary that 44 divisions would like to hold someone back.

Could the Red Army in 1941 attack the Wehrmacht, defeat it, capture and occupy Germany? Could she pass through Germany to the English Channel, break into France, reach the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean?

From a technical standpoint, yes. 303 divisions, 11 thousand tanks, almost 10 thousand aircraft, 40 thousand large-caliber barrels. This is a colossal force, and there was simply no equal to it in Europe. If everything was decided by the number of tanks and guns, Stalin would have captured the whole world very easily.

However, the Soviet leadership did not see the disadvantages of the Red Army, and they are very large.

## CONS OF THE RED ARMY

Soviet people value everything material. Military equipment is very important to them. Much more important is the spirit of the troops, the psychology of the soldiers, their trust in the officers and the entire leadership of the country ...

Technology is always more important to them and people themselves, including more important than their qualifications.

In fact, qualifications were not very good in the Wehrmacht either. By the beginning of 1939, 12 Wehrmacht army corps were formed from 38 divisions, with a total number of 582 thousand people. By September 1939, there were already 3,214,000 people in the Wehrmacht, and by 1941 - 7,234,000 (including both combat and non-combat personnel). With such a rapid growth in the size of the army, many soldiers remained ill-prepared ... from the point of view of a professional army, of course.

But, firstly, in the Wehrmacht and primarily in the German units in non-commissioned officer positions, lived excellent professionals.

A single rank for ordinary soldiers in the Wehrmacht, like the Red Army (Red Army, Red Navy, private), did not exist even within the armed forces. Ordinary soldiers were called by their own special

sti, positions.

Privates in different parts had different names. A private in mountain rifle units was called Jäger (hunter); private in the cavalry - Reiter (horseman). Ordinary artilleryman - Kanonier (shooter). Private tanker - Panzerschütze (tank gunner). And in the motorized infantry - already Panzergrenadier (tank grenadier).

The foreman (sergeant major) in different branches of the military was all the more rigidly separated from the foreman in another branch of the army. The Sanitätstabsfeldwebel is the chief petty officer of the medical service, which has nothing to do with the foreman blacksmith (Stabsbeschlagmeister) or the petty officer - Festungspionierstabfeldwebel'em. And so on up to the foreman-pigeon breeder (Stabsbrief taubenmeister).

And the common German word for soldier "Der Soldat" is used only as a collective name.

Secondly, at least part of the officers would be well prepared.

There are relatively few officers, their qualifications and morale are traditionally high.

Soviet platoons and companies were much less prepared than their German opponents. During the war, the gap between the training of the soldiers of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht gradually narrowed: the Red Army men accumulated experience. In the Wehrmacht, by 1943, many qualified soldiers were knocked out, and new recruits were trained in haste and poorly.

But if the gap narrowed in the course of hostilities, it means that before they began, the soldiers of the Red Army were trained poorly and poorly. This is true.

Pilots in the USSR, upon leaving the school, had only 40-50 flight hours. In the Wehrmacht - about 400 hours.

It is useful to look at the Red Army through the eyes Nazi generals: many of them wrote and published their memoirs. He saw the Red Army as a huge, unwieldy crowd of unprepared, low-initiative people. These people do not know how to use their military equipment, mistreat it and often break it. They are brave on the offensive and tenacious on the defensive, but have little confidence in their superiors and are easily panicked.

The units of the Red Army seemed to the Nazis unable to clearly interact with each other, deprived of reliable communications and little help to each other.

This picture may irritate the "patriots" of the Soviet era. It is no coincidence that V. Suvorov is so popular: after all, he said that the USSR had no technical backlog! The thesis of lagging behind in modern Russia most often causes purely emotional protest and irritation. But this is exactly how the Nazis saw the Red Army. And let me remind you again - the Wehrmacht itself was not very professional. The army of the British Empire was much better prepared and trained than the army of the Third Reich.

It is difficult to imagine an army that would have

a better material part than the Red Army, but which would be worse able to dispose of this wealth.

It is very characteristic that the Nazis asserted that one of the main reasons for the tactical shortcomings of the Red Army was insufficient mechanization. How so?! After all, there were significantly more combat vehicles in the Red Army than in the Wehrmacht ?! Yes, but transport vehicles were times much less.

The Red Army is the only major European army that has not adopted armored personnel carriers throughout the war. Motorized infantry was usually transported on the armor of tanks, most of the infantry moved on foot.

Most often this is explained by the "need" to release as many tanks as possible. Since all industrial capacities were occupied, the production of armored transporters would inevitably lead to a decrease in the number of produced tanks. What is characteristic: during the war, the command of the Red Army considered armored personnel carriers as an unnecessary luxury, but after the war, a program of extensive mechanization of the Red Army was launched.

In fact, the decrease in the number of produced tanks could well be compensated by the training of tankers and the production of armored personnel carriers ... With greater qualifications of tankers and tanks, fewer would be required to perform the same tasks.

So it is not a matter of insufficient production capacity, and it is not a matter of tactical doctrines per se. The point is in the special structure of the brains of Soviet people: they consistently believed that technology was more important than people, a sense of duty was more important than comfort, including psychological comfort, and the fulfillment of the tasks set by the Party was much more important than preserving the life and health of people. That is, a man, but only the result of his labor.

## **AN ARMY FROM ANOTHER ERA**

**This feature of the Red Army and the entire Soviet society is very characteristic of the beginning of the period of industrialism, for the end of the XVIII - the first half of the XIX century industrial products were produced on very simple machines, the qualifications of the workers were not high. That is why it was advantageous to force the worker to "plow" 14-16 hours a day. The machine tool was important: it was rough, you couldn't break it, but it cost many times more than the worker's labor. The result of labor is important: both raw materials and finished products cost much more than the worker is paid.**

**But the worker is not important: his work is not valuable. If he is sick, tired, old, he can easily be replaced by another.**

**In Russia, the industrial revolution was delayed, in the Russian Empire and at the beginning of the 20th century there were many industries in which the worker is less valuable than the machine tool, raw materials and manufactured product. The Bolsheviks, having seized power, "froze" Russia, stopped social development. In the middle of the 20th century, many Russians thought the same as they did half a century ago. Why, Marxism was also born in the early industrial revolution.**

**In Europe, in the middle of the 19th century, machines appeared that required qualifications from the worker. The longer a worker needs to be trained, the more valuable he is. The higher the share of his salary in the cost of the product. The more difficult the machine is - and thus it is easier to break it if the worker does not like to work or he wants to spoil the owner.**

**There were such productions in Russia, but by the beginning of the First World War, industry had only just begun to switch to them. Germany, on the other hand, almost did not catch the first stage of industrialism, going straight to skilled labor. For this reason, Germany**



beginning of the 20th century and pulled ahead, overtaking Britain and France. That is why in Germany there was no mass impoverished lumpenism, as in Britain.

The army of mass conscription is also a kind of "mass production". In the USSR, this "production" is organized according to the laws of another era.

One can give examples for a long time of how Nazi generals and officers are perplexed: why do Soviet commanders not take care of their soldiers so much?! For many of them, this is convincing proof that the Jewish commissars are deliberately destroying the Russian people.

The question has been preserved, which legends attribute to Halder, then Weidling, then Pauwels, then even Dwight Eisenhower. He was asked in different versions of the legend to either Konev or Zhukov. In all versions of the legend, the Soviet commander is asked the question:

Why do you care so little about the lives of your soldiers?

To which the Soviet commander shrugs his shoulders and answers quite bravo:

We fight our way! Stalinist!

But this is not only about Stalinism.

## ARMY NATIONAL OR CLASS?

The very spirit of the Wehrmacht was originally completely different from that of the Red Army. After all, the Red Army was created as a "class" army, an army of "proletariat". The Wehrmacht was formed as an imperial army, including various national units. The ruling party tried many times to bring the army under control, but there was never a post of commissar in the Wehrmacht. Even if party power existed, it was at a distance.

And in the Red Army, each part is from a battalion and larger. In addition to the commander, she also had a commissar. Such a system

ma was introduced during the Civil War. Only in April 1940, after the Finnish war, the rights of the commissars were curtailed, they lost the right to cancel the order of the unit commander. Prior to that, the commissar confirmed or canceled any order of the unit commander of any importance.

Almost all the commissars knew nothing about military affairs. Yes, this was not at all what was required of them, but only absolute personal devotion to the CPSU (b) and personally to Comrade Stalin.

Of course, there were very different people among the commissars. Some honestly helped "their" commanders, others were removed from everything except the "political education" of the personnel. Still others gave valuable instructions and even began to command themselves. An attempt to rein in the commissar could cost the commander dearly.

In addition, in the army units, the Komsomol represented a very independent system. If a soldier of the Red Army did not come to the service of the Komsomol, he was quickly accepted into the Komsomol. And the Komsomol meetings were held ... behind closed doors. Soldiers gathered for meetings, discussed commanders and commissars, and sometimes wrote denunciations against them and even directly refused to obey. In fact, ordinary soldiers of any unit at any moment could understand what a charm this Komsomol was, and practically get out of control. And an attempt to influence the soldiers could immediately turn for the unit commander into a denunciation to "dear authorities."

### **ABOUT "DEAR ORGANS"**

Special Department... This was the name of the military counterintelligence unit, which was part of the Red Army. Special departments were created on December 19, 1918 by the decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), according to which the front and army Chekas were merged with the military control bodies, and on their basis a new body was formed - the Special Department of the Cheka under the Council of People

**Theoretically - military counterintelligence. In fact, it is a system of surveillance and control over troops, a unified centralized system of security agencies in the troops. In 1934-1938. military counterintelligence as a Special, then - the 5th Department, is part of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR. In March 1938, with the abolition of the GUGB, on the basis of the 5th Department, the 2nd Directorate (special departments) of the NKVD of the USSR was created. Already in September 1938, the Special Department was recreated as the 4th Department of the GUGB. Subordinate - special departments (OO) i**

**That is, a special department exists in the army - but ar**  
**Mii does not obey.**

**A special department of the NKVD monitored the political and moral state of the unit, and also had to identify traitors, spies, saboteurs, terrorists, counterrevolutionary organizations and groups of people conducting anti-Soviet agitation. He conducted investigations under the supervision of the prosecutor's office and referred cases to military**

**From the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front. In this mass, 1,505 spies and 308 saboteurs were identified and exposed. That is, less than 2,000 enemy agents were arrested. More than 65,000 soldiers have been detained. For the anti-Soviet agitation and "wrong" talk, nothing else.**

## **ABOUT THE STRANGE STALIN REPRESSIONS IN THE RED ARMY**

**About the "unjustified Stalinist repressions" in the Red Army in 1937, only the lazy did not write. Oh brilliant  
Many repressed commanders have shed tears since the Khrushchev era. We'll have to talk about this...**

**1 See: Degtyarev K. SMERSH. Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2009.**

The brutal Stalinist repressions in the Red Army began with the "Tukhachevsky case", which was officially called: the case of the "anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization." This is a case on charges of 9 major Soviet military commanders in organizing a military conspiracy to seize power. Of these, the army commissar of the 1st rank, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, the first deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR Ya.B. Gamarnik shot himself on the eve of his arrest. The rest were judged.

These 9 top leaders of the Red Army were accused of

- transfer in 1932-1935 to representatives of the German General Staff of secret military information character;

- development in 1935 of a detailed operational plan for the defeat of the Red Army in the main directions of the offensive of the German and Polish armies;

- preparation of terrorist acts against a member

new Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government;

- preparation of a plan for the armed "capture of the Kremlin" and the arrest of the leaders of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government, that is, the preparation of a military coup scheduled for May 15, 1937.

The purpose of the organization was declared a violent seizure of power in the USSR in the event of a military defeat from Germany and Poland.

The investigation took less than a month, the court session took place two days after the confirmation of the indictment and took only one day. At the same time, the hearing was closed, the defendants were deprived of the right to defense and appeal against the verdict. The materials of the court do not provide any facts confirming the charges of espionage, conspiracy and preparation of terrorist acts. The verdict of 11 June 1937 is entirely based on the confessions (or is it "confessions"?) of the defendants.

On June 11, 1937, the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced to death with

confiscation of property and deprivation of military ranks: Marshal of the USSR M.N. Tukhachevsky, commander 1st rank I.E. Yakir, commander of the troops of the Kyiv Military District, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Uborevich, Commander of the Belarusian Military District; army commander 2nd rank A.I. Kork, head of the Military Academy. M. Frunze, commander R.P. Eideman, V.K. Putna, attaché at the USSR embassy in Great Britain, B.M. Feldman, head of the Department for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army, and V.M. Primakov, Deputy Commander of the Leningrad Military District.

The sentence was carried out through how many hours after the end of the trial on the night of June 12 1937.

A typical "Stalinist" process, not bothering with evidence. It is not surprising that many contemporaries and subsequent researchers had doubts about the validity of the verdict and stronger

There are suspicions of illegal methods of obtaining testimony.

On January 13, 1957, all 9 were rehabilitated for lack of corpus delicti. According to the Rehabilitation Commission, the confessions of the defendants were obtained using torture and beatings. And others there is simply no evidence other than self-incrimination.

The difficulty is that signals about the presence of a strong opposition to Stalin in the Red Army were received many times already in 1929-1934. This information did not come out of the bowels of the secret services, but Stalin certainly knew. And there are materials, in addition to their own

A similar case about a conspiracy at the top of the Red Army was developed by the OGPU back in 1930. Stalin was presented with materials stating that a group of major military leaders headed by Tukhachevsky was preparing to seize power and assassinate Stalin himself. The information is based only on the testimony of the arrested teachers of the Military Academy - Kakurin and Troitsky.

At the confrontation, he categorically denied everything and was found not guilty.

According to some researchers, the real cause of the process was a conspiracy to seize power. The accusations of espionage were intended to make the process more acceptable to the rest of the military establishment.

Judging by how the Red Army behaved in 1941? Stalin had very good reasons to believe that the conspiracy of the top military leaders was a reality.

### REPRESSIONS IN THE RKKA 1937-1938

The Tukhachevsky case became a trigger for the beginning of large-scale repressions in the Red Army. Of 8 members new "special presence", which passed the verdict on June 11, 1937, 4 were shot. Marshal V.K. Blucher, according to one source, was shot, according to another, he died under torture. Only V.V. survived. Ulrich, S.M. Budyonny and B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1937-1938 they were shot: out of 5 marshals - 3; out of 5 commanders of the 1st rank - 3; out of 10 teams of rank II - 10; out of 57 commanders - 50; out of 186 com divs - 154; out of 16 army commissars of I and II ranks - 16; out of 26 corps commissars - 25; out of 64 divisional commissars, 58; out of 456 regimental commanders - 4013

. The monstrous scale of the "cleansing", of course.

The "head" of the army has been destroyed, there are no words. And what about the lower-level officers?

According to the Stalinist publicist I. Pykhalov, with reference to archival sources, during 1937—

1 See: O. V. *Khlevnyuk*, Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 30s. M., 1996.

2 See: *Prudnikova E., Kolpakidi A.* Double conspiracy. Secrets of Stalin's repressions. M., 2006.

3 See: *Sokolov B.* Exterminated marshals. Smolensk, 2000, pp. 82-202.

1938 in the army, taking into account all subsequent revisions of cases (changes in articles and reinstatements), 17,776 officers<sup>1</sup> were repressed, of which 9,701 were dismissed and 8,075 were arrested.

V. G. Klevtsov claims that in 1937-1938. 35.2 thousand officers were physically destroyed, D. A. Volkogonov<sup>2</sup> and D. M. Proektor<sup>3</sup> write about 40 thousand repressed. N. G. Pavlenko writes: "... in the army alone, from May 1937 to September 1938, 36,761 military leaders were repressed"<sup>4</sup>. A. M. Samsonov writes about 43 thousand<sup>5</sup>, N. M. Ramanichev - about 44 thousand<sup>6</sup>, Yu. A. Gorkov - about 48 7737.

In journalism, there are even more abrupt figures: 50,000 repressed<sup>8</sup>, and even: "More than 70,000 commanders of the Red Army were destroyed by Stalin even before the war"<sup>9</sup>.

V. N. Rapoport and Yu. A. Geller write: "Therefore, we are forced to consider that the decline in personnel during the two years of the purge amounted to approximately 100 thousand people"<sup>10</sup>. L. A. Kirshner claims that 50% of the officers were repressed: "It is believed

1 See: *Pykhalov I.V.* Great Slandered War. M., 2005.

2 See: *Volkogonov D.A.* Triumph and tragedy. Political portrait I. V. Stalin. In 2 books. Book. II. 4. 1. M., 1989.

3 See: *Projector D.M.* Aggression and disaster. Top military leadership of Nazi Germany in World War II. M., 1972.

4 *Pavlenko N.G.* Reflections on the fate of the leadership. Moscow: Knowledge, 1989.

5 *Samsonov A.M.* The Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1990.

6 *Ramanichev N.M.* Is the Red Army the strongest of all? // Military history magazine. 1991, no. 12.

7 *Gorkov Yu. A.* The Kremlin. Bid. General Staff. Tver, 1995.

8 *Kumanev G.A.* War and evacuation in the USSR // New and recent history. 2006, No. 6.

9 *Yakovlev A. N.* Zhirinovskiy and other "patriots" in bold quotes // Izvestia. April 25, 1995. No. 76 (24435).

10 *Rapoport V.N., Geller Yu.A.* Treason to the Motherland. M., 1995.

**44,000 command personnel, more than half of the officer corps, were repressed”<sup>1</sup>.**

**The numbers are so contradictory that it makes sense to clarify: the number of officer corps in 1938 was about 180 thousand people. Of those dismissed in 1937-1938. 38 thousand commanders and political workers in 1939-1940 returned to the army**

**12 thousand, 9 thousand were dismissed due to old age or illness. No more than 18 thousand officers were dismissed from the army for political reasons. Moreover, only 9.5 thousand of them were arrested.**

**It is important that the scale of repression is GREAT. So great that after Stalin's death, his enemies could easily exaggerate their scale a hundredfold.**

## **DESTRUCTION OF THE BEST?**

**Naturally, the question arose - why? What is Stalin's schizophrenia? Power struggle? Already in those days, contemporaries confidently said: Stalin destroyed the best. On June 11, 1937, the German magazine "Verfront" wrote in the article "The New Face of the Red Army": "After the trial ... Stalin ordered the execution of eight of the best commanders [of the Red Army]. Thus ended a brief period of reorganization of the command of the Red Army ... Military qualifications were sacrificed for the politics and security of the Bolshevik system.**

**Is it a qualification?**

**There was even a version put forward that the repressions against the top of the Red Army were caused by the beautiful operation of the German intelligence: in an effort to weaken the Red Army before the war, the German intelligence "threw" Stalin such a "misinformation".**

<sup>1</sup> Eve and the beginning of the war: Documents and materials / Comp. L.

A. Kirschner. L., 1991.



The defeat of the Red Army in 1941 was repeatedly associated with the Stalinist purge of the Red Army. This is heavily hinted at by both Zhukov and Rokossovsky, and a modern publicist even claims that "without a war, almost the entire magnificent officer corps, the backbone of the Red Army, perished in the dungeons and camps of the NKVD"<sup>1</sup>.

The opinion of the Soviet intelligentsia of the 1960s is brilliant expressed by Rasul Gamzatov in the poem "People and Shadows" composed in 1960-1962:

Summons have been sent to the reserve fighters,  
The German infantry is breaking through.  
Hurry, Marshal Tukhachevsky,  
Present the troops in combat guise.

Let your genius again shine in the order And  
surprise the stunned world.  
Let Fedko send liaison officers to you And Yakir  
radios about business.

But them, sentenced to the highest measure,  
Not to resurrect and God, but for  
now In the battles, irreparable losses  
Are orphaned troops.

True, Hitler thought quite differently: after the conspiracy of the top of the Wehrmacht in July 1944, he said: "The Wehrmacht betrayed me, I am dying at the hands of my own generals. Stalin did a brilliant deed, arranging a purge in the Red Army and getting rid of from rotten aristocrats."

Most "progressive-minded people" believed then, and still believe now, that the "traitor trials" and purges of 1935-1938 are outrageous examples of barbarism, ingratitude and a manifestation of the bad qualities of Stalin himself, who envied brilliant commanders like Yakir and Tu

Khachevsky.

<sup>1</sup>Koval VS "Barbarossa": the origins and history of the greatest pre steps of imperialism. Kyiv, 1989.

The difficulty is to find confirmation of the symptoms of genius of these individuals. Yakir is famous mainly for the fact that during the Civil War he kept a detachment of 500 Chinese executioners with him. Tukhachevsky tried to write theoretical works ... Fortunately, they were published more than once, you can read and make sure: there is nothing in them except ideological spells<sup>1</sup>. It is no coincidence that V. Suvorov devoted a book with the expressive title "Purification" to "repressions in the Red Army"<sup>2</sup>. Suvorov is in complete solidarity with Hitler: the army "purged" of revolutionaries has become much more efficient. If there had been no "cleansing", victory in World War

The methods, of course, are monstrous, but in addition to Stalin's cruelty, it is worth noting his simply implausible foresight and foresight. However, he had the opportunity many times to observe ideological revolutionaries up close. Apparently, he did not like this audience much ...

And not one Stalin did not like. Arguing with the "ideological" on the eve of the "great purge" at a meeting of command personnel, the future Marshal I.S. Konev threw out a very careless phrase: "If the hour of trials comes, then what will we fight with - with a rifle or with M

Paradoxically, the repressions had a positive effect on the educational level of the highest command staff of the Red Army.

In the first half of the 1930s. the share of Soviet military commanders with a higher military education varied from 30 to 40%. Before the repressions, only 29% had an academic education. And in 1938, there were already 38% of such commanders, in 1941 - 52%.

<sup>1</sup> See: *Tukhachevsky M.N. Selected works in 2 vols. M., 1964.*

<sup>2</sup> *Suvorov V. Purification. M., 2005.*

<sup>3</sup> *Cherushchev N.S. 1937: The elite of the Red Army on Calvary. M., 2003, p. 15.*

“... from May 1, 1937 to April 15, 1938, none of the 3 arrested deputies of the people's commissar of defense had an academic education, 2 of those appointed had it. Of the commanders of the districts: 3 "academicians" were arrested, 8 were appointed; deputy commanders of the districts: accordingly, 4 with a higher military education were arrested, 6 were appointed; district chiefs of staff - those arrested did not have an academic education, 4 out of 10 appointed had it; corps commanders - 12 with higher military education were arrested, 19 were appointed; corps chiefs of staff - 14 "academicians" were arrested, 22 were appointed. And so on for all positions, with the exception of division commanders. 33 arrested commanders had an academic education, and among those appointed there were only 27. In general, for the highest command

composition, the number of those appointed with a higher military education exceeds the number of those arrested with a similar education by 45%. Thus, the repressions did not lower the educational level of the categories of officers affected by them, they affected the level of education of senior and middle officers who were promoted to higher positions. Archival data indicate that these were, as a rule, the most highly trained commanders.

Why? Yes, because the "great purge" destroyed the Bonapartes who received the highest posts, adjoining the victors in the Civil War in their own time. And they were replaced by people who had served in the Red Army for many years without joining the CPSU(b). And they joined it, already being regimental commanders and commanders. First, a military career, then joining the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: when the situation requires it.

1 *Gerasimov G. I.* The real impact of the repressions of 1937-1938. on the officer corps of the Red Army // Russian Historical Journal. 1999, No. 1, pp. 48-49.

**Judge for yourself: this is the time when the victims of repression joined the CPSU (b): Gamarnik - 1916, Primakov - 1914, Tukhachevsky - 1918, Uborevich - 1917, Fedko - 1917, Yakir - 1917, Cork - 1918, Eideman - 1918, Putna - 1917 .**

**And here are the terms of entry into the CPSU (b) of those who replaced them: Vasilevsky - 1938, Zhukov - 1919, Konev - 1918, Malinovsky - 1926, Rokossovsky - 1919, Tolbukhin - 1938.**

**The difference is obvious. The ideologists were replaced by pragmatists.**

#### **AGAIN ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE ARMY**

**So, the repressions were not at all catastrophic in scale. Moreover, they did not "orphan" the troops at all. Perhaps the "purges" should be considered a brilliant political move by Stalin. At the same time he eliminated the "Corsican danger": the prospect of a military conspiracy, got rid of another batch of revolutionary slovenliness and raised the level of the high command of the army.**

**In this sense, everything is just wonderful.**

**But how was the army supposed to react to the "purges"? Her officers? After all, what happens: suddenly they "take" generals and officers. They are being tortured. They destroy under pretexts that are completely unobvious. Processes are closed. If there was a conspiracy, where is the evidence? There is no irrefutable proof of the guilt of the higher command staff. There are only obscure rumors that can be interpreted in any way.**

**It seems to be for middle and junior officers links of repression against the authorities are even profitable: after the army is deprived of its top, many vacant posts appear. There is a chance to make an enchanting career. Yes... but:**

**Firstly, military discipline does not increase from this**

he hesitates, because many junior commanders begin to look thoughtfully at their seniors ... And the seniors begin to smile ingratiatingly at the commissars, Komsomol members and subordinates in general.

Secondly, everyone who has received a promotion thinks not so much about military duty, but about when they will come for him, that they can blame him and how would he survive.

There is a career... But what about confidence in the strength of your position? And not only official, but in general his position as a Soviet officer?

By repressing and "removing" the leaders of the army, the government can secure itself, destroy the dangerous seditious and frighten the next. Through such repressions, perhaps, the army is "cleansed" of useless and adventurous people. I will not argue. But to build in this way a professional, standing strong army is impossible.

And in the repressions themselves, and in how they are carried out the main negative quality of the Red Army and the entire Soviet system is clearly shown: ignoring personality, inner world, pathological disrespect for a person.

It cannot be ruled out that Stalin carried out an ingenious system of preparing the Red Army for war. It may well be that he managed to make the army better, and its senior command staff more professional, more educated, smarter, more reliable. May be.

But at the same time, he made this senior commanding staff less self-confident, less trusting in their government, less courageous and less ready to lay down their lives for the good of their state. Since 1937, any military leader simply had to live, constantly looking around nervously. After all, at any moment they could come for him ... And for what - they will find. The system is unpredictable. They have already exterminated some of their people, guided by some not very clear

considerations. On the basis of what "considerations" they will come for you - you never know. And it's not clear. It is impossible to calculate. Understanding is impossible. os lurking only to walk and look around nervously all the time.

V. Suvorov describes the Red Army of 1941 as huge in terms of numbers, the greatest army in the world. This army owns the most advanced technology for that time. It has the largest caliber guns, the most powerful tanks, the fastest and most efficient aircraft in the world.

I believe that the description of V. Suvorov is correct ... but it is not enough.

The Red Army was manned by poorly trained, low-skilled people who did not know how to manage military equipment, did not know how to interact well and had little trust both in each other and in the government of their country.

Even worse, in the Red Army he strictly acted the principle: "business is more important than a person" and "mechanisms are more important than a person". Having received the order, the soldiers and officers of the Red Army quite reasonably assumed that no one cares about their safety. And they showed caution, because the salvation of the drowning was the work of the drowning themselves.

The Red Army controlled all the time, creating immediately several control mechanisms: special departments, missars, Komsomol organizations, mass "purges" of the army elite.

The Red Army was a frightened army, unsure of itself and its own strength. Her employees, from a soldier to a marshal, were not proactive, were afraid to take solid solutions.

Such an army is reliable in the sense that it is unlikely to stage a military coup. But she is not reliable in combat.

And with this army, Stalin was going to conquer the world domination? Create a Zemshar Republic of Soviets?

## ABOUT TERMS

So both sides were planning an attack. Both the Nazis and the Communists. Preparations for war never take place openly. But even according to the available data, it is clearly visible how both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht are preparing for war. In the language of the military, this is called "concentrated logical concentration and deployment of armed forces of the countries-opponents".

Could the Nazis have been planning an attack not on June 22, but at a later date? Quite ... And for an earlier one too. It is even better to attack earlier, because then there will be more time to attack in the summer, in the warm season.

Richard Sorge several times gave the dates for the attack of the Third Reich on the USSR: April 15 ... May 1, 15, 20 ... June 15 ... Not a single date has been confirmed, but this is already the second question.

Could the USSR strike first? Yes. If such actions were part of his plans, then definitely - yes.

And it could be any time too. Suvorov considers July 15 to be a probable date. To build a model - what could have happened during the first attack of the USSR, such a period is no better and no worse than any other. We will proceed from it as from "probable" or even "possible".

## VIRTUALITY: JULY 15, 1941

On July 13, 1941, the defector Ivan Ivanov swam across the Bug and ran to the location of the Nazi unit. In terrible German, he loudly shouted that he knew a great secret, and "Stalin is kaput!" He shouted so that he woke up the sentry. The sentry at first wanted to shoot Ivanov, but then he simply gave him a kick and told him to get out. Ivanov hung around the location of the unit until morning and shouted loudly. In the morning he was handed over to reconnaissance, and

there he told about Stalin's plans to attack the Third Reich on the morning of July 15th.

- Where did you get such information?

- In the bath, the guys told.

How do you guys know this?

One of them is having an affair with the lieutenant's mistress special units, she said.

Ivanov was not given back, but no one, of course, thinks to believe him. Well, how can an ordinary person know the plans of the command and leadership of the state ?!

Even before that, as if a journalist, but in fact the double spy of the USSR and the Reich, Grisha Zabolotnik from Argentina, transmitted information that the USSR was preparing an attack on the Third Reich. He had already transmitted such reports several times: about the attack of the USSR on the Third Reich on April 15 ... May 1, 15, 20 ... June 15 ... So".

And the night falls on July 15, 1941 .. Already from July 10 each division commander has two envelopes: yellow and green. At 10 pm on July 14, the division commanders received an order to open the yellow envelope. After reading the text, eat immediately.

The divisional commanders read and summoned the regimental commanders. The military machine has come to an incomprehensible yet, it is unclear new movement.

12 hours of the night. Sleepy tankers sit in tanks: ordered to wait.

The pilots are warming up the engines. They guess that begins, but also waiting for orders.

At zero hours 30 minutes, division commanders tear open the green envelope and read the order. When reading

<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Richard Sorge transmitted messages several times about different dates for the attack of the Third Reich. All the dates he gave were wrong. The reasons for such inaccuracy in the messages are still being debated, either referring to the "pre-war atmosphere, when everything was permeated with the expectation of war", or to the "misinformation" deliberately slipped by Sorge.



regimental commanders present. The order is received, and on July 15 at 1 am Moscow time, the Red Army, a colossal front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, sets in motion. 3.3 million armed to the teeth, equipped with an incredible amount of military equipment, people go, go, swim, fly to the west. Bridges and roads are cleared, nothing interferes.

Rising from their airfields, the planes of the Red Army in a matter of minutes find themselves over the territory of the Reich.

At 4 o'clock in the morning, a terrible bomb load falls on the "peacefully sleeping" airfields of the Third Reich, its garrisons and military units.

At 5:30 the Red Army crosses the border. She easily crushed the border units, begins to delve into the territory of the Third Reich.

At about 3:30 am on July 15, 1941, in Berlin, Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov, standing in front of the Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Ribbentrop, read out the text of the Soviet declaration on "military countermeasures against the Third Reich." On Stalin's orders, it was forbidden to mention the words "war" and "attack" in the declaration.

Ribbentrop would later write in his memoirs that when Dekanozov read the text of the declaration, his voice trembled and his eyes were full of tears. After listening to the ambassador, the minister was silent for a long time, and then quietly said: "Is this a war? Do you think we deserve it?" Barely restraining himself, the Soviet ambassador muttered that he did not approve of his government.

At the same time in Moscow, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov hands the Third Reich Ambassador von Schulenburg a declaration of war. The astonished ambassador quickly recovered his senses and sharply declared: "You will regret having carried out this attack! You will pay dearly for this!" He got up, bowed, and, without shaking hands with Molotov,

headed for the door. Seeing the ambassador off, Molotov whispered: "I was against this attack."

Then in the Third Reich they will spread propaganda tales about the USSR attacking the Third Reich without declaring war. These tales will be repeated in the Third Reich until 1991, that is, until the very time of the collapse and collapse of the Third Reich.

At 12 noon on July 15, 1941, Goebbels made an official radio address to the citizens of the Third Reich, announcing the Soviet attack on the Third Reich and announcing the start of war.

### **VIRTUALITY: DIRECTION STRIKE RED ARMY**

Of course, all directions of impacts are designed very conditionally. Let's imagine a certain scheme to make it easier to build a model... And without insisting at all that the plans would be such and only such.

So, the troops of the Odessa district go to Romania, Hungary, Slovakia. Having crushed these small countries, they must begin to move towards Vienna and Switzerland.

The troops of the Kyiv district strike at Krakow, then at the "underbelly" of Germany proper: Munich, Mannheim, Frankfurt am Main.

The troops of the Belorussian district are attacking Warsaw, then Breslau, Frankfurt an der Oder, and in the long run directly on Berlin.

The Baltic district invades Memel and East Prussia, then goes to Danzig and further to Schleswig and Ostemünde. He must finish this part of the campaign in Hamburg and in the Ruhr region.

### **FOUR SURPRISES**

Whatever the plans of the top leadership of the USSR, the Red Army will inevitably expect four great surprises.

**First surprise: own inner weakness.**

**Any propaganda, any idea of "liberating the pro-letarians from the yoke of the bourgeoisie" cannot hide the main thing: the Red Army is committing an act of aggression.**

**There is a colossal difference in the morale of the troops who march on foreign soil and who defend your land.**

**In reality, the Red Army initially turned out to be a defending army. And when she began to fight abroad in 1944, she already had the experience of two and a half years of war on her own territory. By that time, she already unequivocally considered herself morally right, and the Soviet Union - a victim of aggression.**

**In our virtuality, on July 15, the Red Army attacked the Third Reich. In our reality, the Red Army fled and surrendered in 1941.**

**Within a matter of weeks, the entire first strategic echelon of the Red Army was destroyed. The Red Army was "completely defeated, all military equipment was abandoned in the forests, most of the personnel were captured or died, a few some survivors were chosen in small groups from the encirclement for several weeks or months"<sup>1</sup>.**

**If in reality this army fled, from where will it now start fighting furiously for Stalin? During an offensive, it is impossible or very difficult to escape and surrender. But the army is fighting sluggishly. She follows orders, but without tension, without readiness to carry out combat missions at any cost. Parts of the Red Army miss many opportunities, in each**

**in a particular case, they do only part of what is possible.**

**In addition, the Red Army is morally tense... If serious difficulties begin, it will go over to the side of the enemy.**

<sup>1</sup> *Solonin M.* June 22, or When did the Great Patriotic War begin? M., 2008. S. 103.

**The second surprise: the readiness of Germany and the German people for war.**

**It means not only and not so much higher  
what preparation.**

**The Red Army encounters fierce resistance: for the Germans, the war is defensive. Danzig and East Prussia are their own land for the Germans. Rodina. Fathers land. The psychology of those over whose land the enemy is marching is the psychology of the Russians, over whose Smolensk and Pskov regions German tanks with a black cross on their armor are rolling.**

**In the same way, the Germans consider many cities and regions in Poland and Lithuania to be their land. Danzig, Breslau, Vilna, Lviv-Lviv-Levenburg are German cities. Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians consider them theirs - but this does not prevent the Germans from considering them in the same way. After all, the cities of Kyiv and Minsk are the capitals of Ukraine and Belarus, which did not interfere at all  
Russians consider these cities their own and fight for them as part of their homeland.**

**From the very first hours of the war, the Red Army marched through the lands of native Germany. For this reason, for the Wehrmacht and all of Germany, this is a defensive war.**

**The third surprise: a defensive war for all the peoples through whose territory the Red Army is marching. Poles, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians have every reason to consider themselves victims of Soviet aggression. No nation likes when an enemy army marches across its land and resists an invasion.**

**In our reality, the peoples of Eastern Europe first experienced all the "charms" of the Nazi occupation, and then already had to deal with the Red Army. During the war, the communist underground became very strong among them, for which the Red Army was a tribe of dear partygenossen. And even many nationalists were ready to support the Red Army, or at least not to fight with it. Let the "Russians" beat**

and they drive the "Germans", all the same, nothing worse than the "Germans" can be.

In 1944, not all, but many Polish patriots were ready to raise an uprising in the rear of the Nazis, helping the Red Army.

By the way, there is no complete analogy in the Baltics and Ukraine: after two years of Soviet occupation, Lithuanians, Latvians, Western Ukrainians and Estonians were ready to help the Wehrmacht. For the same reasons: that nothing could be worse than the Soviet occupation.

It is all the more difficult to acquire readiness to support the Red Army because the peoples of Eastern Europe are closer in civilization to Central Europe than to Russia. For the Serbs and Carpatho-Russians, the Red Army could still be an army of "their own" in terms of culture, but not for the Poles and not for the Lithuanians. In order to support the Red Army, they needed a long and brutal occupation of the Third Reich.

In our virtuality of the attack of the USSR, there is nothing like it yet. Unless the Czech Republic, occupied in 1938, may be ready to support the Red Army. And in Poland, separate parts of the Home Army.

On the whole, the Red Army is an aggressor not only for the Germans, but also for all the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Surprise four: the weakness of the communist "fifth column" in the places captured by the Red Army. Of course, with the movement of the Red Army, communists and all leftists in general will come out of the underground, start wars with their governments.

But! In reality, the communists of Europe started the Resistance against the Nazi occupation. They acted as patriots of their countries and therefore had such colossal support. In France, in Yugoslavia, in Poland, in Greece, entire regions were liberated by communist partisans. In order for the communists to become strong, it again required a long and brutal Nazi occupation. And to themselves com

**Moonies have risen, and that the population recognizes them. In Yugoslavia, Tito's communist army did not become an important factor until 1942. French and Greek red partisans - not earlier than 1943.**

**In our virtuality, local communists are you tread like traitors helping the conquering army of the vest. This confuses them, and even more so**

**tal population.**

**In any case, it is impossible to imagine the attack of the USSR as an analogue of the attack of the Third Reich: with the same scale of collapse and devastation, mass exodus and unwillingness to fight.**

**There will be no flight of the Nazi army, not wanting to fight. The tanks of the Red Army will not move at a speed of 30 km per day. There will be no mass surrender date the enemy is captured.**

**A very difficult, extremely cruel war awaits the Red Army, in which it will have to fight for every settlement. And it will also not work to come in the role of liberators to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Taking Krakow and Belgrade would mean war with both the Wehrmacht and the local armies and militias. Occupation will mean leaving people in the rear of the Red Army who will willingly and at the first opportunity stab in the back.**

**All four surprises concern only one aspect of the war: military-strategic. This is a very important aspect, but there are others that need to be considered as well.**

## **ASPECTS OF THE LEADING WAR**

**The outcome of World War II was determined by four factors:**

- military-strategic;**
- military-diplomatic;**
- revolutionary;**
- Anglo-Saxon.**

The military-strategic and revolutionary aspects are clearly not in favor of the Red Army.

The military-diplomatic situation is also not in favor of the USSR.

For all continental Europeans from Spain to Poland, the Red Army is a very frightening political factor. All the more frightening factor: their own Civil War, which the Red Army will actively help. Even though the communists emerging from the underground are not numerous and do not have mass support. In our virtuality, it was enough to attack the USSR - and the air smelled of civil wars and the World Revolution.

In our reality, the mobilization capabilities of the Third Reich turned out to be much less than that of the USSR. This is not the case in our virtuality, because the continental powers will act as Hitler's allies. Moreover, as allies not for fear, but for

conscience.

In reality, Franco sent one division of volunteers. But he could move almost his entire army. And the French power of Marshal Pétain can move an army of up to a million bayonets. And Italy can fight in a completely different way. And even countries already conquered Nazi bathrooms.

### THE ANGLO-SAXON FACTOR

In reality, Britain and the United States became a huge factor in the victory of the USSR. First, Britain fought the Nazis in North Africa, pulling back significant forces. Secondly, the Lend-Lease Act, passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, provided that the President could help any country whose defense was considered vital to the US. Initially, the USSR was not included in Lend-Lease.

Only after the start of the war between the Third Reich

and the USSR, June 26, 1941, Washington declared that the law of neutrality does not apply to aid to the Soviet Union. And then the Soviet government presented the American and British side with a list of necessary supplies! Instantly.

But before the decision was made, Roosevelt sent his trusted man, Mr. Harry Hopkins, to Europe. After Hopkins considered the results of the talks with Stalin "extremely positive", on August 2, 1941, an exchange of notes took place between the USSR and the USA. In its note, the American side announced its decision to render maximum economic assistance to the USSR. On August 9, Roosevelt and Churchill, having talked off the coast of Newfoundland, sent a message to Stalin, assuring him that he would receive help. And proposing to convene a conference in Moscow, specifically to discuss this assistance to the USSR, on October 1, 1941, Roosevelt approved the connection to the Lend-Lease of the USSR.

The main thing for the Americans was - is the USSR ready to fight the Third Reich until the victorious end of the war? They had good reason to doubt it.

The Lend-Lease Program (from lend - "to lend" and lease - "to rent, for hire") is a system by which the United States of America, mainly on a gratuitous basis, transferred ammunition, equipment, prod

permission and strategic raw materials.

The delivered values were not payable if were lost and used during the war.

Property left after the end of the war and suitable for civilian purposes must be paid for, but not immediately. The United States will provide long-term loans to pay.

The United States was the only country in the world with sufficient manufacturing capacity to provide such support in a sufficiently short period of time.



**terms in order to have time to influence the course of hostilities in 1942.**

**Out of a total of \$50.1 billion (about \$700 billion in 2008 prices), Britain received the most: \$31.4 billion (\$440 billion in 2008 prices). In second place - the USSR - 11.3 (160 billion) dollars. France received 3.2 billion (about 45 billion), China - 1.6 (22) billion.**

**It was asserted abroad that the victory over Germany was determined by Western weapons and that without Lend-Lease the Soviet Union would not have survived .**

**In Soviet historiography, it was usually argued that the amount of lend-lease assistance to the USSR was rather small - only about 4% of the funds spent by the country on the war, and tanks and aircraft were supplied mostly outdated models. To defend a different position is considered very unpatriotic.**

**But if Lend-Lease supplies were so unimportant, then why did Stalin attach such enormous importance to them? He addressed Churchill and Roosevelt many times in the most insistent manner, literally**

**but extorting supplies.**

**On September 4, Stalin sent another message to Churchill, in which he wrote that if the Allies did not open a second front in the Balkans or in France and did not supply the USSR with 400 aircraft and 500 tanks every month, the USSR would not be able to help the Allies, if not at all. will soon be broken.**

**The Allies refused. Then Stalin asked to send 25-30 divisions to Arkhangelsk or transfer them through Iran. After all, soon we will have to surrender the central part of the country and organize a new front beyond the Volga ... And in general, the fate of Moscow hangs in the balance.**

**At the Soviet-Anglo-American conference in**

**1See: Jones R. H. The Roads to Russia: United State Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union, Oklahoma, 1969.**

On September 29-October 1, 1941, Stalin directly stated to Moscow that the USSR was ready to fight depending on supplies. Let's get supplies - or we'll lose the war! And then you will feel bad! Blackmail? Maybe... But apparently, not only blackmail. Both Zhukov and Mikoyan<sup>1</sup> spoke about the need for Lend-Lease .

Lend-Lease was literally extorted by the Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky. He constantly demanded more help than Britain could physically provide, and did not ambiguously hint that in the event of a refusal to supply the USSR could well lose. One day W. Churchill said:

“Remember that four months ago we on our island did not know if you would come out against us on the side of the Germans. Indeed, we considered it quite possible. But even then we were convinced of our ultimate victory. We have never considered our salvation to be in any way dependent on your actions. No matter what happens and no matter how you act, you have no right to reproach us .

If the USSR in July 1941 was the first to attack the Third Reich, it is unlikely that they would be supplied with anything. In such virtuality, the Anglo-Saxons can take two positions:

- help the Third Reich;
- take a position of complete neutrality.
- In any case, the Anglo-Saxons will not help the USSR.

## USSR AND BLitzkrieg

Talking about blitzkrieg as the main military doctrine of the Nazis, historians lose sight of the fact that exactly the same “blitzkrieg” lay at the heart of the Soviet doctrine. "With little blood and on foreign territory" - is it

<sup>1</sup> See: *Zenkovich N. Ya. Marshals and general secretaries. M., 1997. S. 161-162.*

<sup>2</sup> See: *Ruge F. War at sea 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 209.*

**not a blitzkrieg of pure water? All the plans known to us assume the conquest of Europe during literally 1-2 months of hostilities.**

**In reality, the USSR could not win a protracted war without the supplies of the Anglo-Saxons, that is, without the resources of the British Empire and the United States. And even more cynically, without the resources of the Western Hemisphere and the British colonial empire. In our virtuality, the USSR, all the more, will not "pull" a protracted v**

**The USSR can only count on a blitzkrieg: exactly like the Third Reich. The Third Reich was unable to carry out the blitzkrieg in the summer - in the autumn of 1941, before the onset of frost - and thus was doomed to victory. defeat.**

**And the USSR has even less chance of a blitzkrieg than the Third Reich. The USSR is opposed neither by the army, which does not want to fight, nor by the population, which wants to stop the crazy communist experiments.**

**When attacking the Third Reich, there will be no blitzkrieg. There is no need to seriously talk about the "little blood" of the army-anthill, with a monstrosity low level of training of the available staff. Even the brilliant victories of 1944-1945 in East Prussia and Germany, with the absolute superiority of the Red Army in artillery, tanks, aircraft, military equipment, cost hundreds of thousands of dead soldiers and officers.**

**The capture of East Prussia and the entry of the Red The armies on German territory in the summer-autumn of 1941 will cost even more dead: the Red Army will not have that experience.**

**For the USSR, a war on foreign territory is inevitably a protracted war. This war will be fought with comparatively worse military-diplomatic, political, economic conditions than in reality. The USSR has more resources than the Third Reich, it will "stretch out" the protracted war longer. But even for him, such a war is doomed to defeat.**

The degree of failure of this war depends on the political alignment. It may be more or less successful for Stalin's plans, and in this sense more or less "good." It is physically impossible to consider all options, and it is not necessary. Consider two extreme cases: the alignment of the most "good" and the most "bad".

## THE VIRTUALITY OF ITSELF "BAD" SCORES

In this scenario, Hitler is smart, the Europeans are brave, the Comintern is ugly like a true child of Trotsky, and the Anglo-Saxons are efficient and cunning.

1) In the very first hours, maximum days, of the war, Hitler gives states to the Poles and Ukrainians. He announces that there is a war going on between European civilization and the Huns, Mongols, whoever attacked it. In a word, with the barbarians who attacked innocent Europe.

The Wehrmacht fights for everyone! But let everyone help him. The state of the Poles - to be. Recognition of the government in exile in London, an appeal to the Poles: we will give you broad autonomy, as in Austria-Hungary. We are already giving it! Let the Polish units in Polish uniforms, under the command of their officers, on the orders of their government, go into battle against the Bolshevik hordes.

Bandera and his people are released from prison. Before they apologize. They are told: you already have your own state. The Third Reich signs a peace treaty with you as a sovereign government. Just fight.

The form is yours. The officers are theirs. Planning operations - together with the General Staff of the Third Reich.

This will immediately give hundreds of thousands, soon millions of bayonets and sabers. Of course, in order to make such decisions, Hitler must turn from a revolutionary and a poser into a cunning, intelligent, realistic politician, capable of calculating three moves ahead. He

**become Stalin! The option is practically impossible, but it must also be calculated as some kind of almost unbelievable extreme.**

**Even more incredible, but no less effective: to stop anti-Semitic politics. Even without abandoning the racial theory as such. Reversal at measured in this spirit: among the Jews there are many descendants of the Aryans ... There was a lot of confusion, the adoption of giyu ra back in the Middle Ages, many marriages ... Now this blood is affecting! The slogan: a Jew who fights for the Reich is also an Aryan! Berlin and Frankfurt rabbis solemnly issue "blood certificates". The racial commission certifies that they are Nordic types.**

**This does not at all rule out reprisals against towards disloyal elements and all those who support the enemy. But the repressions are not racial, but political. The one who works against his state is guilty, not the one who was born with a different nose shape.**

**For the population of Germany, this marks a rallying in the face of the eastern enemy. Many new soldiers, most of them skilled and active. Soldiers who will prove their right**

**to this new attitude towards them.**

**For the whole world - at least a long-term stun. An important weapon has been knocked out of the hands of the enemies of the Reich, they have lost an essential argument.**

**For the Jews of Eastern Europe, doubt about the refugees to support any enemy of the Third Reich.**

**2) The Comintern did not raise a single one behind enemy lines overwhelming revolution. The European Communists are few and weak. They are unable to bring confusion into the life of their countries, and even more so to actively help the USSR.**

**As a result:**

- the peoples of Europe are united;**
- the weakness of the communist idea becomes everything obvious;**

- civil wars begin only where the Red Army comes. Which serves as another proof that in no case should it be allowed into its territory.

3) France, Spain, Italy, Hungary march together against the USSR. Even the small countries of Europe are putting up contingents of their troops. The number of allied troops is comparable to the number of the Wehrmacht.

4) The British are neutral at first. Then, when the Red Army advances deep into Poland, they and the Americans sign a truce with Hitler and begin to supply fuel and equipment.

And in this scenario, the Red Army has a chance to move west. The question is how far? Perhaps the Red Army will take Warsaw and Krakow. Crazy attacks of the Polish Home Army, hopeless whose chivalry makes the whole world talk about the heroism of "Little Poland" and the brutality of the "Russians", yes leading this country.

Perhaps it will be possible to capture the entire German Baltic region: Memel, East Prussia, Danzig. This will confirm the whole world in the idea of the USSR as a terrible aggressor who must be resisted at any cost.

The capture of East Prussia in our reality was accompanied by monstrous atrocities. In our virtuality, it can hardly be otherwise. Another argument for the Wehrmacht to fight to the last, and for the whole world to help the Wehrmacht, to act against the USSR.

The entry of the Red Army into the territory of Bulgaria and Serbia can take place relatively easily. Relatively little bloodshed - with the neutrality of the indigenous population. And the Wehrmacht will fight here from teasingly. But the battles on the territory of Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary will go on with both the Wehrmacht and the national armies. If these countries can be captured, then at the cost of long battles and huge losses.

**Wherein:**

- the USSR has no moral justification for aggression;
- the Red Army is advancing - the army of the World Revolution. For everyone, its movement is like the raid of the Red Army in 1920: "To Warsaw! To Berlin!"

Initially, Finland did not intend to capture Leningrad. In our virtual reality, her willingness to participate in the storming of the city is real.

**VIRTUALITY:  
PROBABLE RATES OF ADVANCE**

During the winter-spring campaign of 1944 for 4 me  
The Red Army has advanced 250-450 km for a week.

The brilliant Lublin-Brest operation (July 18 - August 2, 1944) was more successful: in 16 days - 260 km.

Another analogy. On August 30, 1944, the Slovak National Uprising began, in which many communists participated: against the pro-Nazi regime Slovak Republic led by Josef Tiso. The Soviet leadership wanted to help the uprising. To do this, on September 8, 1944, Soviet troops launched the Carpatho-Dukela operation. But the advance of the troops was so slow that in early November 1944, the Nazis crushed the uprising even before the Soviet troops could give it real help.

Only during the Vistula-Oder operation, which began on January 12, 1945, Soviet troops advanced up to 20 km per day for 20 days.

The question is - for what? Firstly, as always, the dead were not counted: the minefields were passed by penal battalions. Secondly, in the course of artillery preparation, there were up to three hundred guns per kilometer of the front. The distance from one gun to another was only three or four meters.

<sup>1</sup> See: *Konev I.S. Forty-fifth. M.: Military Publishing, 1970.*

In our virtuality, an uprising of the Slovaks would be unrealistic. And the Poles would actively fight with the Red Army.

After all, in reality, during the Lublin-Brest operation, the Red Army acted together with the Poles. The government in London gave the Home Army the task of restoring statehood BEFORE the arrival of the Red Army. As the Wehrmacht retreated, the Craiova Army took possession of the liberated areas in Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland. The advancing Soviet troops already found a formed apparatus of power there, supported by armed detachments, subordinate

to the exile government.

This was very convenient for the Red Army: it fought with the Wehrmacht, having an ally and conducting battles with joint operations, and the rear units ended up on the territory of the union state. Later, the AK officers were arrested, and the fighters were disarmed and mobilized into the pro-Soviet Polish Army of General Berling. Naturally, not everyone went there. When trying to disarm the Akovites, they went into the forests. Capturing, the Akovites were accumulated in Nazi camps, including in Majdanek, and from August 23, 1944, they were sent to camps in Russia.

But in reality, the Craiova Army was born underground. From November 1939, the *Zwienziek valki zbroinei* (Union of Armed Struggle - ZVZ) gradually subdued the military conspiratorial organizations operating in Poland, which supported the government in London.

If the Nazis had armed the Craiova Army, it would have been both more numerous and better armed. If

<sup>1</sup> See: *Malinovsky M., Pavlovich E., Pomeransky V., Shpegonsky A., Vilyush M.* Polish labor movement during the war and Nazi occupation. M., 1968. S. 45.



if such an army, together with the Wehrmacht, fought with the Red Army, the pace of the offensive would be much faster.  
lower.

From the Soviet-Nazi border of July 1945 to Wroclaw-Breslau, Vienna, Prague and Bratislava, to Belgrade - approximately the same distance: about 400-500 km.

Such a path is 3-5 months of continuous offensive, that is, non-stop offensive battles. Moreover, communications are unreliable, no one gives or sells anything, the population is hostile, in the forests and mountains there are armed detachments of partisans.

If you don't engage in demagoguery about the fact that "ours always won all the same," I don't see the slightest opportunity to go this way ... But it is only about half the distance to the western regions of Germany.

## RED ARMY AND VIRTUALITY

The war in reality turned out to be quite unexpected for the soldiers and officers of the Red Army. They were being prepared for such a cheerful and victorious patriotic-class offensive, during which the proletarians from the enemy armies surrender, and the bourgeoisie will invariably be defeated.

But in reality, they could explain what was happening as a "treacherous attack" by the Nazis. Even in defeat there was a bitter but soul-stirring consideration: we were not prepared. We were suddenly attacked. We harness slowly, but then we'll go fast.

The enemy was marching across the territory of Russia... This made the war morally justified, and it was no longer so important who was going to attack whom. We are right because we are victims of aggression. We need to expel the enemy from our territory, then we'll figure it out.

The offensive war in July 1941 proved

would be even more unexpected and, moreover, deprived of any moral justification. That is, an excuse can be found - the historical inevitability of the World Revolution. There was even a contingent of Arbat boys ready to die for the World Revolution. But were there many of them, the red-breasted children of the Arbat? Boys from Moscow families fed by the authorities, well-fed, in whose homes the place of icons was replaced by portraits of Marx, Lenin and Stalin? The history of the show hall: Timurov Gaidarov and Pash Koganov are few. They disappeared by the winter of 1941 because it was not their war. They wanted war, but completely different.

If the Nazis lost the war, it was precisely because for millions of Russians of 120 nationalities they acted as OCCUPANTS. As enemies who must be beaten regardless of the political system of both the Fatherland and them, the invaders, the state. The Nazis were defeated because the division of the world by Stalin and Hitler turned into a Patriotic War for Russia.

In virtuality, the Red Army has been marching across a foreign land from the very beginning. For every sneeze of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht snarls with fire. His soldiers do not surrender, no one is going to "beat the bourgeoisie" together with the Red Army. Next to the soldiers of the Wehrmacht some other people are huddled in a completely unfamiliar form. People in villages and towns leave with an unfriendly army or scatter. foreign land blazes with fire, meets empty, silent, devastated. It is dangerous to enter the forest; those who left the location of the unit did not return. The rest do not answer questions, try not to make eye contact.

Of course, in the conditions of an offensive war, one cannot fail you live in the forests and do not rush from the enemy to the east. But as soon as the front stabilizes ...

In reality, 5.7 million soldiers and officers of the Red Army surrendered during the war years. Of these, more cute

**Lyon fought as part of the Wehrmacht, and collaborated with the Nazis for more than one and a half million.**

**Among the prisoners - 79 generals. 13 generals killed by the Nazis for refusing to cooperate, 4 generals fled, returning to the Red Army or partisans.**

**But 23 other generals of the Red Army after the victory of the USSR were shot or hanged, and 10 received decent terms. For cooperation with no one.**

**In virtuality, the same Red Army men and the same generals are going west. Why would they behave differently?**

## **VIRTUALITY OF "RUSSIAN POLITICS"**

**In reality, the Wehrmacht created Russian national units more than once and willingly included defectors in its composition. And the political leadership of the Reich prevented this in every possible way. We are considering the virtuality of the "smart Hitler", and therefore we are simply obliged to assume: on July 25, the government of the Russian Republic is being created in Krakow. Well, well, let it be the Russian National Socialist Republic. The government is created on August 1, 1941 and is temporarily located in Krakow. Soon he will have to move to Wroclaw.**

**This creation of an alternative "government" would mean exactly one thing: Stalin was fed his own porridge. Communists regularly created "alternative governments" of the states they were at war with. Depending on the alignment, these governments either later forgot like a bad dream, or**

**rotated into the government of the satellite country.**

**The first case is the Terijoki government, established on December 1, 1939. The "People's Government" was created in the village of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk), to**

faith from Petersburg. The "government" was "headed" by an old member of the Comintern, the Bolshevik Otto Kuusinen. After the defeat of the USSR in the Winter War, the government was simply forgotten.

The second case: on July 21, 1944, the Polish Communists and their allies created the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Chej̃m, a provisional pro-Soviet government of Poland. Poland had a legal government - the Polish government

ministry in exile.

Nevertheless, in the Sovietization of Poland, it was precisely the "Chelm government" that played a large and sinister role and became the basis of the future government of the Polish "People's" Republic.

And so, the government of the Russian National Socialist Republic arises.

Leaflets over the positions of the Red Army. Leaflets can be collected, prevented from being read, shot for possession. But at night, near the location of the Red Army units, they shout the same thing in good Russian: "You are dying for the International! You are tools in the hands of the commissars!"

Even in official writings such as Zhukov's "Memoirs and Reflections," there are references to the fact that before the war, the orders of People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko from Moscow was sabotaged in a number of military districts. This sabotage took place especially openly in Byelorussia, in the ZapOVO, where General of the Army D. Pavlov commanded.

Already in July 1941, the entire leadership of the Western Front, including the front commander Pavlov, was shot for "cowardice, lack of initiative and alarmism, which created the possibility of the enemy breaking through the front"<sup>1</sup>.

Only the deputy head of the front, Boldin, was saved: when

<sup>1</sup> Materials of the investigation and trial of General D.G. Pavlov // Unknown Russia. Collection of documents. Book. 2. M., 1992.

they shot the chief and colleagues, he was surrounded. And he left already in August 1941. Besides time, the cadre army almost completely perished, and the survivors were not shot. Boldin was promoted in rank, given command of the 50th Army. He survived the war and even wrote memoirs. About how "the troops were forced to retreat and dispersed in scattered groups through the forests"<sup>1</sup>.

In our virtuality, there is nothing to shoot Pavlov for, he honestly conquers Europe. But does he want to fight more than the same Pavlov in reality?

On September 15, a white rag appears above the parapet of the trench. Silence. Between the lines of the trenches, the envoys of the Red Army are moving. General Pavlov and his staff go over to the side of the Nazis. And is he alone? In reality, there were 23 collaborator generals, and 5.7 million soldiers and officers who surrendered. This is already more than enough to create the Russian Liberation Army. In our reality, the ROA was created only in 1944. In this virtuality, it is created in September 1941. The huge ROA not only splits the front, it forces the units loyal to Stalin to roll back. It will create an ambiguous situation: there are two armies, two governments in Russia.

Of course, the Anglo-Saxons will not support the National Socialist Republic of Russia. And the Republic of Russia? If the diplomats of this Republic come to London on October 1, 1941? There are amazing possibilities here...

## THE VIRTUALITY OF THE RED ARMY'S RETREAT

When will the invasion of Europe by 120 languages finally stop? Where? Will this happen near Krakow, October 1, 1941, after two months of war? Under

<sup>1</sup> *Boldin I.V.* pages of life. M., 1961.

**Warsaw, in the third month of the war, November 1, 1941, right? Or will the Red Army stand up and be unable to move on only on the bank of the Danube, drenched in human blood, littered with fragments of the living and the dead, on October 15? Will the Red Army reach Breslau and stand only on its outskirts on December 15 1941?**

**In any case, the moment is inevitable when she gets up. Someone else will rush forward, rape tank engines, go stubbornly, run, crawl, go towards the purple-smoky flashes of shots, aim artillery barrels at the houses of Polish peasants that have not yet flared up. But the army stood up. Having lost millions of soldiers, having completely lost the understanding of the meaning of its actions, the Red Army stands up and can no longer.**

**Just as the Nazis failed at Stalingrad, so the Communists will not succeed at Warsaw. Near Stalingrad, the Red Army fed the Wehrmacht with its own porridge: it took 22 divisions into the "cauldron": as the Nazis more than once or twice took the Soviet armies into the "cauldrons".**

**Virtually, on October 15, the ring closed near Warsaw. There are no frosts, although it is already cool for soldiers dressed in summer. But the main thing is that the "cauldron" is very hungry. And hopeless. I didn't want to fight before, now I've lost my desire completely. By October 20, the encircled soldiers, having killed the commissars and officers who did not want to surrender, fled in droves to the Nazi trenches, raising their hands. They will be driven through the streets of Berlin, demonstrating t**

**From October 16, the Red Army will roll back in the south and in the center. Only near Danzig did she catch on and stand. From that day on, the only question is when the front, which is rolling back to the east, will reach Moscow. And when the Finns move to St. Petersburg.**

## THE PROBLEM OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

Winter campaign problem? Yes, in reality, the government of the Third Reich did not order to prepare for the winter campaign. Then the generals of the Reich in their memoirs will describe the terrible "General Frost", who defeated them. Of course, he won if no one was preparing to fight with him. If neither winter lubricant, nor winter uniforms, nor warm shoes and underwear are prepared. If it is officially said that the blitzkrieg should end by September.

In our virtuality, Hitler and his entourage mind we are shrewd. They are ready for the winter campaign.

Among the fairy tales about Europe, Russia is very fond of this one: that Europeans are very afraid of frost. In fact, because of the high humidity in Europe, even "weak" frosts, according to Russian concepts, are much more difficult to endure. The drier, the higher the frost tolerance. Minus 5 in Berlin feels like minus 25 in Moscow and minus 35 in Novosibirsk.

At least for the inhabitants of Northern Europe, "Russian frosts" up to 25-30 degrees are quite comfortable. To the same extent as minus 5-10 at home.

## INEVITABLE DESTRUCTION

The invasion of enemies on the USSR in the autumn of 1941 or in the spring of 1942 is much worse in virtuality than what happened in reality:

- an army is marching on the USSR, much more formidable than was in reality in 1941.

- this is really the "team of Europe": in reality, and not in the inflamed imagination of the "patriots" from the semi-official party;

- the war easily becomes civil for the peoples of the USSR, including the Russian people.

If the front collapses, stretching from the Baltic to

**Danube, further can go at the pace of the Civil: that is, the speed of the movement of the Wehrmacht can become 30-40 km per day. Even more if you travel by rail, throwing away in populated areas**

**military teams.**

**When will the Wehrmacht and its allies enter Moscow? Will it happen on November 9, 1941? Or May 1, 1942? To be honest, I don't see a fundamental difference.**

**If the Nazis are completely smart and created the Russian Republic and the Russian Liberation Army, there is no need to storm Moscow. When the Wehrmacht approaches Moscow, the new Red Army, formed in the Urals and Siberia, will do the same thing that its predecessor did in June-September 1941: partly scatter, partly surrender.**

#### **THE DEFEAT OF THE USSR... FOR LONG TIME?**

**There is also a question of a smart and stupid occupier. But I see no particular need to consider different perspectives of occupation. This is the subject of a se**

**To put it briefly: WITHOUT a Russian nation-state, the occupation lasts exactly as long as it takes to start a large-scale people's war.**

**If there EXISTS a Russian national state, a Russian republic, then the results of the war can become final. After some time, the occupiers can withdraw their troops, Russia has forever ceased to be the center of the World Revolution.**

#### **VIRTUALITY: THE BEST PACKAGE**

**But consider the opposite!**

**In this version, everything is very successful for Stalin: Hitler is especially stupid, the Europeans are especially cowardly,**



The Comintern is surprisingly effective, the local communists are brave, the British and Americans are excluded. profoundly shortsighted.

1) Hitler does not give anything to the allies, he insists on the holiness and inviolability of racial theory. He does not give them weapons, powers, or equipment to pursue an independent policy. That is, it actually prevents Ukrainians and Poles from fighting the USSR, because

that they are racially unclean.

2) Europeans are splitting within themselves, they are in a civil war.

In Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, France, and the countries of Northern Europe, the Communists are coming to the surface with the first volleys of the invasion. As a result:

- in countries where hostilities are taking place, the Red Army receives a powerful and active ally, many numerous local agents;

- the governments of countries separated from the theater of operations by the territory of the Third Reich are paralyzed by these internal unrest and cannot actively help the Third Reich, even if they want to.

The exceptions are Spain, where the communists and anarchists in 1939 were suppressed firmly and for a long time. And Italy, where the social program of the communists is successfully carried out by Mussolini.

3) Europeans do not want and are afraid to fight on the side of Hitler.

For Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, the Czech Republic, there comes a moment of weakening of the enemy that conquered them. They try not to support Hitler, slow down supplies to the Wehrmacht, do not send their units or violate the deadlines for their speeches, and prevent the recruitment of volunteers.

The allies of the Third Reich, Italy and Spain, are not sure of his victory. They are waiting. As the Red Army advances, they become more and more convinced of the correctness of their policy.

#### **4) The British and Americans are neutral.**

**Let's not even consider the option of Anglo-American assistance to the USSR. Anglo-Saxons are neutral. They are waiting, watching how the USSR destroys yesterday's ally.**

**The speech in the Senate by Democratic Senator Harry Truman (since 1944 Vice President of the United States, from April 1945 to January 1953 - President of the United States) is widely known: "If we see that Germany is then we should help Russia, and if we win Russia, then we should help Germany, and, so let them kill as many as they can, although I do not want under any circumstances to see Hitler as the winners .**

**Suppose the Anglo-Saxons do not act as the great Truman commanded them. They don't help a losing Hitler. They are waiting. It is most likely that they open a second front at the last moment.**

**Then by the winter or, at most, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army will occupy both Eastern Europe and the Third Reich. Berlin is renamed Stalingrad. Hitler and his entourage partly manage to escape to South America, part of the highest Nazi bosses die.**

**It is also possible that part of the leadership of the Third Reich will go over to the side of the Reds. Indeed, in 1945-1953, Buchenwald continued to work, and many workers of the Third Reich from his guard continued to work in their former places. There were quite a few people in the Stasi in the GDR who worked in the SS and the Ge**

**So, on October 15, 1941, the Polish People's Republic was founded. Her army is fighting the Nazis. In Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, or "people's" governments.**

**December 15, 1941 or May 1, 1942 Berlin**

**1 New York Times. 06/24/41.**

pitulated. German communists and those who joined them recall the revolutions of 1918-1919 and 1923 and the Rot Front. The emaciated but lively Ernst Thälmann puts those who had just kept him there in Majdanek. Goebbels hysterically shouts on the radio about the abyss ty, into which he brought the superior race ... that is, in the sense of the proletarians of Germany, the accursed regime of Hitler-Bormann.

You can rename Berlin to StalinStadt, München to Zhukovheim, Hamburg to Leningretz, and Dresden to Marksdorf. Complete communist idyll.

But even this does not at all mean the conquest of the fact that the world ... Does not even mean the conquest of Europe.

A Soviet empire arises on an expanded scale, which includes all or almost all of Germany. Not in 1945, but in 1942. And it's all.

The rest of Europe is not conquered. West of Croatia and south of Germany lie France, Italy and Spain. They also have to be conquered.

There are two options, directly dependent on what and how the Anglo-Saxons will do. If they are neutral, then the USSR will face a new terrible war. Imagine this war as a direct continuation of the war with the Third Reich. So, in the spring of 1942, units of the Red Army and the armies of the new states of Eastern Europe, including the Red Army of Germany, forced the Rhine, launched an offensive in the Ardennes. At the same time, other units of the Red Army are moving into Northern Italy. New protracted war.

For example, in the autumn of 1942, the advanced units of the Red Army, advancing in Portugal, saw the swells of the Atlantic Ocean in front of them. Others still toiled with their stomachs in the summer, eating oranges and grapes of southern Italy.

But this is not the conquest of the world. This is not even the conquest of Europe, because there is also Scandinavia,

**and then there is Britain, still invulnerable in her islands.**

**This is the first option if the Anglo-Saxons do not intervene  
sya. As they sat on the sidelines, so they sit.**

**The second option is that the Anglo-Saxons are on the  
move BEFORE the USSR conquers everything.**

## **ANGLO-SAXONS AS NON-ALLIES**

**There is a historical legend according to which Harry  
Truman explained to his son: the peoples of Europe are the  
players on the battlefield. And we are substitute players, we  
will go to the field when the rest are tired. Cynically? Yes, it  
seems that Stalin also said something like that ...**

**The question is exactly when and in what form the Anglo-  
Saxons will play their historical role.**

**Option One: They Open a Second Front BEFORE  
defeat of the Third Reich. Let's say they were late to share  
the defeated Germany. November 9, 1941 or May 1**

**1942 British-American and Soviet soldiers meet on the Rhine.  
But they meet not as in our reality: not as comrades-in-arms!  
Across the Rhine, they are reviewing, it's good if they don't  
exchange fire, not allies ... Well, if not enemies yet.**

**In this case, it is not very clear whether a new round of  
the Second World War will take place: the conquest of  
Western and Southern Europe. Because the USSR is clearly  
not ready to fight with the Anglo-Saxons. Basically. This  
detail is somehow not considered by our brave "patriots",  
but in vain ...**

**In this scenario, the conquest of ALL of Europe will not  
take place. The USSR can, if it wants to, be replenished with  
the Greek SSR, the Polish SSR, the Hungarian SSR, the  
Slovak SSR, the Czech SSR and other SSRs. He can dismember  
Germany and adorn himself with the High German SSR, the  
Rhine SSR, the Bavarian SSR, the Saxon SSR, the Palatinate  
SSR.**

**What will change if the Anglo-Saxons intervene later? In the sense - if they do not interfere with Steel, well, to conquer Europe? Then, firstly, several million more people will die. Secondly, then the USSR will be replenished with the Catalan SSR, the Sicilian SSR, the Picardy SSR and the Breton SSR. Let's say that the USSR will have not 30, but 50 "Soviet socialist republics." Suppose the borders of the USSR will stretch from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic... So what?**

### **DELICATE QUESTION**

**A delicate question that our unfortunate "patriots" never ask: the question of why the USSR behaved so modestly after the Second World War. I dare to remind you: because only the USA had atomic weapons. There are several examples ... I will give only one. Stalin tried to chop off all of Azerbaijan from Iran. Not even to conquer Iran, but more modestly - to seize from Iran about a third of the territory and population. No persuasion worked, of course.**

**Only the United States, which at that time had a monopoly on atomic weapons, could stop the Soviet Union. In March 1946, when the Azerbaijani crisis reached its peak, President Truman threatened to use atomic weapons against the USSR if Stalin did not withdraw the occupying troops. And it worked: brought.**

**In our reality, it was possible to steal the atomic secret through the hands of the Rosenberg spouses. The last action of not forgotten Comintern times was a success because that some American Jews still had a sentimental attitude towards the USSR as a former homeland and as a conqueror of the terrible enemy of Jewry — Hitler.**

**In our virtuality, the aggressor is the USSR, no**

him the glory of a savior. And it's unlikely that the kidnapping atomic secret will take place.

In our reality, the Anglo-Saxons allowed to create Soviet empire ... but of a strictly defined size. In our reality, they considered it necessary not to let their dear ally Stalin into most of the territory of Germany, and even more so into Western Europe. And even if they let you in?

Of course, the world map would have looked different... On this world map there would have been a huge Soviet empire, but also of a strictly defined size. This size would have been openly or tacitly, but stipulated, and Stalin would have observed these agreements, he would not have gone

Conquer the British Empire and its satellites  
no one would let him.

#### **CONSEQUENCES OF "GOOD VIRTUALITY" FOR USSR AND USA**

... In fact, they are only bad for the USSR. Throughout the history of the USSR, various countries of Europe and the USA were a source of high technologies for it. The USSR could play on the contradictions of opponents. If Europe has become part of the USSR, the same thing happens to it that happened to Russia itself, and then to the countries of "people's democracy": it ceases to be a source of high technologies. In reality, the United States greatly benefited from the fact that Europe lay in ruins in the late 1940s. In our virtuality, things are even better for the USA. They are turning into the ONLY complex industrial production center on Earth.

And the USSR is forced to deal with the USA as the only ruler of the Earth, the monopoly on atomic weapons, the only buyer of raw materials mined in the USSR. And besides, his "fifth column" in the United States itself is much weaker than in reality.

For Britain, the conquest of the continent is also

it's not bad for everyone: if several "Soviet republics" appeared in the place of France, its colonies will easily be "captured" by the British. How long? Let parse eat themselves.

## STALIN AS HITLER

When discussing the prospects of the "Zemshar Republic of Soviets", our theoreticians and analysts show, firstly, fabulous ignorance. They just don't represent how vast and complex the world is.

Secondly, they turn out to be incapable of the most elementary action, which seems to be obligatory for an analyst. They do not calculate events beyond one first move. However, they have this in common with Stalin.

We are still supposed to consider Stalin a "great statesman" and almost a genius. So Suvorov thinks ... Although he himself writes how Stalin miscalculated, how he made a mistake in all the calculations.

Indeed: he was preparing to create something Zemsharnoye, even the Palace of Soviets was going to be built with 100 floors. To do this, he shared the world with Hitler, but did not get what he expected. The "icebreaker of the revolution" failed to fulfill its "historical mission" and even attacked Stalin himself.

He again began to divide the world, this time with the rulers of "the rotting bourgeois pseudo-democracies", and in the same way - with the help of secret collusion.

But what is most interesting is that twice finding allies, twice starting to share the world with them, in both cases Stalin was deceived in his plans and forecasts. Great statesman? But every time he

managed to make incredible efforts and get unreasonably little for them. Including, it seems, by the fact that he did not understand the psychology of his allies at all, did not see what really mattered to them.

oritetno, for which they are ready to fight in earnest.

**In our reality, even in Europe, Stalin was not able to play the role of a "reserve player" who came to the battlefield last. Hitler was ahead of him at the last moment. But in our reality, not Stalin, but the Anglo-Saxons were the last to enter the field. They got it! The Anglo-Saxons played the same game with Stalin that he played with Hitler.**

**Stalin and Hitler together turned out to be "icebreakers of the US hegemony." They smashed Europe to pieces, and then the "valiant allies" came and took everything into their own hands.**

**In "good" virtuality, only one thing changes: Stalin becomes the only "icebreaker of US dominance." He plays the same role in history that he himself has prepared for Hitler.**

**Moreover, in many respects, Stalin's post-war empire is noticeably WORSE than the one that arose in reality.**

## **PERSPECTIVE OF THE USSR FROM OCEAN TO OCEAN**

**Judge for yourself...**

**Firstly, in conquering this "USSR from the Pacific to the Atlantic", the Russian people and other peoples of the "first USSR" will overstrain even more than they have overstrained in our reality.**

**Secondly, many centers of resistance immediately appear in conquered Europe: Lithuania, Poland, Western Ukraine, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece ... And what is being done in Spain with its Guerilla tradition, it is simply difficult for me to imagine.**

**The empire will never be reconciled. She will never be peaceful and calm. And how much blood will be shed, one can only guess.**

**Thirdly, Soviet domination means the collapse of precisely those complex branches of the economy that made Europe the mistress of the world. No imports of food and raw materials from the colonies? So there is a simplification**



infrastructure, the percentage of the population employed in agriculture and forestry is growing.

Fourth, complete dependence on the United States, which has already been mentioned.

All in all, a terrible prospect.

There is much more to say, but that's another topic.

The attack of the USSR on the Third Reich is fraught with much worse consequences, even in the event of a quick victory over the Reich. In reality, the best took place story option.

## ***Dmitry Khmel'nitsky***

# **STALIN'S ONLY DEFEAT**

### **WHY DIED**

#### **PERSONNEL RED ARMY IN THE SUMMER OF 1941?**

At home, two old newspapers hang on the wall under glass. Both are dedicated to old, but joyful events. Krasnaya Gazeta of January 24, 1924, reports on the delivery of the body of the deceased Lenin from Gorki to Moscow and on the worldwide mourning over this occasion. In "Trud" dated March 10, 1953, a photograph of Stalin's funeral and Malenkov's mourning speech were published on the first page. In front of the entrance to the Mausoleum there is a gigantic coffin, like for Gulliver. On the podium of the Mausoleum are all the main communists of the world, about thirty people - small, but recognizable. Khrushchev and Malenkov are in the middle. Near Beria and Zhou Enlai. On the left flank, Dolores Ibarra.

In post-Soviet Russia, the anniversaries of Lenin and Stalin pass completely unnoticed. Both are very lucky. The ironic indifference with which we, former Soviet people, vainly remember the names of the leaders is the best and completely undeserved reward for great people.

They have always been lucky. It was possible to put together a party of a completely new type. Managed to seize power. I managed to die my own death. Even if Ilyich was upset before his death, these griefs cannot be compared with the dying grief of his faithful comrades-in-arms. Zinoviev and Kamenev were more upset. The cult of Ilyich, rehearsed by Vissarionovich in his own interests, survived the cult of Stalin himself and will live on for a long time to come. The image of a wise, intelligent, decisive and humane leader exists

on its own, regardless of the terrible realities of the era, which even in Russia can already be read legally. Stalin did Ilyich a service he had no intention of doing. The spirit of Lenin was called upon to hold a halo over the head of Stalin himself. The head turned black and fell off, but the spirit remained and looks quite idyllic against the background of Stalin's personality and his era. The pre-revolutionary background natural for Ilyich has gone into oblivion so long and so firmly that it seemed that it had never existed. He disappeared along with the people for whom it was Lenin who was the main ghoul who defiled a completely decent country.

The Soviet thaw began with a "return to Leninist norms", with the ingenuous Voznesensky, with "...get Lenin out of your money!". The thaw started off sweet the horror of realizing the similarities between Hitler's and Stalin's regimes. The process of awareness has dragged on for fifty years and still has not reached its climax. nations, although along the way, not only a handful of renegades, but the entire Soviet people turned into emigrants, and the Great Motherland ended in self-annihilation. It will probably take before the hell of a time to realize the deep dissimilarity between Hitler and Stalin and to see much closer parallels between Lenin and Hitler.

There is a simple psychological test for identifying the ability for abstract thinking - to exclude a dissimilar figure from several figures. In a group of three leaders - Lenin, Stalin, Hitler - it is Stalin who stands apart. Stalin's psychology is a mystery; black box of Soviet history. His views, goals and tastes have not yet been deciphered. In terms of the totality of terror and the well-functioning of the state system he invented, he was far ahead of his colleagues.

Compared to Stalin, Lenin and Hitler are simple and clear as a tear. Both are political idealists who invented an idea and faithfully served it (on ideas, ru

led by Stalin, and it's ridiculous to say. He could turn anyone inside out). Both came from the mid-range intelligentsia and were actively engaged in self-education. Self-education brought both to a complete break with the environment and its values. Both were charismatic mathematical leaders, surrounded by associates and like-minded people (Stalin was surrounded only by halims). Both were respected and loved by their party comrades. Their power—at least in this circle—was based on respect, not fear. His comrades-in-arms also loved Stalin, but it was mortally dangerous not to love him. Hitler would hardly have kept Goebbels' love if he had arrested his wife. Stalin did this repeatedly.

Both were socialists. Both dreamed of the reorganization of the world and the happiness of mankind. Both to withdraw from a happy humanity some groups unworthy of happiness: one of the “class enemies”, the other of the “racial” ones. Both got power in democratic countries and turned them into totalitarian and one-party. Lenin, it is true, did this by much more brutal means than Hitler. But his situation was more complicated - he had to fight. Therefore, the role of the Cheka-OGPU in Soviet Russia was immeasurably higher than the role of the Gestapo in the Third Reich. Lenin, after seizing power, inflicted terror in his own country on such a scale that Hitler decided only during the war and only on foreign territory. Lenin and Hitler destroyed approximately the same number of people - 7-10 million (Stalin was several times more). Crazy utopian ideas were behind the terror of Lenin and Hitler. Their implementation often ran counter to the practical usefulness of the regime and brought it to the brink of collapse. Lenin managed to avoid collapse, Hitler did not.

Stalin's terror, on the contrary, was due to practical, administrative and economic considerations.

niami. It has always only benefited—not for the population, of course, but for the regime. Hitler and Lenin were in their own way to him by honest people - what they thought, then they wrote. The most brutal orders were given by both of them, of course, secretly, but they did not particularly hide their strategic intentions and goals.

Brilliant hoaxer and absolute cynic Sta  
against their background, lin looks like an alien from another world.

The historical injustice lies in the fact that the posthumous fate of all three developed differently. Hitler looks like the only embodiment of absolute evil in the eyes of all mankind, including the Soviet people, who, it would seem, suffered the most from the activities of the troika. About Stalin, his politics, goals and personal qualities, and decades after the release of *The Gulag Archipelago*, discussions are underway.

If in the question of intra-Soviet crimes  
There is no consensus on Stalin and the existence of the GULAG is practically not questioned by anyone, the role of Stalin and the USSR in World War II is still a topic for the fiercest historical and ideological disputes. Moreover, the myths about the peacekeeping and anti-fascist role of the USSR, which  
which are expelled with great difficulty not only from Soviet, but also from Western historical science, were once invented by Stalin himself. But they survived him for a long time.

Part of the blame for this lies with the Nuremberg Trials. For all its merits, it turned out to be a farce in one serious respect: Nazi war criminals were tried in the international tribunal by Soviet war criminals. Rudenko, who accused Kaltenbrunner, just as Stalin accused Hitler, was an outrage against the idea of a tribunal, which all the participants could not but be conscious of. Some with a sense of powerlessness, others with malice. It took half a century for the public

ness (European, but not yet Soviet) finally asked itself the question: is Stalin really better than Hitler or is he just as bad?

And Lenin? He's not here at all. Everything was given but not true. The cult of Lenin, overgrown with good-natured anecdotes, turned into a cult of a ritual graphic symbol with a bald head and a beard, which, in contrast to Hitler's mustaches, does not evoke positively any feelings in the public. The image of Lenin was replaced by the image of his mummy with a difficult fate. The funniest problem in Russian politics is whether it should be

drop or leave to lie as an exhibit.

It's probably all right. It is very difficult to connect the orders for mass executions of hostages with the young blond man familiar all his life on the October star and the elderly sage from Brodsky's paintings. Not everyone succeeds.

There is a certain situational-psychological similarity between the conflict between Lenin and Stalin in the last years of Lenin's life and the conflict between Stalin and Hitler, which also ended in the death of the latter. Both Lenin and Hitler disastrously misjudged a man whom both, one for a long time and the other for

rotko - considered their ally.

..

The defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 is the most, and probably the only, unexpected event in Stalin's history. This is the only obvious defeat of Stalin, a violation of his plans. Everything else always went according to plan, or at least logically followed from other actions of the Soviet government.

Before 1941 and after 1945, all the troubles, misfortunes and difficulties of the Soviet population were inspired from within the country, by its own leadership. Therefore, all the other troubles of Soviet history (also with kind

lions of corpses - collectivization, industrialization, police terror) have always been presented by state-owned Soviet historiography either as victories and achievements, or as temporary difficulties due to insurmountable circumstances. In extreme cases, as errors and deviations from the correct course. And only the military defeats of the summer of 1941 remained in the minds of the Soviet people as a catastrophe, the evil intention of an insidious enemy. The victims actually incurred then (and later, during the war) were the only ones in the entire Soviet history that were officially recognized as victims during the Soviet era. For a very simple reason - they were easy to attribute to the enemy.

And the answer to the question about the reasons for the military defeat 1941 always seemed quite obvious: the enemy had treacherously attacked the defenseless, unprepared to fight and unsuspecting Soviet state. Hence the millions of losses at the first moment, and the most difficult three-year extrusion of the Wehrmacht outside the USSR.

This is an answer that is obvious to Soviet people, who have been weaned from thinking about official formulations, and completely unsatisfactory for those who have not lost the ability to think.

I believe that the death of the entire personnel of the Red Army followed not because the USSR was not ready for war, but for the exact opposite reason.

The Stalinist USSR prepared too well for war. Strictly speaking, the Soviet people did nothing else for a decade and a half before the war. Although not everyone suspected it. The USSR was preparing for war, forgetting about everything else, and besides, by the time of the German attack, it had already been participating in it for a year and a half - on a par with Hitler and as an aggressor. That's what neither the Soviet people nor Stalin himself were at all ready for, it was the role of victims of aggression.

Actually, it's worth clarifying the terminology here. Expressions like "the USSR was preparing" or "not preparing war", "the USSR believed, hoped, calculated..." are essentially incorrect. USSR in the thirties This is Stalin and no one else. Even Molotov and Kaganovich were only performers. Extras, but not players. Extras Stalin changed, frightened, flogged, exalted, used, killed, imprisoned and freed, but only he made decisions. Just as soon as he himself set key tasks and defined goals. The power structure built by Stalin by the beginning of the thirties ruled out even the minimum inner-party collegiality, even at the level of the Politburo. Therefore, the plans and policies of the USSR of that time are the plans and policies of Stalin.

Stalin very succinctly expressed the principle of his foreign policy in a letter **to Molotov and Kaganovich** dated **September 2, 1935**:

*products from the USSR to Italy due to the conflict in Abyssinia. I think the Narkomindel's doubts stem from a misunderstanding of the international situation. The conflict is not so much between Italy and Abyssinia, how much between Italy and France, with on one side and England on the other. Old Antan you are no more. Instead, two entente: the entente of Italy and France on the one hand, and the entente of England and Germany on the other. H the stronger the fight between them, the better for THE USSR. We can sell bread to both so they can fight. It is not at all profitable for us that one of them should immediately smash the other. It is beneficial for us that their fight should be as long as possible, but without a quick victory of one over the other .*

Here we are talking about a specific situation, but the main principle of the Soviet political stratum is indicated.

1 Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 Moscow, 2001. S. 545.



gies: pit opponents (and potential opponents - all European countries in general), wait until they weaken, and then attack. This was the essence of the foreign policy of the USSR in the thirties. Earlier and later, too, but only in the thirties the chances of achieving these goals became catastrophically greater.

In Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, the exposition of which was published in November 1939 by the Gavas agency and later found in the Russian archives by Tatyana Bushuyeva, in other words, those same goals.

Here is a quote from a text found by Tatiana Bushueva:

*"... If we conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Germany will refuse from Poland and will seek "modus vivendi" with the Western powers. War will be averted, but in the future, events may take on a dangerous character for the USSR. If we accept Germany's offer to conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she, of course, it will attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will become inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious unrest and disorder. Under these conditions, we will many chances to stay away from the conflict, and we can hope for our advantageous entry into the war.*

*The experience of the last twenty years shows that in in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist movement in Europe so strong that the Bolshevik party could take over power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a great war. We Let's make our choice, and it's clear. We must accept a German sentence and politely send it back Anglo-French mission. The first advantage which we extract will be the destruction of Poland before*

***the very approaches to Warsaw, including the Ukrainian Galicia ... At the same time, we must foresee the consequences that will flow from both the defeat and the victory of Germany. In the event of its defeat, the Sovietization of Germany will inevitably occur and a communist government will be established.***

***We must not forget that a Sovietized Germany will face a great danger if***

***this sovietization will be a consequence of the defeat Germany in a fleeting war. England and France will still be strong enough to capture Berlin and destroy Soviet Germany. And we don't we shall be in a position to come to the aid of our Bolshevik comrades in Germany.***

***Thus, our task is to***

***so that Germany could carry on the war as long as possible, with the goal that England and France, tired and to such an extent, exhausted, would not be able to defeat Sovietized Germany. Adhering to a position of neutrality and waiting in the wings,***

***The USSR will provide assistance to present-day Germany, to supply it with raw materials and foodstuffs mi ... For the implementation of these plans, it is necessary that the war lasted as long as possible, and it was at this all the forces that we have in Western Europe and the Balkans must be directed to the side... Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR , the motherland of the working people, that a war break out between the Reich and capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible.***

***longer in order to exhaust both sides. Precisely according to For this reason, we must agree to the conclusion pact proposed by Germany and work on so that this war, once declared, lasts the maximum amount of time .***

There is still a very heated discussion around the presentation of this speech. Not all researchers believe in its authenticity, since no other documents irrefutably confirming that the speech of 19 August took place have yet been discovered. There are two versions - either this speech was actually delivered, or someone who was aware of Stalin's plans and the discussions going on in the Kremlin elite simulated it. The latter is highly improbable—there is too much evidence to support the veracity of the presentation of the speech<sup>1</sup> —but even if it is not, there is no doubt that Stalin's political aims are set out in the alleged forgery perfectly adequate to reality. It could only be done by an extremely knowledgeable person. There is no evidence that Stalin could have other goals and other plans. All the actions of the Soviet Union after August 19, 1939 (and before - too) fit perfectly into the record

speech concept.

Pay attention to the phrase:

*“... If we conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Germany will refuse from Poland and will seek "modus vivendi" with the Western powers. War will be averted, but in the future, events may take on a dangerous character for the USSR.*

What could be the danger for the USSR? We are not talking about a military danger from the outside, since "war will be prevented." And hunters of good will to attack the USSR in pre-war Europe were not observed in any way. In the 1920s, the Soviet leadership played with the thesis that Poland was sleeping and seeing how to attack the Soviet Union, in the early thirties as "probable

<sup>1</sup>See: Doroshenko V., Pavlova I., Raak R. Not a myth: Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 // Pravda Viktor Suvorov. Rewriting the history of World War II. M., 2006.

tivnikov, a fantastic coalition of all the western neighbors of the USSR was considered, but all this was not even nonsense, but an ideological veil that masked their own plans for a war against all their neighbors. The USSR chose its probable opponents for itself, and

the degree of probability did not depend on their plans, but on the Veteran.

Based on Stalinist logic, the danger for the USSR consisted in the IMPOSSIBILITY to unleash a world war in such a way as to enter it after all the other participants had exhausted their forces. That is, it was an ideological danger. This situation could develop into a real military danger only if the USSR nevertheless decided to attack the peaceful and, consequently, immediately united against it Europe.

ü The main danger for the future of the USSR, according to Stalin, was the prevention of war. It was in order to avert this danger that Stalin agreed to conclude an agreement with Hitler. Treaty that provided for the start of a world war, brought Germany into conflict with a coalition of Western states, unleashed the hands of Stalin in Eastern Europe,

which closed the Soviet borders with the German ones and created a real and desirable opportunity for Stalin to intervene in the world war at the right moment as an "arbiter". In other words, the only winner. The "Sovietization" of Germany was programmed by Stalin in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact from the very beginning. Moreover, it is interesting that, first of all, the "Sovietization" of Germany was planned in the event of Germany's defeat in the war with England and France. This

could mean only one thing: at the moment when the German troops are defeated in the west, the USSR enters into German territory from the east and goes further west as an ally of the "Sovietized

Germany". It is difficult to envy the role that Hitler was destined for in this scenario.

Thus, one of the main reasons for the military defeats of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 was Stalin's foreign policy strategy as a whole. If it were not for the permanent focus of the USSR on inciting a world war, the war would simply not start. The turning point of this strategy came precisely on August 19, 1939, assuming that Stalin acted

On this very day, he decided to conclude a pact with Hitler and opened his cards to his comrades-in-arms.

Everything depended only on Stalin. If he had not concluded a pact, the war would have been prevented, the borders would have remained in their original places, and a clash between Germany and the USSR would have been physically impossible.

Hitler, for all his military ambitions, was a dependent figure in this alliance. If Stalin refused to conclude an agreement and he concluded an agreement on cooperation with the British and French, then that was it - that was the end of Hitler's freedom of action, and dreams of expanding living space in any direction continued to remain dreams. The pact opened the way for Hitler to Poland and, most importantly, to the West. However, there is no reason to believe that Hitler was so eager in 1939 for an immediate all-European war - the declaration of war by the Western allies shocked him greatly. But there is no doubt about Stalin. Strived, and how.

However, when concluding the pact, a real danger arose, which Stalin should have taken into account - Hitler could realize that his plans for the future of Europe differ from Stalin's plans. And to imagine what fate Stalin is preparing for Germany, Europe and for him personally. But the situation in which Hitler found himself (and found himself), realizing after getting bogged down in the European war that the threat from the East, earlier, before the pact, was perceived throughout Europe rather as a hy

Skye and abstract, suddenly became completely real, did not leave him too many options for action. Strictly speaking, at that moment there was only one option left - a second front in the East.

Disputes about the causes of the German-Soviet war of 1941, as a rule, are especially intense, even hysterical, due to the discussion of the topic of "prevention". Thanks to it, a purely academic, historical problem acquires an acute ideological significance. Accept that Hitler attacked the USSR

Necessarily, for many participants in even quite serious scientific discussions, it means to justify Hitler. Which is strange. As if, after what Hitler had already managed to do by the summer of 1941, he can be justified by the fact that the attack on Stalin was forced. Hitler's reputation does not depend at all on whether he attacked preemptively or not. But the reputation of Stalin (and the USSR) depends on this very much. In the case of proven preventiveness, the USSR is the aggressor, which was outstripped. Prevention has not been proven - the USSR is a pure victim.

This topic has been sufficiently studied by many quite conscientious researchers. The picture emerges like this. Soon, within the next few weeks, Hitler did not expect a fall on Germany in June 1941, although it was absolutely real, which was repeatedly proven by both Russian and Western historians. German intelligence had a very incomplete idea of the state of the Red Army's deployment. The picture of what was happening in the three hundred kilometer border zone was more or less clear, but the Germans did not imagine the entire military potential of the Red Army, they did not know about the second and third countries.

tag echelons.

Giving the order to prepare for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler did not expect an imminent strike by the Red Army, although as the date of his own attack approached

the concern of the German military leadership about what was happening in the Soviet border zone, all time increased.

The fact that the USSR in principle represents an open military threat to Germany, and that its appetites go far beyond the limits stipulated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, was completely clear to the German leadership at least since the summer of 1940. Stalin could attack in six months, after a year or two, it still made the situation unbearable for Hitler, because it paralyzed his actions. Hitler could not end the war in the West without using one and a half hundred divisions stationed on the eastern border. And he could not take them away, because Stalin's aggressive intentions were obvious. Stalemate situation

also could not last too long, since it only led to a deterioration in the strategic position of Germany. Stalin could wait, but Hitler could not. In this situation, Hitler decided to cut the Gordian knot and, having defeated the Red Army, untie his hands in the West.

The ideological plans for the expansion of "living space" to the east played a third power role in this situation, if they played at all. Goebbels wrote about this quite clearly in his diary on June 16, 1941. Propaganda in diary entries, naturally

vein, and does not smell:

*"The Führer explains the situation to me in detail: the attack on Russia will begin when our deployment is over. This will happen within a week... The Russians have accumulated right on the border, this is for us the best that could have happened. If they dispersed and retreated into the interior of the country, they would be a great danger. They have 180-200 divisions, perhaps even less, in any about as much as we have. In personnel and technical terms, they are even comparable*

***You can't be with us... The Führer estimates the duration of the action at 4 months, I estimate it at a shorter time. Bolshevism will crumble like a house of cards... We must act. Moscow wants to keep out war until Europe is tired and bleeds out. Then Stalin will want to act, Bolshevize Europe and take power. These are his calculations. will be crossed out. Our action is prepared well, as far as it is generally in human power. So many reserves have been prepared that failure is easy excluded. The promotion is not limited geographically. The struggle will continue as long as the Russians armies will not cease to exist...***

***Russia will attack us if we weaken, and then we will have a war on two fronts, which we are preventing by this preventive action. Only when we have a free rear ...***

***We must also attack Russia so that you free the people. Undeclared Russia binds***

***150 divisions that we urgently need for the military economy. It needs to be strengthened in order to programs for the production of weapons, submarines and planes, then the US will not be able to do anything to us. We have materials, raw materials and machines for three-shift work, but not enough people. If Russia will be defeated, we will be able to release the lye military age and build, arm, get ready. Only then will it be possible to start an air war with England on a different level. An invasion is still unlikely. So, it's about guarantee victory otherwise...***

***The trend of the whole campaign lies in the palm of your hand: more wisms must fall, and England will be knocked out of the ha the last weapon on the continent. Bolshevik poison will be expelled from Europe. Against this even Churchill and Roosevelt have little to say. In Russia tsarism will not be restored, but to replace the Jewish***



***real socialism will come to Bolshevism ... Cooperation with Russia was a stain on our uniform. It will now be washed away. What is against we have fought all our lives, now it will be destroyed.***

***A week earlier, on June 8, Goebbels writes: "Received the program for the territorial division of R[ussia]. A very large apparatus is required. We are not talking about the Asian part of R.. Will have to take care only about European. Stalin recently told Matsuoka that he was an Asian. Well, please!" 2 .***

***And here is a piece of the entry dated June 14, 1941: "Russians, they don't seem to suspect anything. Anyway, they deployed in the way that we can only wish: very crowded, easy prey"3.***

**These records contain some of the most interesting mo  
cops.**

**First, it shows how wrong the Nazi leadership was about the scale of Soviet military preparations. Goebbels and Hitler counted on 180-200 Soviet divisions (or less), in reality there were more than 250 of them in the first two strategic echelons alone.**

**Secondly, the concentration of Soviet troops on the nice is not considered as an indication of an imminent attack. They did not expect him, but they were glad that the crowded Soviet troops would become easy prey. As it happened, by the way.**

**Thirdly, the Nazi leadership has no doubts about the strategic threat posed by Stalin and the Red Army. Stalin will attack as soon as he gets a favorable opportunity to do so. Therefore, it is by no means possible to remove troops from the eastern border.**

**1 Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels. Teil 1, Band 9, Munchen, 1998, pp. 377-379.**

**2 Ibid. S. 359.**

**3 Ibid. S. 371.**

Fourthly, the motive for the attack is indicated quite precisely - a preventive action aimed at removing the threat from the East in order to successfully end the war with England. Moreover, this action is not considered as a war on two fronts, on the contrary, it should prevent one. Indeed, at that moment the Wehrmacht was not conducting hostilities on land. But any activation on the Western Front, using forces redeployed from the East, automatically meant an attack by Stalin on a weakened sector and the opening of a second front under extremely unfavorable circumstances. That is, the main goal of Germany's attack on the USSR is the successful conclusion of the war with England. And the conquest of "living space" in the East and the elimination of Bolshevism is a secondary goal and does not determine the strategy. In the notes of Goebbels there is not a word about the seizure of land in the East as the main goal of the German-Soviet war. And there is nothing about the struggle against the "inferior races" as the driving force behind the Eastern Campaign. Ideology did not play any role at all in the decision to fight the USSR. Germany's appetites extend only to the European part of the USSR, and only out of necessity. Since Stalin is an "Asiatic", let him sit out in Asia.

At that moment, Hitler did not need any "living space", Germany in 1941 already had it in abundance. Much more than physical opportunities to master, pacify and control the seized half of Europe.

Thus, the specific reason for the defeats of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 is an error in calculations. If the end of the deployment of the Red Army for the attack had been planned not for mid-July, but a month earlier, the Wehrmacht could have expected the same terrible defeat. Apparently, as some researchers believe, for example, the Austrian historian Heinz

**Magenheimer, the Soviet leadership did not expect Hitler to attack suddenly and so soon. It was assumed that diplomatic demarches, ultimatums, political demands, etc. would follow first.**

**Goebbels details in his diary in May - June 1941, the camouflage efforts made by Germany, and especially by his department, in order to give the USSR the impression that Germany was ready for negotiations. Hence, probably, Stalin's disregard for warnings about the outbreak of war. up to the windows**

**there were only a few chances of preparation for the attack**

**weeks, he expected to hold out. And even then the German preparations ceased to play any role whatsoever. In the same way, on June 22, 1941, all the long-term efforts of the USSR to prepare its own attack on Europe instantly depreciated.**

**In fact, both sides, preparing to attack each other in the spring of 1941, made the same mistake. Both underestimated the danger of an enemy attack in the short term, and both counted on the complete success of their own military preparations. Both were preparing to make the same maneuver with the same goals. None of them prepared for defense. Due to a combination of chance circumstances, and not at all military tactical foresight, Hitler managed to get ahead of Stalin. But the opposite could also happen. And then today Hitler's mistakes that led to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in July 1941 would be discussed.**

..

**So, both sides were preparing to attack, both saw the enemy's threatening military preparations, and both did not expect the enemy to attack in the very near future. It makes sense to raise the question of the "prevention" of Germany's attack on the USSR in a slightly different way. Namely: did the partners meet**

the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, concluding it in August 1939, to violate this pact voluntarily, without pressure from external circumstances in the foreseeable future? Or would they intend to comply?

There is no doubt about Stalin. He was not just going to break the pact, for him the agreement with Hitler was a step towards achieving a goal that completely contradicted the essence of the pact: Stalin was not going to share Europe with anyone. There is plenty of evidence for this. Conversely, there is no indication that Stalin's (and the USSR's) strategic plans could have been different. All the military planning of the USSR from the end of the 1920s (and earlier too) was aimed at one day being able to defeat the armies of all European countries taken together. With the complete absence of a real threat not provoked by one's own actions from the European neighbors.

This raises a natural and important question for the topic under discussion: when did the USSR begin to prepare an attack on Germany? Purposeful preparations for an attack on Europe (and on Germany, of course) began in the Soviet Union long before Hitler's decision to develop Operation Barossa in 1940. And long before Hitler came to power.

American John Scott spent five years at industrial construction sites in the Urals. In a book published in Stockholm in 1944, he wrote: *"In 1940, Winston Churchill announced to the English people that he had nothing to expect other than blood, sweat and tears. The country is at war. [...] However, since 1931 the Soviet Union was at war, and his people went sweat, blood and tears. People were hurt and killed women and children froze to death, millions died of starvation, thousands were tried by military courts and were*

<sup>1</sup> See: *Oleg Ken*. Mobilization planning and political solutions. Late 1920s - mid 1930s. St. Petersburg, 2002.

***shot in the military campaign for collectivization and industrialization. I'm willing to bet that in Russia the struggle for the production of iron and steel has led to great losses than the Battle of the Marne in World War I. During all the thirties the Russian people waged war - industrial war.***

**It was an industrial war, which was supposed to bring the real war closer. All the terrible events of Stalin's history that we are accustomed to perceive separately - collectivization, industrialization, various waves of repressions - were elements of the implementation of one global plan to turn the USSR into a military camp, and the population partly into soldiers, partly into slaves. Which, in fact, in the Stalinist situation is one and the same thing.**

**The ideological cover for all these events was a bluff. Collectivization was not conditioned by any class struggle in the countryside. Industrialization did not aim at the economic rise of the country. And even the political repressions were not political. Political opponents of Soviet power would whether destroyed or completely paralyzed back in the 20s. Anti-Stalinist sentiments could be suppressed in the 1930s by repressions many orders of magnitude smaller than those that took place.**

**All Stalinist actions and reforms called political, were in fact purely economic in nature. It was a process of militarization of the country in the Stalinist way.**

**It was necessary to build military factories in the shortest possible time, providing weapons for the most powerful army in the world. This required a) funds, b) modern technology, c) cheap, and even better - free labor, d) a social structure that allows the leadership of the country to**

1 John Skott, "Jenseits von Ural", Stockholm 1944, 1944. S.12.

ny to manipulate all the country's resources - food, raw materials, industrial products, labor. All these tasks were solved in parallel. The main goal of Soviet industrialization was the construction of a military-industrial complex by reducing the standard of living of the population to a physically possible minimum. This was the goal

directly opposite to what is called the development of the economy. Normal economic growth usually means an increase in the well-being of citizens, an increase in the comfort of life. The Stalinist military industry was created by destroying, liquidating the civilian economy and reducing the standard of living on

villages.

Military-industrial technology had to be purchased from the West; there was no one of our own. This process began in 1927-1928. In 1929 - a huge success. American architect Albert Kahn receives an order from the USSR to design hundreds of industrial enterprises for a total of \$2 billion. Thanks to contacts with Kahn and other Western firms, a stream of military-industrial technology, machine tools, and all kinds of equipment began to flow into the USSR.

There was a stream of grain, all kinds of food and forests going towards them. There was nowhere else for the USSR to get the currency. Both streams culminated in 1932-1933; as a result, it was during these years that the peak of mass starvation in the country with many millions of victims fell. Collectivization was a means of pumping out food from the countryside and the pumping of the "surplus" enslaved peasant population into slave labor at the construction sites of the five-year plan. New enterprises were built close to sources of raw materials, where it was impossible to find voluntary workers at all. But tens of millions were required, free of charge. This problem was solved in several ways. The same collectivization; squeezing out "extra", useless

from the point of view of the state Stalinist dachas from urban populations through measures such as the introduction of the passport system; successive waves of repression. In parallel, the social structure of society was changing. Remains of economic and civil liberties were expelled from it. Ideally, the Stalinist system of government in the USSR, built by 1931-1932, was a concentration camp, in which, in fact, the GULAG served as a punishment cell. Those who remained at large had more privileges and better provision than prisoners, but no more civil rights. Even the Stalinist commissars.

The people who lived through those times in the Soviet Union left practically no memoirs. But in Europe, and especially in Germany, hundreds of books about life in the USSR were published in the 1930s. Most of the authors are foreign workers, engineers, former communists who lived and worked in the USSR, or journalists who traveled to the USSR as tourists. For Nazi propaganda, which published such books in gigantic circulation, they were a gift. Which, however, does not mean that they were not true. Yes, and it would be ridiculous to slander the Stalinist USSR, the reality was worse than any fantasy. Here is one example.

In the spring of 1932, the young German architect Rudolf Wolter came to Novosibirsk as a "foreign specialist". After a year of work, he returned home and, shocked by what he saw, published the book "Specialist in Siberia"<sup>1</sup>. Voltaire with great sympathy described a strange society, consisting, as it were, of some infantile adolescents. Something like a well-organized boarding school for children with retarded development. Members of this community are deprived of free will, freedom of choice, sense of self

<sup>1</sup> Rudolf Wolters, *Spezialist in Sibirien*, Berlin, 1933.

dignity and do not seem to understand what it is. They experience constant horror of the secret police and fear of the authorities, embodied in three guises - party organizer, trade union director. The bosses consist of the same teenagers, only invested with trust. They live in terrible conditions, but at the same time they think that life is worse in the West. They cannot change their place of work and place of residence, at any moment they can be deprived of their bread card (at the beginning of 1933 - 400 grams of bread per day for a worker). At the same time, they are sure that they are building socialism, and they are looking forward to the day the five-year plan ends, because they were promised that at that very moment the standard of living would triple. After all, they wrote about it in the newspapers!

With sad irony, Walters recalls the advice he constantly heard from his interlocutors: "You must read the newspapers. What you see with your eyes Zami, gives you the wrong impression of our system!" And an anecdote on the same topic: the teacher tells the class that a new factory has been built on Tverskaya Street. Student: "I live opposite, there has been only one fence for five years." Teacher: "Fool, read the newspapers, it's written there in black and white."

By 1932, Stalin had already fashioned a society that was ready to perceive reality not with its own senses, but through newspapers - in black and white. And I came up with all the necessary myths for him - black and white. The leader was a brilliant director and psychologist. He gave people fooled to the point of idiocy the most important thing - a sense of their value, need and nobility. The society united by Stalinist myths managed to outlive the leader himself, his image, and the formal change of the state system.

From the very beginning of his reign, from 1927, the goal of all Stalin's measures was the same - the speedy construction of a very strong army and the unleashing of



world war. The last goal was achieved in 1939. And by 1941, Stalin had an army incommensurable in numbers and technical power with any other army in Europe. Concluding a pact with Hitler in 1939, Stalin was by no means going to stop

pour on what has been achieved.

.. .

But was Hitler going to conclude the pact in August 1939, in the near future to break it? The agreement with Stalin opened the way for Hitler to the West and guaranteed (or was supposed to guarantee) a secure rear. If already in 1939 he was planning to seize both Western Europe and the Soviet Union in parallel (or successively), this means that even then he was actually preparing a war on two fronts. And he intended to deceive Stalin in the same way that Stalin (which is undoubtedly proven) intended to deceive Gith

Lera.

If, however, Hitler had no such plans in 1939 and he entered into a pact in earnest, with the intention of observing it, then this means that the attack on the USSR was forced, that is, preventive.

There could also be a third option: in 1939 he was not going to, and then, under the influence of victories in the West, his appetite was played out at times ... But this option is unambiguously unprovable. The unfinished and unpromising war with England and the real prospect of a war with the United States looming behind England on the Atlantic horizon did not give rise in 1941 to much optimism and intoxication with victories, no matter how spectacular they may seem.

It seems that no data has been published showing that until the summer of 1940, that is, before the annexation of part of Romania by Stalin, Hitler planned to launch the Eastern Campaign and, moreover, in the very near future.

In confirmation of this version, it is always quoted

**only one phrase "Mein Kampf": *"When we speak about the conquest of new lands in Europe, we, of course, can have in mind in the first place only Russia and those border states that are subordinate to it."***

**To the obvious question, why would Hitler, who had captured half of Europe by 1941, but never completely won the war in the West, treaty with the USSR and open a second front in the East - this question is followed by the traditional answer: he himself wrote that he would attack Russia. Here he attacked.**

**It is precisely this explanation that should not be believed out of the blue. Because in "Mein Kampf" Hitler wrote not only that. And not even quite that.**

**Hitler wrote his infamous book in prison in 1923-1924, after the failure of the coup. At that time he could only dream of the coming victory. Strictly speaking However, his book is not propaganda literature, but party theory, which was to form the basis of a mass movement in the future. These are the sincere thoughts of a defeated far-right extremist politician at that time about the fate of Germany.**

**He sees the main goal of Germany as abandoning the struggle for colonies in favor of conquering new lands in Europe: *"Until our state has managed to provide each of its sons with a sufficient amount of land for centuries to come, you should not consider that our position is strong. Never forget that the most sacred right is the right to own a sufficient amount of land, which we ourselves will cultivate. Do not forget***

<sup>1</sup>Cit. by: Gogun Alexander. Black PR of Adolf Hitler. M., 2004, p. 61.

***never that the most sacred is that blood  
which we shed in the struggle for land .***

Hitler plans wars of conquest, but with all his disgust for both the Bolshevik regime and Western democracies, he is driven not by political motives, but by purely mercantile motives - raised, however, to the level of high spiritual values. It is physically impossible for Germany to wage a war of conquest simultaneously in the West and in the East. War is possible only on the condition of an alliance either with the West against the USSR, or with the USSR against the West. Both options are acceptable if they lead to success.

Hitler considers options and speaks in favor of the first - an alliance with the West against the USSR - for purely practical reasons: ***"From a purely military point of view, the war between Germany and Russia against Western Europe (or rather, in this case against the rest of the world) would be real disaster for us. 'Cause the whole fight's played out not on Russian, but on German territory, and Germany could not even count on any significant support from Russia ... "2 .***

Russia, according to Hitler, is a weak, poorly armed ally. ***"Add to that the fact that between Germany and Russia is located Polish state, wholly in the hands of France. In the event of a war between Germany and Russia against Western Europe Russia before send at least one soldier on the German front, was supposed to to withstand a victorious struggle with Poland. In such a war, in general, it would not be so much a matter of soldiers as of technical equipment"3 .***

1 Ibid. S. 71.

2 Ibid. S. 64.

3 Ibid.

A military alliance with the USSR threatens Germany, according to Hitler, a repetition of the First World War. No less dangerous is an alliance with Russia that does not pursue immediate military goals:

*"The usual objection to this is that an alliance with Russia should not at all mean an immediate war, or that we can properly prepare ourselves in advance for such a war. No, it's not! An alliance that does not aim at war is meaningless*

*and useless. Alliances are created only for the purpose of fighting ... One of two things: either a German-Russian coalition would have remained only on paper, and thereby would have lost all value and significance for us; either such a union would cease to be just a piece of paper and be realized, and then the rest of the world will inevitably I would see this as a warning to myself. It is quite naive to think that England and France are in In this case, they would calmly wait, say, ten years, until the German-Russian alliance does everything necessary technical preparations for war. No, in that case the storm would break over Germany with incredible speed.*

And one more, minor, but important argument:

*"The modern rulers of Russia do not at all think of concluding an honest alliance with Germany, and more about its implementation, if they concluded it"<sup>2</sup>.*

Hitler concludes that the treaty with Russia is against West is senseless and dangerous, but "... really useful and opens up great prospects for us an alliance would be only an alliance with England and Italy.

Such an alliance of Germany is beneficial: *"I openly admit that already before the war I believed that Germany*

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid. P.66

3 Ibid. S. 71.

***would have acted much more correctly if, having abandoned the senseless colonial policy ki, from the creation of a navy and the strengthening of her world trade, she would enter into an alliance with England against Russia"***<sup>1</sup>.

So, attempts at conquest in the West are futile due to the lack of a strong ally, and the path to the East is open, since there is a potential strong ally in the West, and Russia is weak.

**Summary: "We want to stop the eternal German drive to the south and west of Europe and definitely point the finger in the direction of the territories located in the east. We finally break with colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and consciously move on to the policy of conquest new lands in Europe. When we talk about conquest new lands in Europe, we can of course have in mind, first of all, only Russia and those outlying states that are subject to it .**

If only the last phrase is taken into account, then yes, Soviet historians are right, Hitler himself predicted his attack on Russia. If you know the whole complex of Hitler's reasoning, then it turns out that he did not predict anything of the kind. In Mein Kampf he argued for the necessity of an alliance with the strong against the weak. The choice of an ally was determined not by political or national sympathies, but by him, an ally, military capabilities.

An attack on a strong Russia, not only without the support of the West, but also at war with it, from the point of view of Hitler during Mein Kampf, is madness. And history has confirmed the correctness of this assessment. Then what could make him take this step, except for despair?

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. S. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. S. 61.

It is worth bearing in mind that Hitler started the Second World War in full accordance with his reasoning of the times of "Mein Kampf" - he made an alliance with a strong side. Only the balance of power has changed. The Soviet Union turned from a weak country without a single truck of its own into a powerful military force, into a country with a poor and completely disenfranchised population, but armed to the teeth.

And the West showed no desire to support Germany in its aspiration to the East. An alliance with the West against Russia turned out to be impossible, but an alliance with Russia against the West became a seductive reality. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded in 1939, was a direct realization of Hitler's theoretical developments of fifteen years ago. It was an alliance that led to an immediate victorious war for the conquest of living space. Moreover, the issue with Poland was quickly resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.

The effect of this alliance was beyond anything Hitler could have dreamed of in 1924. In the summer of 1940, he was master of most of Europe. France has been defeated and captured, some of the European countries have been occupied, and some are reliable satellite allies. The living space for the development of its German nation - above the roof.

In the west - still resisting, but blocked  
bathroom and isolated from the continent of England.

And in the east - Stalin ...

Usually, when discussing the causes of the Second World War, everything revolves around Hitler's intentions. The intentions and policies of his partner Stalin remain in the background, as if the actions of the USSR were only a mechanical reaction to the actions and plans of Hitler. Hitler offered to conclude a pact - concluded. He proposed dividing Poland and the Baltic States - they divided it. So what is next?

Stalin had, however, his own view of the development of

being in Europe. Very similar to Hitler's. Only, unlike Hitler, Stalin did not publish his secret plans in millions of copies. He deceived Hitler, dragged him into the war in Europe, but made a serious political mistake that cost him the entire Red Army, which perished in the summer of 1941.

Having succeeded in concealing in the spring of 1941 the actual scale of Soviet military preparations, Stalin was unable to conceal in the summer and autumn of 1940 the scale and direction of his strategy. He frightened off Hitler and cited him for an attack.

...

It is believed that Germany attacked the USSR without declaring war. It is not true. At about three o'clock in the morning on June 22, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop summoned the Soviet ambassador Dekanozov to him and read out a note that was in fact a declaration of war. The next morning, the German ambassador von Schulenburg conveyed the same note to Molotov in Moscow. There was never a word about this document in Soviet historiography. Which looked strange. It would seem that aggression is aggression, and the fact of the official declaration of war an hour before the attack does not fundamentally

However, one has only to leaf through the text of the note, published in Berlin in 1941 in all European languages, including Russian, as it immediately becomes clear what is at stake. Under no circumstances should this document reach the Soviet reader. It openly spoke of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 and its consequences. The existence of this protocol, which referred to the division of spheres of influence between the USSR and Germany, was denied by the Soviet Union until 1989. Then they admitted it. But even after perestroika, up to the present time, the content of the "Note of the German Foreign Ministry Co.

to the Veteran Government" does not fit well into the official Russian historiography.

As a matter of fact, several documents were published together: "The Führer's Appeal to the German People" and "Note of the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government" with appendices, which included "Report of the German Foreign Ministry on Propaganda and Political Agitation of the Soviet Government" and " Report of the High Command of the German Army to the German Government on the Concentration of Soviet Troops against Germany. In the Proclamation, Hitler explained in a pathetic language understandable to the people what was officially stated in the note, and detailed information was collected in the appendices about the hostile activities of the USSR towards Germany and military incidents on the joint border. All further quotations are taken from this text, published in 1941.

The note is characteristic in that it is very reminiscent of the Soviet declarations after 22 June. Typical totalitarian propaganda. That is, everything that is said about the enemy's behavior is practically pure truth, and what is said about one's own plans and intentions is just as pure a lie. The note lists all Germany's claims against the USSR that accumulated between August 1939 and June 1941. The reason for the German attack on the USSR, according to the authors of the note, was the USSR's violation of the friendly pact with Germany. The essence of the pact was to delimit spheres of influence *"by banning Germany from any influence on Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia, while time as areas of the former Polish state up to the line Narew - Bug - San should have be annexed - at her request - to the Soviet Russia".*

Moscow was charged with "intensive demoralizing work in the regions occupied by Germany".



her ... as well as in Norway, Holland and Belgium "and espionage. At the same time, the repatriation of Germans to the territory of the Reich from the occupied regions of Poland and the Baltic states was used to force the repatriates to espionage. The Germans had enough proof that in Moscow they looked at Germany as "tomorrow's strong enemy." A document is cited that was found in the Soviet embassy when the Germans occupied Belgrade: *"The USSR will react only at the right moment. Axis powers*

*scattered their military forces even further, and therefore The USSR will suddenly attack Germany.*

An interesting detail. According to the note, at the conclusion of the 1939 pact, the Soviet government declared that it *"with the exception of the areas of the former Polish state that were in a state of decay, has no intention either to occupy the states that are in the sphere of its interests, or to Bolshevize or annex them"*. Therefore, the seizure of the Baltic countries and the war with Finland were regarded by Germany as violations of the agreements.

At the conclusion of the first treaty in August 1939, Lithuania remained with Germany, but then it ceded it to the USSR "reluctantly and for the sake of peace." But after June 15, 1940, the whole of Lithuania, including the piece that remained in the German sphere of influence, was invaded by the USSR without warning.

Soviet claims to Bessarabia and North Bukovina's guilt in 1940 also came as a surprise to the Germans, and they got only 24 hours to think about it. As the note says: *"Despite the fact that*

*Vietnam government during the Moscow negotiations declared that it, for its part, would never take the initiative to resolve the Bessarabian question, the German government on June 24 received from the Soviet government a message that it decided to solve the Bessarabian question by force. Simultaneously*

*It was specifically reported that Soviet demands also extended to Bukovina, i.e., to the region which belonged to the former Austrian Crown, never belonged to Russia, and about which At one time, Moscow was not even mentioned at all."*

Germany "for the sake of preserving peace and friendship" advised Romania to cede these territories to the USSR. *"These areas were also immediately annexed to the Soviet Union, underwent Bolshevization and were thereby virtually ruined. And further: "The occupation and Bolshevization of the entire sphere of interests, granted by the German government in Moscow to the Soviet Union, the Soviet government clearly and unequivocally acted in contradiction to*

*Moscow agreements.*

After the incident with the capture of Bessarabia and Sev. Bukovina, Germany no longer had any doubts that the USSR was pursuing a policy hostile to it. The authors of the note see a clear confirmation of this in the report of the Yugoslav military attache in Moscow dated December 17, 1940, found in Belgrade, which stated: *" According to According to statements from Soviet circles, the armament of the air fleet, tanks and artillery, based on the experience of this war, is in full swing and will be basically completed before August 1941. This, according to most likely, the deadline before which it is impossible expect major changes in the Soviet foreign policy*

*politics."*

To eliminate misunderstandings, Molotov arrived in Berlin in August 1940 and made new territorial demands, listed in the note:

*"1. The Soviet Union wishes to give Bulgaria guarantees and, moreover, to conclude with this state mutual assistance pact on the model of the pacts concluded in the Baltic regions, i.e. also with the formation military bases...*

*2. The Soviet Union demands an agreement*

***relations with Turkey in order to create bases for land and naval military forces of the USSR near the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term pact. In the event that Turkey had not declared its consent to this, Germany and Italy must join Soviet diplomatic efforts to carry out this requirement.***

vaniya...

***3. The Soviet Union again declares what it feels themselves under threat from Finland and therefore demands the full provision of Finland to him with side of Germany, which in reality would mean the occupation of this state and the death of the Finnish people.***

On all these points, "which was a prerequisite for the Soviet government to join the Three Powers Pact," Molotov was denied.

Further on, the note lists other examples of the hostile attitude of the USSR towards Germany in the political and military spheres - support for the putsch in Yugoslavia, inciting Turkey and Romania against Germany, and, finally, the concentration of "not less than 160 divisions" against Germany on the western borders (! - D.H.).

The note ends like this:

***"Contrary to all the obligations assumed and in In gross contradiction to its solemn declarations, the Soviet government took a stand against Germany.***

***It not only continued its attempts at disintegration directed against Germany and Europe, but also strengthened them with the beginning of the war; it is intensifying degree with hostility directed its policy against Germany and concentrated all its military forces at the German border with the readiness of a quick attacks.***

***Thus, the Soviet government changed its treaties and agreements with Germany and violated them ... Therefore, the Führer now gave the order to the German army to oppose this threat with all***

*the means at its disposal. The German people are aware that in the coming struggle they are not only defending their homeland, but that they are also called upon to save the entire cultural world from the mortal danger of Bolshevism and to pave the way for to a true social renaissance in Europe.*

Of course, the Fuhrer lies about his own goals, Hitler's rhetoric about saving the cultural world from Bolshevism was the same set-up as Stalin's corresponding declarations about saving the world from the fascist threat. Neither one nor the other world was going to be saved from themselves.

But Stalin's aims and policy are described quite correctly in this document. In the spring of 1941, Germany had to fear very seriously for its security. And it was by no means worth relying on Stalin's promises to honor the agreements with Hitler. With all Hitler's desire to sooner or later deal with the Soviet Union, the time for expanding the "German living space" to the East, if we assume that this is what he intended to do, was extremely poorly chosen. Europe is captured, but not pacified and not mastered. England is blocked on the island, but the prospects for victory over her are very problematic. But on the horizon is the very real prospect of war with America. And in the east hangs Stalin, frankly spitting on any agreements and concentrating an army of 5 million on the border in the last stage of readiness for an attack. Under these conditions, the outbreak of a war on two fronts was a desperate and, as experience has shown, a hopeless attempt by Hitler to

break the situation.

Actually, the violation by the Soviet Union of the blatantly criminal treaty with Germany of 1939 could only be welcomed if the goal was to prevent war in alliance with the West. Alas, Stalin's goals were diametrically opposed.

So, the attack of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941 was initially preventive in the strategic sense. It warned of an obvious and imminent attack by Stalin in the near and foreseeable future. But it became de facto preventive in a short-term, tactical sense, unexpectedly for the German leadership, which discovered only in hindsight what danger they managed to avoid at that moment. However, this luck did not help Germany ultimately win the war.

*Stalin's tactical mistake in timing attacks are historically surmountable, Hitler's strategic mistake in choosing an ally is fatal.*

*Valery Danilov*

## **STALIN'S STRATEGY FOR STARTING THE WAR: PLANS AND REALITY**

The political dispute about responsibility for the outbreak of the German-Soviet war flared up from its first hours. Both opposing sides gave their interpretations of what happened in government declarations on June 22, 1941.

From Berlin's statement:

“... Parts of the Russians are moving more and more towards borders of Germany, despite the fact that no military measures are being taken by the German side that could justify such actions by the Russians .

From Moscow's statement:

“... This unheard-of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the conditions of this pact in all good faith.

Despite the fact that this dispute, having moved from the realm of topical politics into the realm of ideology and partly science, has not subsided until now, it is obvious that the guilt of Germany as an aggressor cannot be called into question. Recall Hitler's credo, formulated by him back in the 1920s in the book "Mein Kampf": "If we talk today about new lands and territories in Europe, we turn our gaze primarily to Russia, as well as to its neighbors and for the countries dependent on it"<sup>3</sup>.

Since 1933, when the Nazis came to power, this seemingly delusional idea has become the cornerstone of German foreign policy. In the spring of 1940, at the direction of Hitler, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht began to develop a plan for a war against the USSR. On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved Directive No. 21 - the plan "Barbarossa."

Large-scale preparations for a war against the Soviet Union began. Initially, the readiness for an attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15, 1941. Later, this date was specified. The directive of the command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht dated June 10, 1941 said: "Day 'D' is proposed to be considered June 22 ... At 13.00 On June 21, the Dortmund signal will be transmitted to the troops. It means that the offensive, as planned, will begin on June 22 at 3:30 am: the start of the offensive of the ground forces and the flight of aircraft across the border"4.

It is not out of place to recall the morality of Hitler as a politician. Ten days before the attack on Poland, he declared to his generals: "I will give a propagandist reason for starting a war, no matter whether it is reliable or not. The winner is not then asked whether he told the truth or not. At the beginning and during the course of a war, it is not the law that matters, but the victory .

It was this scenario that Hitler used in his attack on the Soviet Union. These are well-known facts. But they concern only the plans and actions of the German leadership. At the same time, the following questions remain insufficiently clarified: how was the upcoming military clash with Germany seen from the Kremlin? How satisfactory is the traditional Soviet version of the motives for Stalin's behavior in the months, weeks and days before the war? How to explain the striking discrepancy between the many times proven fact of the long and versatile preparation of the USSR for a big war and crushing defeats?

by our troops during its first months? What kind of war did Stalin plan? The general answer to the last question, in my opinion, has already been given on the pages of the second issue of the journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya* for 1995. But it deals mainly with the ideology of a future war in its propagandistic reflection. An article by M.I. Meltyukhov is a successful attempt to critically comprehend the historiographical discussion related to the assessment of the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards Germany on the eve of the war. K  
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Unfortunately, the author did not use new archival documents on the topic of the article to substantiate his conclusions. The article also loses a lot from the fact that in his judgments the author does not use foreign historiography at all, which, as is known, has a rich experience of "critical reflection on one discussion"<sup>6</sup>.

Working in recent years with documents from the archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the personal archive of I.V. Stalin, as well as the Historical-archival and military-memorial center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, the author of this article had the opportunity to get acquainted with a fairly wide range of new materials related to the history of the eve and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Based on them, a number of publications were prepared in the domestic and foreign press<sup>7</sup>.

Now it is already possible to quite definitely talk about a set of documents and materials on the topic under discussion. First of all, these are "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies"<sup>8</sup> declassified in the spring of 1992 (the title is provisional, according to the inventory of the archive, hereinafter referred to as "Considerations"). They made it possible to breach the wall erected by the regime of secrecy in front of researchers



immediately attracted public attention. Unfortunately, many of the comments are not without significant shortcomings. So, Professor D.A. Volkogonov and writer V.V. Karpov practically limited himself to only an insignificant quotation from the document, without analyzing it and without expressing his attitude towards it. In the publications of the Military Historical Journal, in my opinion

It seems that a definite attempt has been made to find some correct directions for the analysis of the Considerations. However, the secrecy of the document, apparently, fettered the authors and did not allow them to make weighty scientific assessments of the events on the eve of the war. In particular, the document itself is presented with large denominations. The fact is that from the text of the "Considerations" were excluded information, which is very important for scientific analysis, about the composition and correlation of forces and means of the parties as a whole and on individual fronts, the possible direction of the main attack of the enemy, the likely allies of Germany, the availability of available reserves for the deployment and combat operations of troops, and others data.

Six other documents are mentioned in the Considerations (admission to them is still not allowed):

Plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war with Germany;

Plan of planned military actions in case of war with Germany;

Deployment scheme, map 1:1,000,000, 1 copy;

Cover deployment scheme, on 3 maps;

Scheme of the correlation of forces, in 1 copy;

Air force base in the West, 3 maps.

A number of directives (including handwritten ones) of the General Staff on the regrouping and strategic deployment of troops on operational, organizational and other issues have also been preserved.

To date, the main document that gives grounds to raise the question of us in a new way

opinions of the Soviet military-political leadership, are "Considerations". This document is addressed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Line up. It is a 15-page manuscript of standard typewriter paper, written in black ink by Major General A.M. Vasilevsky (since 1943 - Marshal of the Soviet Union), then the current deputy chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. The first page is on a letterhead with the corner stamp of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. It is marked on it: "... May 1941." (number not given). In the upper right corner of the neck: "Top secret. Particularly important. Only personally. Instance of unity.

There are clarifications and corrections in the text of the manuscript. decisions of an operational-strategic, statistical and editorial nature, introduced with a simple pencil by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. Information on the organizational composition and number of enemy troops and the Red Army is given as of May 15, 1941. The places for signatures of People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. Zhukov. However, they did not sign the document. The date of the document's development is not specified. Nevertheless, taking into account that: a) the "Considerations" reflect some of the provisions from the speech of I.V. Stalin on May 5 in front of graduates of military academies; b) Stalin was appointed Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on May 6; c) the data on the forces and means of the parties are given as of May 15 - it is likely that work on the doc

The nature of this document is extremely succinct and emphatically says the following policy statement from it: "Considering that Germany is currently keeping her army mobilized, with

deployed rear, it has the ability to warn us in the deployment and deliver a surprise strike. In order to prevent this and defeat the German army, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative of action to the German command to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the combat arms"9. Justifying the expediency of delivering a preemptive strike, the General Staff proceeded not only from a favorable military-political and military-strategic situation (Germany was bogged down in a war with England), but also favorable balance of power.

It was assumed that out of the 284 divisions she had, Germany concentrated 120 divisions on the borders of the USSR. In total, in the event of war, she could put up to 137 infantry, 19 tank, 15 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne divisions, that is, 180 divisions. The rest of the strength she needed keep in the center of the country, on the western borders, in Norway, Africa, Greece and Italy. All in all, according to the calculations of the General Staff, Germany, together with its allies, could deploy up to 240 divisions against the Soviet Union .

The ground forces of the Red Army consisted of 303 divisions, including 198 rifle, 61 tank, 31 mechanized, 13 cavalry and 74 artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command (RGK). Of these, the Northern, Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Fronts comprise 210 divisions, including 136 rifle, 44 tank, 23 mechanized, 7 cavalry and 53 artillery regiments of the RGK. At the same time, the reserve of the High Command behind the Southwestern and Western fronts included 27 rifle, 14 tank and 7 mechanized divisions. According to an updated calculation prepared

personally N.F. Vatutin on June 14, 1941, in the zone of the Southwestern Front (Kiev Special Military District - KOVO), i.e., where it was planned to deliver a preemptive strike, 58 divisions were concentrated (32 rifle, 16 tank, 8 mechanized, 2 cavalry) , as well as 5 anti-tank brigades and one airborne corps. In addition, since the beginning of hostilities, this front has received reinforcements - 45 rifle divisions (19 from Odessa, 5 from Moscow, 7 divisions each from the Oryol, Kharkov and Volga military districts). Thus, by the beginning of the war, the Southwestern Front could have a powerful shock fist consisting of 103 rifle, 16 tank, 8 mechanized and 2 cavalry divisions, as well as 5 anti-tank brigades and an airborne corps (excluding the reserve of the High Command)<sup>12</sup> . For comparison, we point out that other military districts had: Leningrad - 21, Baltic - 25, Western - 44 divisions. The Considerations emphasizes: "Thus, the Red Army will launch offensive operations from the front of Chizhev, Lutowisk with the forces of 152 divisions against 100 German divisions. Active defense is envisaged in the remaining sections of the state border"<sup>13</sup> .

The General Staff considered the main strategic goal to be the defeat of the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line, and to reach the front of Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The subsequent strategic goal was to defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and capture the territory of former Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task was to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and in the Krakow direction to reach the rivers Neman, Vistula and capture the area of Katowice. To achieve these goals, the General Staff proposed:

**“a) deliver the main blow by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from its allies;**

**b) deliver an auxiliary strike by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Sedlec, Demblin with the aim of pinning down the Warsaw grouping and capturing Warsaw, as well as assisting the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy's Lublin grouping;**

**c) to conduct an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary and Romania and be ready to strike against Romania if the situation is favorable”<sup>14</sup> .**

**The tasks for the fronts were also determined by the general strategic plan. Severny, Severo-Zapadny (except for its left wing) were to conduct active defensive operations. Set the Southwestern Front the task was:**

**“a) with a concentric strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, encircle and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the river. Vistula in the Lublin region;**

**b) simultaneously with a blow from the Senyawa, Przemyśl, Lutowski fronts, defeat the enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz directions and capture the area of Krakow, Katowice, Koltse, meaning to further advance from this area in a northern or northwestern direction to defeat large forces the northern wing of the enemy's front and the capture of the territory of former Poland and East Prussia;**

**c) firmly defend the border with Hungary and Romania and be ready to deliver concentric strikes against Romania from the Chernivtsi and Chisinau region with the immediate goal of defeating the northern wing of the Romanian army and reaching the line of the river. Moldova, Iasi”<sup>15</sup>.**

**These are the main provisions of the strategic plan proposed by the General Staff of the Red Army niya preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht.**

**Why did the General Staff choose the southwestern direction**

to deliver a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht? This was apparently due to the following considerations. Firstly, it created the possibility of cutting Germany off from her southern allies; third

them, to deprive the Wehrmacht of a very strategically advantageous springboard for an attack on the rich industrial and agricultural region of the Soviet Union - Ukraine.

In an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda, one of the leaders of the Russian General Staff, Colonel-General A.N. Glue Menov stated the following about the above document: "Apparently, this is one of the numerous draft working projects, of which many are developed in any operational body before a plan, directive or other document is born"<sup>16</sup>.

Lack of signatures of high officials or Stalin's notes on a document sometimes serve as a basis for questioning his value as a source that makes it possible to reconstruct the real plans of the Soviet military-political leadership on the eve of the war. Although this does not take into account the fact that, according to the conditions of the time, operational documents of this magnitude could have been developed exclusively with the knowledge of Stalin and on the basis of the military-strategic concepts expressed by him. In such a case, any initiative was excluded, because it could be regarded as a group action against the "party line", i.e. Stalin, with all the ensuing consequences. Marshal G.K. Zhukov said in this regard: "We must really imagine what it meant then to go against Stalin in assessing the general political situation. All of them still had recently past years in their memory; and declare aloud that Stalin is wrong, that he is mistaken, to put it simply,

could then mean that, before you even left the building, you would already go to drink coffee with Beria.

Naturally, everyone preferred to drink coffee in their office.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that Stalin often gave the "go-ahead" for holding this or that event, formally leaving no "traces" on the document presented to him. It is possible that this is exactly what happened with the "Considerations". The fact is that in the former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a written interview of Marshal A.M. was sent there for approval. Vasilevsky dated August 20, 1965, in which it was said that in the second half of May 1941 Vasilevsky personally brought documents to the Kremlin cops and materials on the planned preemptive strike. In Stalin's waiting room, he handed these documents over to G.K. Zhukov, who, together with S.K. Timoshenko reported them to Stalin<sup>18</sup>.

An analysis of the "Considerations" and other documents connected with the preparation of an attack on Germany leads to the conclusion that these were "active" documents. On their basis, large-scale events unfolded. And since the preparation for the proactive strike in a certain respect was nothing more than a redirection of the army from defense to step, then, firstly, it is impossible to present this matter in such a way that such preparations began from today to tomorrow. Rather the opposite. Measures for the preparation of the attack were carried out in a certain respect within the framework of previously carried out measures to strengthen the defense and specific defensive actions. Secondly, some of the measures taken by the beginning of the redirection of the army from defense to offensive were reflected primarily in the "Considerations". In order to ensure the implementation of the outlined plan, it was emphasized in them, it is necessary to carry out the following measures, without which, according to Gen.

headquarters, it was impossible to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air and on the ground. These Events:

1. Conduct covert mobilization of troops under the guise of reserve training camps. (In the spring of 1941, 793,000 people began to be called up to "pass through large training camps" - BUS. - V.D.)

2. Under the guise of an exit to the camps, to carry out a hidden concentration of troops closer to the western border, first of all, to concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the High Command. (From mid-May, four armies and a rifle corps began to move out of the internal districts to the line of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. In the border districts, formations were pulled up to a distance of 20-80 km from the state border. - V.D.)

3. Secretly concentrate aviation on field airfields from remote districts and immediately begin to deploy aviation rear services. (In mid-June, only from Transbaikalia and the Far East began the relocation of several air divisions to the European part of the country.)

The Considerations emphasized: "In order to protect ourselves from a possible enemy strike, to cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and to prepare them for going over to the offensive, it is necessary:

4. Organize a solid defense and cover of the state border, using for this all the troops of the border districts and almost all of the aviation designated for deployment in the West.

5. Develop a detailed plan for the country's air defense and bring air defense systems to full readiness.

On these issues, I have given orders, and the development of plans for the defense of the state border and air defense is completely completed by 01.06.41 .

In favor of the fact that these plans began to be carried out,



say the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, sent to the western border districts in May-June 1941. They gave the following instructions to the commanders of the districts: "In order to cover the mobilization and deployment of troops ... by May 30, 1941, personally to you with the chief of staff and the head of the operational department

- a) A detailed plan for the defense of the state border ...
- b) Detailed air defense plan...

6. The cover plan is put into effect upon receipt of an encrypted telegram for me, a member of the Main Military Council and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, with the following signature: "Proceed to implement the cover plan of 1941"20.

7. To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, all deep rifle divisions and command and control rifle corps with corps units should be brought to the camp in the areas provided for by the cover plan ...

8. Leave the border divisions in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be carried out by special order.

9. The withdrawal of these troops must be completed by July 1, 1941. "21

Since the second half of May, measures for regrouping and strategic deployment of troops have noticeably intensified.

On May 27, the western border districts received instructions to urgently build frontline field command posts. Since mid-June, the advance of troops to the western border has been even more accelerated. During June 14-19, the commanders of the western border districts received directives on the withdrawal of front-line departments from June 21 to 25 (created on the basis of headquarters and departments of military districts)

to field command posts. On June 19, an order was issued to camouflage airfields, military units, important military facilities, paint tanks and vehicles in camouflage, and disperse aviation.

So, feverish preparations began in the Red Army for a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht. And this is perhaps one of the most weighty arguments against the assertions of traditional historiography regarding the preparation of the country and the army to repel aggression. More precisely, there were attempts to carry out some measures to cover and provide for the upcoming offensive operations. Recently a hundred whether the results of a questionnaire survey conducted by the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff in the late 1940s and early 1950s were made public. In order to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western border districts according to the plan for covering the state border, the participants in the first battles were asked five questions. This is how they answered the first question—whether the plan for the defense of the state border was brought to the attention of the troops in the part that concerns them; when and what was done by the command and staff to ens

Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District):

“I was appointed commander in March 1941... Neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga at the PribOVO headquarters, I was informed of the existence of such a plan. In the documents of the army headquarters, which was located in the city of Jelgava, I also did not find any indications on this issue ... Only on May 28, 1941, I was summoned to the district headquarters, where the commander of the troops, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov hastily acquainted us with the defense plan... Approximately 1.5-2 hours after receiving the plan, before I had time to familiarize myself with it,

who received me in a darkened room and with an eye dictated the decision by sight.

Colonel General L.M. Sandalov (former chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District):

"In April 1941, the command of the 4th Army received a directive from the headquarters of the ZapOVO, according to which it was necessary to develop a plan to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment in the Brest direction  
leniya".

Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan (former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District):

"The plan for the defense of the state border was brought to the attention of the troops in the part that concerns them, as follows: the troops that directly carried out cover ... had detailed plans and before

documentation up to the regiment inclusive; the rest of the troops ... had a sealed envelope with a combat order and all orders for combat support of the assigned tasks stored in the safe of the corresponding chief of staff of the formation .

The above evidence supplements the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky. On the eve of the war he was the commander of the 9th mechanized corps (KOVO), he could not understand the meaning of the measures taken by the district command. According to the marshal, the field trip conducted on the eve of the war by the commander of the district did not make it possible to determine what she was persecuting. He wrote: "The orders to the troops about you that followed from the headquarters of the district

sending artillery to the artillery ranges located in the border zone, and other orders that were ridiculous in that situation caused complete bewilderment. <...> Judging by the concentration of our aviation on advanced air  
dromes and the location of warehouses of central importance in the front line, it was like preparing

jump forward, and the disposition of the troops and the activities carried out in the troops did not correspond to this. <...> In any case, if there was any plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had developed by the beginning of the war”<sup>23</sup>.

Perplexity K.K. Rokossovsky is quite understandable. After all, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General G.K. Zhukov, with a special directive, warned the commander of the Kyiv Special Military District that the measures being taken for preemptive strike preparations “no one but you, a member of the Military Council and the chief of staff of the district, should know”<sup>24</sup>.

Naturally, the question arises about the planned timing of a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht. Of course, statements about specific dates for the fall on Germany are untenable. Not in "August-September", and even more so "July 6"<sup>25</sup>. The Red Army, and indeed the General Staff itself, could not be prepared for such an action. But the decision to deliver a preemptive strike against Germany, in the presence of a favorable military-strategic situation in Europe for this, could have been taken by Stalin without taking into account the ability of the Red Army to take offensive actions. It remains to be assumed that the preemptive strike could have been delivered approximately after July 10, 1941, the date indicated in the directive of the General Staff, by which the deployment of troops in the western border districts was to be completed<sup>26</sup>.

Documents discovered in the caches of military archives You and materials imperiously dictate, as it seems to me, the need to clarify some conceptual provisions of the history of the threshold and initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Otherwise, our historiography, as the ancestors said, will have to be “against the prattles”. This problem, in my opinion, requires independent consideration.

Here I would like to pay attention only to some glaring contradictions in historiography, which in no way fit into the logical framework of the actual development of events on the eve and the beginning of the war.

Let us turn to the language of figures and facts, characterizing the beginning of the war.

By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions that took the first blow from the German military machine, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. Particularly severe losses were suffered by the troops of the Western Front. Of the total number of divisions destroyed on the Soviet-German front, 24 were part of this front. The remaining 20 divisions of this front also found themselves in a catastrophic situation. They lost in forces and means from 50 to 90%.

During the first three weeks of the war, the Red Army lost a huge amount of military equipment and weapons. In divisions alone (excluding reinforcements and combat support), losses amounted to about 6,500 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, more than 3,000 anti-tank defense guns, about 12,000 mortars, and about 6,000 tanks. During this time, the Air Force lost 3,468 aircraft, including a significant number of new designs. Already by noon on June 22, during the bombing of Soviet airfields, the Germans destroyed 1,200 aircraft, of which over 800 were on the ground. The losses of the Soviet Navy were: 1 leader, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats, a number of other ships and transports.

By the end of 1941, the Red Army had lost practically the entire first strategic echelon, the best trained cadre troops.

POW only

As it is now established, the losses during this time amounted to about 3.9 million people. By July 10, German troops advanced deep into Soviet territory: on

in the main, western direction - by 450-600 km with a rate of advance of 25-35 km per day, in the north-western direction - by 450-500 km with a rate of 25-30 km per day, in the south-western direction - by 300- 350 km at a rate of 16-20 km per day. For comparison

nia: the losses of the Wehrmacht during this period amounted to about 40% of the tanks of the original composition, of which 20% were combat losses; 900 aircraft; in the Baltic - 4 minelayers, 2 torpedo boats and 1 hunter. In Lich

The loss of the Wehrmacht, according to German data, amounted to about 100 thousand people killed, wounded and missing<sup>27</sup>. Such losses of the Germans, although they significantly exceeded their losses in previous battles in Western Europe, were in no way comparable with the losses of the Soviet troops.

In connection with all that has been said, there arises a legitimate pros: what is the reason for the tragedy on June 22? Among many factors, "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet military-political leadership are usually named. But on closer examination, some of them turn out to be not naive delusions at all, but the result of well-thought-out measures with the aim of

preparation of a preemptive strike and subsequent offensive operations against Germany. This strategic concept was the subject of the principle of operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon. In fact, the war had to be started under the conditions of a powerful unexpected blow from the enemy with unorganized defensive actions. In addition, by troops, almost everywhere taken by surprise.

Another fact. The General Staff, taking into account the main attack on the enemy in the southwestern direction, planned to concentrate here a grouping of troops, which was one and a half times larger than the grouping of enemy troops. Yes, and the tasks assigned to the front on

this direction, pursued offensive, not

defensive purposes. Consequently, not from the mythical expectations of the main attack of the enemy, but based on our calculations for success in the Ukrainian direction, the corresponding grouping of troops was concentrated here. The enemy, on the other hand, dealt the main blow in the western, Belorussian direction, where our General Staff intended to conduct mainly active defensive operations.

As already noted, the German plan of attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan, was not a secret for the General Staff of the Red Army. Ten days after the approval of this plan by Hitler, that is, on December 28, 1940, its main provisions were in the hands of Soviet military intelligence. And this means that the Soviet High Command had information regarding the German plans for delivering the main blow to the Soviet troops north of the Pripyat marshes, as well as about the offensive with especially strong tank wedges from the Warsaw region and north of it with the tasks of defeating the Russian forces in Belarus, etc. Why did the Soviet General Staff concentrate rather strong groupings of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov salients? You don't have to be a strategist to answer this question. Even a cursory glance at the configuration of the Soviet-German border (future front line) shows the possibility of using the Bialystok and Lvov salients to deliver promising concentric blows against the Germans here. The General Staff could not but use such a chance. But, as has been known since the Battle of Cannae (216 BC), an alluring ledge under certain conditions can turn into a devouring cauldron. It was in such boilers that the troops of the Red Army ended up. The triumph of the German command was at the same time the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of councils.

sky warriors.

In the military-historical literature, it is alleged that the General Staff allegedly made a major miscalculation, since

by sweeping the main stocks of materiel near the state border. As is known, from the first hours of the war they found themselves in the enemy's fire zone. After two weeks of the war, about 200 warehouses with fuel, ammunition and weapons were on the territory occupied by the Germans. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the retreating troops were forced to destroy a significant amount of materiel. Of the 700 wagons of ammunition that were in the artillery depots in Lvov, 160 were destroyed. During the first three weeks of the war, the Southwestern Front destroyed 1,933 wagons of ammunition and 38,047 tons of fuel<sup>28</sup>. It is regrettable to admit that the deployment of materiel near the border was not a simple miscalculation, but was dictated by the need to effectively support the advancing troops, more precisely, the planned offensive.

Based on the proposed offensive actions, the General Staff apparently believed that there was no need to create capital cable underground communication lines. Communication with the fronts was planned to be provided mainly through a nationwide network, the nodes and lines of which were concentrated in large cities. The operating communication centers were located in premises that were not protected from air attack. There were no spare communication centers and bypasses of large settlements. Air communication lines ran along railways and highways.

Such an organization of communications led to the fact that literally from the first minutes of the war, the connection of the General Staff with the fronts, and the fronts with subordinate troops shena.

The "offensive" strategy led to the fact that neither the General Staff nor the commands of the branches of the armed forces were prepared in advance command posts with the appropriate communication, control and life support systems. That's what had to